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Abstract
The thesis presents our research developments throughout the course of my Ph.D study.
My research focuses on two aspects. The first aspect is using data perturbation to achieve
data confidentiality. We identified and discussed value disclosure risk issues associated
with noise-multiplication masking scheme. The main achievement is that we developed
measures which could help a data provider with the process of noise generating variable
selection in practice, so that the data provider could produce noise-multiplied data with
a desired utility-risk tradeoff. We also studied how output perturbation can be used to
protect data privacy in a query system, especially the effect of a differencing attack. We
developed a perturbation algorithm which effectively protect against the differencing attack. The second research aspect is analysing probabilistically-linked data. Because data
linked by a computerised linkage algorithm contains linkage errors, various approaches
have been proposed in the literature for analysing linked data so that unbiased estimates
could be obtained. Our research is based on using linkage error model to correct the estimation bias. Our research achievement is that we developed a new linkage error model
which is more efficient than other models, and unbiased estimates could be obtained while
other models fail to do so.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Statistical agencies such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics collect a large number of
data from the public through different means such as sample surveys. To fulfill the role
of public services, a statistical agency may either disseminate the collected data to the
public for data analysis, or use the data itself to gain knowledge of the population for
public issues. When carrying out these two jobs, there are two practical issues faced by
the statistical agency. The first issue is data confidentiality. As is required by law in many
countries, the statistical agency needs to ensure that when releasing data to the public,
private information of data respondents such as personal incomes, are not revealed to the
public. The second issue is longitudinal data analysis. That is, the information of the same
data respondent may appear in different sample surveys. Consequently, the response variable and the explanatory variables of a regression model may appear in different datasets.
It makes data analysis difficult as the statistical agency cannot always match records in
different datasets perfectly. The thesis presents my developments on these two issues.
The following two sections introduce each issue separately, and outline my research area
on each topic.

1.1

Data confidentiality

Data can be released to the public either as microdata or as tabular summaries. Microdata contains information of data respondents across several attributes, such as personal
income. Identifiers associated with each record, such as the social security numbers, are
removed from the microdata in order to prevent direct identification of a record. Tabular
data contains aggregate information of several data respondents, such as the annual income of all businesses in an area. Releasing microdata provides data users with a wider
range of statistical analysis than tabular data but has higher disclosure risks than releasing
tabulated data because it contains detailed information of a data respondent. In practice,
the statistical agency may decide the type of data to be released to the public according to

1
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Table 1.1: Hypothetical microdata released by a statistical agency.

Record1
Record2
Record3
Record4
Record5
Record6

Age
58
55
31
32
29
25

Gender
M
M
F
F
M
M

Postcode
2224
2210
2001
2552
2313
2220

Marital Status
Divorced
Divorced
Married
Married
Single
Single

Income
40000
45000
48000
59000
35000
36000

the sensitivity of the data. For instance, the Australian Bureau of Statistics only release
tabulated business data to the public as business data are considered highly sensitive. On
the contrary, the U.S. Census Bureau releases household microdata containing household
incomes, property tax, etc to the public by means of microdata because household information is less sensitive.
Ideally statistical agency only releases data to legitimate data users for data analysis. A
legitimate data user is interested in knowing population information from released data.
However, a malicious data intruder is interested in knowing private information of data
respondents (such as a person or a business). Some measures have been adopted by statistical agencies, including the Office for the National Statistics in the United Kingdom to
only allow approved researchers to have access to sensitive data (Abrahams and Mahony
2008). However, it is often the case that both legitimate data users and malicious data
intruders have access to data released to the public by a statistical agency.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of risks: identity risk and attribute risk. Identity
risk is the risk that a record in microdata is correctly associated with the sampling unit in
the population by a data intruder. In terms of microdata, identity disclosure occurs if a
malicious data intruder correctly re-identifies a sampling unit in a microdata. For instance,
A quasi-identifier is an attribute which is not a unique identifier, but could be used in
combination with other quasi-identifiers to uniquely identify a record. A data intruder
might be able to learn the identity of a particular record using quasi-identifiers. Examples
of quasi-identifiers are age, sex and education status. To illustrate identity disclosure,
suppose a statistical agency releases a set of hypothetical microdata in Table 1.1. A data
intruder knows that his target sampling unit is in the microdata, and he knows that the
sampling unit has values (29, M, Single) across three attributes (Age, Gender, Marital
Status). Then the data intruder could link the sampling unit to Record 5 in Table 1.1. In
that case, Record 5 is re-identified. Sweeney (2000) showed that, 18% of the population
in the United States could be re-identified using a combination of three quasi-identifiers:
county, gender and date of birth.
Attribute risk is the risk that an attribute value of a sampling unit is disclosed by a data
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intruder. Attribute disclosure occurs if something new about about an attribute of a data
respondent is learnt by a data intruder. For the above example, the data intruder learns
the income value of his target sampling unit from the released microdata. As a result,
the attribute value of income for the sampling unit is disclosed. Attribute disclosure was
discussed in the U.S. Department of Commerce (1978). Identity disclosure and attribute
disclosure were discussed and compared in Skinner (1992).
Tables might be created for count data or magnitude data. For count data, each table
cell shows the number of observations which satisfy certain criteria. For instance, a table
cell might be the total number of sampling units which are male and less than 18 years old.
For magnitude data, each table cell provides the aggregate value of an attribute over all
sampling units contributing to the cell. For instance, a magnitude table cell might be the
total annual profit across several businesses in a particular area. For tabular data, identity
disclosure might occur if the number of contributor values to a table cell is small. For
instance, a table cell might be the total annual profit of all mining businesses in a remote
area. However there is only one mining business in that area. In that case the identity of
the contributor value to the cell is disclosed. Another example is that, suppose a cell of
business totals contains three contributors, and the cell value is 100,000. The data intruder
knows that the business value of the largest business in the sampling frame is over 80,000
and the business values of all the other businesses are below 20,000. In that case the data
intruder knows that the largest business is included in the cell.
Attribute disclosure might occur if a data intruder learns the value of a target unit using
an attacking strategy. For instance, suppose a data intruder wants to learn a confidential
value of a target business. Suppose the data intruder knew that there are two table cells of
business totals: Cell 1 and Cell 2. The contributor units for these two cells are the same
except that the target business is in Cell 1 but not in Cell 2. In this case, the data intruder
might infer the confidential value of the target business by using the value of Cell 1 minus
the value of Cell 2. For a table cell, a dominance rule might be used to evaluate attribute
risk for the table cell. For instance, in the Australian Bureau of Statistics, a dominance
rule finds cells where the cell value is dominated by a small number of data respondents.
If a cell fails this rule, then further investigation is needed to ensure that attributes of
predominant data respondents are not disclosed.
Data quality describes whether a set of data contains rich and accurate information.
Good data quality means that the data is representative of the real-world and it fits the
intended purpose of use. Data users could extract accurate population information from
high quality data and use statistical outputs for various purposes. Data utility describes the
amount of population information carried in a data release. A higher data utility means
a higher analytical validity, i.e. data users could extract more accurate population information from the data. Data sensitivity concerns with information of data respondents that
need to be protected against unauthorised disclosure. Sensitive data, such as an attribute
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Table 1.2: Hypothetical microdata released by a statistical agency.

Record1
Record2
Record3
Record4
Record5
Record6

Age
≥ 45
≥ 45
30 ≤ Age < 45
30 ≤ Age < 45
≤ 30
≤ 30

Gender
M
M
F
F
M
M

Postcode
*
*
*
*
*
*

Marital Status
Income
Divorced
≥ 40000
Divorced
≥ 40000
Married
≥ 40000
Married
≥ 40000
Single
30000<Income<40000
Single
30000<Income<40000

of a person, must be protected in a data release. When releasing data to the public, the
statistical agency needs to ensure that legitimate data users could obtain population information from released data, while sensitive information of survey respondents has low
disclosure risk. To achieve these two objectives, a common practice used by the statistical agency is to mask the data first, and then release masked data to the public. The
masked data normally has a lower level of disclosure risk at the expense of a higher data
utility loss. In other words, there is a disclosure-utility tradeoff in the masked data. Duncan (2002) discussed the tension between data utility and data sensitivity and technical
procedures for addressing the tension.
To mask a set of original data, the statistical agency might apply one or a combination
of the Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) methods. Different SDC methods achieve
the disclosure-utility tradeoff differently. Commonly used SDC methods for both microdata and tabular data include micro-aggregation, suppression, data perturbation, etc. For
microdata, additional SDC methods include synthetic data, data shuffling (Muralidhar
and Sarathy 2006), top and bottom coding, k-anonymity (Sweeney 2002), noise-addition
(Kim 1986) and noise-multiplication. Top and bottom coding has been studied in many
papers, e.g. Klein et al. (2014). More information on could be found in Willenborg
and de Waal (2001) and Hundepool et al. (2012). Each SDC method attempts to protect
sensitive data by either reducing identification risk (such as k-anonymity), or by reducing attribute risk (such as top and bottom coding), or both (such as noise-addition and
noise-multiplication). For instance, k-anonymity masks microdata in a way that, for each
record, there are at least k − 1 other records with the same combination of attributes value.
To achieve 2-anonymity for Table 1.1, the statistical agency could anonymise Table 1.1
to produce Table 1.2. In this case a date intruder with knowledge of a sampling unit (29,
M, Single) for attributes (Age, Gender, Marital Status) will only have 50% chance of
correctly link the sampling unit to the corresponding record.
For each set of original data, the statistical agency needs to determine an appropriate
SDC method to be used so that the masked data achieves desired disclosure-utility tradeoff. In order for statistical agencies to make correct decisions, the capability of each SDC
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method in terms of its disclosure risk control and utility preservation needs to be fully
understood.
Utility loss measures could help statistical agencies to evaluate the amount of information carried in the masked data. Utility loss measure is not unique, and there is no
universal measure for it. Different utility loss measures are proposed under specific contexts, see Shlomo (2010), Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001) and Agrawal and Aggarwal
(2001) for instance. In this thesis, as we consider different masking scenarios in each
chapter, we will introduce different utility loss measures for illustration purpose in each
chapter. We note that the main focus of the thesis is on the development of disclosure risk
control.
My research area is based on two aspects: the first aspect is on quantifying disclosure
risk associated with the noise-multiplication masking scheme for microdata. It involves
identification of potential disclosure risks associated with releasing noise-multiplied data
to the public, and development of disclosure risk measures which could be used by statistical agencies for decision-making when producing noise-multiplied data. Another aspect
is on developing output perturbation methods to protect contributor values of tabulated
business data. The following two subsections introduces the background of the two aspects in detail.

1.1.1

Noise multiplication masking method and disclosure risk

Multiplicative noise is a data perturbation method for numeric data. Using multiplicative
noise for data protection has been advocated by many researchers because of its appealing
features. Multiplicative noise provide uniform protection, in terms of the coefficient of
variation of the noises, to all sensitive observations (Nayak et al. 2011). Multiplicative
noise are also more suitable for economic modeling of income data in some situations
(Kim and Winkler 2003). The masking mechanism is easy to implement in practice and
a balanced utility-risk tradeoff is achieved by selecting an appropriate noise generating
variable, which is referred to as “tuning mechanism” in Klein et al. (2014). The masking
method has been used in practice by the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the
U.S. Bureau of Census (Kim and Jeong 2008).
The masking scheme protects the original data by perturbing each original observation
by multiplying it with a random noise term generated from a noise generating variable C.
The data provider releases the noise-multiplied data together with the density function,
fC , of the noise generating variable C to the public. Methodologies for analysing noisemultiplied data have been developed by taking into account the information of fC such that
population parameter estimates could be recovered from noise-multiplied data (Nayak et
al. 2011; Sinha et al. 2011; Lin and Wise 2012; Klein et al. 2014). We will review some
of the analysing methods in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

6

The noise multiplication masking method could significantly reduce identification rate
caused by record-linkage techniques if numeric attributes are involved in the linkage
process (Kim and Winkler 2003; Oganian and Karr 2011; Muralidhar and DomingoFerrer 2016). More on record linkage will be introduced later. However, the masking
method may not reduce identity disclosure risk caused by quasi-identifiers if they are
non-numeric. For instance, a data intruder might just use non-numeric quasi-identifiers,
such as (Gender, Marital Status, Education level, Postcode) to re-identify a record. It is
unlike k-anonymity, which could be applied to both numeric and categorical data to reduce re-identification risk caused by quasi-identifiers. To reduce re-identification risk, a
statistical agency might use a combination of multiplicative noise and k-anonymity. That
is, the statistical agency might choose to apply multiplicative noise on numeric attributes
and k-anonymity on categorical attributes.
In this thesis we focus on attribute disclosure. We assume that a numeric variable
in a microdata is considered sensitive. The numeric variable is positive, and protected
by multiplicative noise. The density function of noise generating variable is released
along with the microdata to the public. To learn the sensitive attribute value of a target
sampling unit, a data intruder might attempt to unmask a target value from its noisemultiplied counterpart. Attribute disclosure might occur if the intruder re-identified a
target sampling unit using non-numeric quasi-identifiers, and infers the target attribute
value from its noise-multiplied counterpart with high accuracy. To reduce attribute risk
in this case, we aim to perturb the attribute in a way that it is difficult for a data intruder
to infer a target value with high accuracy. For the data intruder, he might have no prior
knowledge about the unperturbed microdata at all, or he might have some knowledge
about the unperturbed microdata. We will consider different cases in each chapter.
To reduce attribute risk, two things need to be determined. The first is intrusion behaviours. That is, to infer the sensitive value of a target record which is protected by
multiplicative noise, a data intruder might attempt to develop reasonable attacking strategies to unmask the target value. The statistical agency might need to be aware of these
attacking strategies. The second is disclosure risk measure. That is, the statistical agency
needs a way to quantify attribute risk associated with each original value. However, as
noted in Nayak et al. (2011), evaluating attribute risk is difficult because different data
intruders may have different target values as well as different prior knowledge about the
original data. Based on the level of knowledge, the data intruder might use different attacking strategies to unmask a target value. To understand attribute risk of a data masking
mechanism, a common approach in the literature is to model intrusion behaviour. For
instance, certain intrusion behaviours have been developed for unmasking noise-added
data (Agrawal and Srikant 2000; Domingo-Ferrer et al. 2004; Liu et al. 2008). Correspondingly, appropriate actions could be made during data masking stages such that the
released masked data is protected against these behaviours.
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Under the context of multiplicative noise perturbation, some intrusion behaviours have
been modelled under specific contexts. For instance, Nayak et al. (2011) considered the
scenario that multiplicative noises are used to perturb contributor values of tabular data,
and modelled an intrusion behaviour for disclosing a target contributor value of a table
cell. In terms of using multiplicative noises to perturb microdata, Klein et al. (2014) considered the scenario where a response variable is sensitive and masked by multiplicative
noises while explanatory variables are unmasked and public.The data intruder targets the
value of the response variable using the knowledge of explanatory variables. The authors
showed that the data intruder may use the predicted value based on the generalised regression model to estimate a target value. Another intrusion behaviour is recognised in
Nayak et al. (2011) and Lin and Wise (2012), that the data provider may simply use the
noise-multiplied value as an estimate of an original value, provided that the mean of the
noise generating variable is 1. This is because in this case, the noise-multiplied value is in
fact an unbiased estimate of the original value. This fact is also recognised in Kim (2007)
and Kim and Jeong (2008) and these authors proposed several noise distributions in order
to reduce the disclosure risk. Corresponding disclosure risk measures against these intrusion behaviours were proposed in Klein et al. (2014) and Lin and Wise (2012) so that
data providers could control the disclosure risks by choosing a suitable noise generating
variable during data masking stage.
In this thesis, we study several attacking strategies that might be attempted by a data
intruder. Consequently, we propose solutions to reduce attribute risk against these attacking strategies. We identify three intrusion behaviours, under specific contexts, and we
propose disclosure risk measures or other disclosure avoidance methods which help statistical agencies to make appropriate decisions during the data masking stage, especially
the noise generating variable selection process. Our developments might help statistical
agencies to produce more secured noise-multiplied data in practice. We will present these
developments in Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6.

1.1.2

Protecting contributor values of business tabular data

Business data is difficult to mask because of its nature. Typically, some industries will be
dominated by large businesses whose information is difficult to conceal by existing data
masking methods. Non-perturbative data masking methods, such as top coding (Klein
et al. 2014), suppression (Salazar-González 2005) and micro-aggregation (Defays and
Nanopoulos 1993), significantly reduce information of continuous data items such as
turnover or profit, which are of key interest to data users. Perturbation methods, such
as data swapping (Moore 1996), synthetic data (Rubin 1993) and noise addition (Kim
and Winkler 1995), cannot efficiently protect businesses with distinct continuous-valued
characteristics. As a result, most statistical agencies have taken a cautious approach to

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

8

releasing business data, and the majority of business data is still released in the form of
broad-level tables.
The emergence of remote access facilitates but imposes a challenge of releasing business microdata. Remote access (Blakemore 2001; Reiter 2004) is a virtual system that
provides a data analyst with access to a remote system built by a statistical agency. The
statistical agency stores microdata in the remote system, and the data analyst communicates with the remote system through a query system. The analyst is restricted from
viewing the underlying microdata. Instead, the analyst could only obtain statistical outputs of underlying microdata through the following model (see O’Keefe and Chipperfield
2013; Chipperfield and O’Keefe 2014): (1) an analyst submits a query (i.e. request for a
table) to the remote system; (2) the remote system modifies or restricts estimates using an
automatic algorithm; (3) the system sends the modified output to the analyst. An example
of remote access system is American FactFinder (Hawala et al. 2004), which releases
perturbed tabulations of census data to data users.
In this thesis we consider algorithms for producing perturbed business totals via a remote system. We assume a remote system could allow users to specify and request tables
created from business microdata. This is considered in TableBuilder, a remote system
built by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (Chipperfield et al. 2018). Each cell of a table
contains a perturbed survey estimate of total computed from a set of surveyed business
values (such as annual revenue) specified by a data user. The set of surveyed business
values are called contributor values to a table cell.
The reason for a remote system to release perturbed statistics is to prevent disclosure
of confidential values via various methods of attack, the most significant of which is a
differencing attack (Lucero et al 2009, Sect. 4.1). A differencing attack reveals a confidential value by taking the difference of two cell totals whose contributing values differ
by one. A differencing attack could be very effective on a remote system as the attacker
is able to obtain statistical outputs of different underlying microdata with a high degree
of freedom. Therefore, a safe and effective automatic perturbation algorithm is needed to
produce perturbed cell totals against differencing attacks.
Perturbation of tabular data could perform either through input perturbation (Evens.
1996; Nayak et al. 2011), or through output perturbation (Dwork et al. 2006; Chipperfield et al. 2019). For input perturbation, a random noise with expectation 0 is added
to each original business value to produce a perturbed business value. As a result, a set
of perturbed business data is produced from the underlying business data. The perturbed
business data is stored in the remote system and all responses of queries are calculated
based on the perturbed data. For output perturbation, the response to a query is calculated
based on the underlying original data first. Then, a random noise with expectation 0 is
produced and added to the true response to produce a perturbed response. The advantages of using output perturbation for business totals in a remote system are outlined in
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Chipperfield et al. (2019): 1. because the estimates, not the underlying micro-data, are
modified, relationships in the micro-data are essentially retained; 2. the degree to which
an estimate is modified depends upon the output itself. For example, modification of an
estimate may be relatively high if a cell is dominated by a single business and relatively
low if a table cell has many small businesses of roughly equal size; 3. because an analyst is restricted from viewing the micro-data, less modification is needed than would
otherwise be the case; 4. it allows users to gain rapid access to estimates they request; 5.
the modification algorithm assures a specified level of protection is guaranteed if certain
restrictions on the remote system are imposed. We note that for Point 4, as soon as the
user submits a query, the remote system will generate a perturbation amount to be used
for output perturbation. This process will cause delay for users to gain outputs. We also
note that Point 5 requires certain restrictions to be imposed on a query system. There
are concerns with a remote system when it allows a infinite number of queries to be sent.
One example is the tracker problem. It is recognised by many researchers (e.g. Sarathy
and Muralidhar 2011). Roughly speaking, the tracker problem states that as the number
of queries goes large, the protection level offered by a query system to an original value
could go down dramatically. Another example is that a data intruder might refine his estimate of a target value by sending multiple identical queries. For instance, to learn the
value of x1 , the data intruder could send multiple queries for the total of (x1 , x2 , x3 ), and
then send multiple queries for the total of (x2 , x3 ). The intruder’s estimate of x1 is the average of the responses for x1 + x2 + x3 minus the average of the responses for x2 + x3 . As
the expectation of random perturbation to each table cell is 0, by increasing the number
of repeated queries, the data intruder is able to refine his estimate of x1 . For the repeated
query problem, the remote system used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics works in
a way that the same perturbation amount is always used to perturb identical queries. To
protect against the tracker problem, a statistical agency might need to add more and more
noise as the number of queries increases, or impose restrictions on the total number of
queries a data user could send. In the thesis we assume certain restrictions are imposed
on a remote system to address these problems.
Thompson et al. (2013) proposed an algorithm for perturbing cells of business totals.
The algorithm adds noise to a table cell according to the top few contributor values to the
cell. The algorithm ensures that, as the contribution of the top contributors gets larger, a
larger amount of perturbation is generated. Chipperfield et al. (2019) discussed this algorithm and showed that it effectively protects the top contributor values against various
attacking strategies. Another potential output perturbation algorithm, which adds Laplace
noises to table cells (Dwork et al. 2006), does not work well for business totals as doing
so might cause a large amount of information loss (see Sarathy and Muralidhar 2011 for
numerical examples). In Chapter 7 of the thesis, we review Thompson et al.’s perturbation algorithm, and we propose a new algorithm which could be more effective against
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differencing attacks for a large amount of table cells.

1.2

Analysing probabilistically-linked data

Statistical agencies often have access to administrative datasets about a set of individuals.
The aim of record linkage is to identify and consequently link records, across two (or
more) data sets, that contain the same set of individuals. Linking datasets allows more
statistical analysis to be performed because the linked dataset contains more analysis variables than in each individual dataset. Record-linkage is the procedure of finding records
belonging to the same entity (such as individual or business) across different data files.
Perfect linkage, i.e. records of the same entity will be linked, might be difficult to achieve
if unique identifiers such as social security number are not available.
A record pair consists of one record from each file. A record pair is said to be a match
if the records in the pair belong to the same entity. To find matches, Fellegi and Sunter
(1969) introduced a record linkage model for linking two data files when unique identifiers
are not available. The decision rule of the model is based on agreement/disagreement
across certain attributes which are common to both data files. These attributes are called
linking fields. Typical linking fields include date of birth, age, gender, etc. A record
pair does not need to agree exactly on a linking field in order for the record pair to be
an agreement on the linking field. A comparison function defines what constitutes an
agreement. A comparison function could require linking field values of two records to be
exactly the same in order for them to be an agreement on the linking field. Alternatively,
a comparison function might require the distance between two linking field values to be
less than a pre-specified amount in order to classify them as an agreement on the linking
field. Christen and Churches (2005) discussed different comparison functions.
The agreement pattern of a record pair is an indicator vector of {xl }kl=1 , where xl = 1
if the pair agrees on the l-th linking field and 0 otherwise, k is the total number of linking
fields. Under the Fellegi-Sunter record linkage model, an agreement pattern is a realisation from either one of two latent classes: Match Class or Unmatch Class. Each record
pair has a match weight. It is the log2 of the ratio of the probability of the agreement
pattern given that the record pair is a match and the probability of the agreement pattern
given that the record pair is not a match. More on the latent model will be described in
Chapter 8. A record pair is classified as a match if the match weight is over a threshold
value, and is classified as a non-match if the match weight is below a threshold value.
Chipperfield et al. (2018) described a probabilistic linkage algorithm. It is assumed that
each record on one file has at most one matching record on the other file. The probabilistic
linkage algorithm makes 1-1 assignment. That is, each record on one file could only be
linked to at most one record on the other file. A record pair is said to be a link if the pair is
linked by the probabilistic linkage algorithm. However, a link is not necessarily a match.
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There is a chance that a non-match record pair is linked. In other words, linkage errors
might be present in a linked dataset.
Analysing linked data with linkage errors will lead to biased inferences if linkage errors
are ignored. It is studies in many contexts, e.g. Scheuren and Winkler (1993). Adjustments need to be made to standard analysing procedure in order for unbiased inferences
to be made. Scheuren and Winkler (1993) showed that unbiased regression coefficients
estimates could be obtained if the probability for a given record pair to be a match is
known. Many models for estimating this probability have been proposed in the literature.
Following Chipperfield (2019), a model for estimating this probability is called a Match
Error Model (MEM). Lahiri and Larsen (hereafter referred to as LL) (2005) proposed an
MEM which estimates this probability by using the posterior probability for a record pair
to be a match given the observed agreement pattern. LL’s MEM is studied in Hof and
Zwinderman (2012).
Chambers (2009) considered the case where two data files are linked by the probabilistic linkage algorithm. The author considered the scenario that a “secondary file” is linked
to a “benchmark file”. The sampling units in the secondary file is a subset of the sampling
units in the benchmark file. The author showed that unbiased regression estimate could
be obtained if the probability for a sampling unit in the benchmark file to be linked to a
sampling unit in the secondary file could be calculated. Following Chipperfield (2019),
a model for estimating this probability is called a link Error Model (LEM). Chambers
(2009) proposed an Exchangeable Linkage Error (ELE) model for estimating this probability. Under the ELE model, all matching record pairs have the same probability of being
linked, and all non-matching record pairs have the same probability of being linked.
There are limitations with both LL’s MEM model and the ELE model. Chipperfield
and Chambers (2015) showed that estimates obtained using the MEM model can be biased. For the ELE model, our simulation showed that it will lead to biased regression
coefficients estimates in some cases.
In Chapter 8 we introduce a new LEM. The new LEM is constructed by conditioning
on the observed linking fields on the benchmark files. We will compare the new LEM
with the ELE model and LL’s MEM via simulation. We will show that the new LEM
outperforms both models.

1.3

Research achievement overview and thesis structure

There have been five papers came out of my research. The first paper is about a new algorithm for perturbing business data in a query system. The paper was presented in Privacy
in Statistical Databases (PSD) 2016 conference and was published in PSD2016 conference proceedings (Ma et al. 2016). The paper is an extension of a joint work between the
Australian Bureau of Statistics and us (Chipperfield et al. 2019). The content of our work
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is presented in Chapter 7. The second paper is the identification of “correlation-attack”
which could be used to attack noise-multiplied data. The paper has been accepted by
Sankhya B (Ma et al. 2019). The content of the paper is presented in Chapter 3. The
third paper regards value disclosure risk of noise-multiplied data should the knowledge of
the maximum or minimum of the original data be possessed by data intruders. The paper
had been submitted to Transactions on Data Privacy (TDP), and is now being revised and
will be send back to TDP for reconsideration of publication. The content of the paper is
presented in Chapter 6. The fourth paper is about quantification of the protection level
associated with a noise generating variable for noise-multiplication masking method. The
paper was accepted by PSD 2018 and was presented in the conference and published in
the conference proceedings (Ma et al. 2018). The content of the paper is presented in
Chapter 5. The fifth paper is about a linkage error model which corrects estimation bias
of probabilistically-linked data. This is a working paper. The main content of the paper
was presented in a workshop of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and is presented in
Chapter 8.
Here is the outline of the thesis: Chapter 2 overviews the noise multiplication masking
method, utility loss and disclosure risk measures; Chapter 3 introduces the correlationattack which could be used to attack noise-multiplied data; Chapter 4 investigates the performance of different noise variables against the correlation-attack through simulations;
Chapter 5 proposes a way for quantifying the protection level a noise generating variable
offers to the original data; Chapter 6 introduces another value disclosure risk associated
with releasing noise-multiplied data to the public by recognising that the knowledge of
the maximum or the minimum of the original data could be learnt by some data intruders;
Chapter 7 introduces a new output perturbation algorithm for tabulated business totals;
Chapter 8 introduces a new linkage error model for obtaining unbiased estimates from
probabilistically-linked data; Chapter 9 concludes the thesis.

Chapter 2
Noise multiplication masking scheme,
data utility loss and disclosure risk
measures overview
There are several ways for using multiplication noises to create a perturbed version of
the original data. For instance, Oganian and Karr (2011) considered using multiplicative
noises to perturb the original data first, and then apply a linear transformation on the
noise-multiplied data to create a final set of perturbed data. The final perturbed data could
be regarded as a synthetic version of the original data. In the final perturbed data, the
first two moments properties of the original data are preserved, which means that data
users could obtain this information by applying standard data analysis on the perturbed
data. Another method is called Matrix Multiplicative Data Perturbation (MMDP) (Liu
et al. 2008). MMDP uses an orthogonal matrix to be multiplied with the original data
matrix to create a perturbed data matrix. The perturbed data matrix preserves Euclidean
distances for any two data columns. As a result, data users could apply data mining
algorithms to the perturbed data matrix to obtain results similar to the ones obtained from
the original data matrix. The multiplication masking method we consider in the thesis
follows Kim and Winkler (2003), Nayak et al. (2011), Lin and Wise (2012) and references
therein. The features of our noise-multiplication masking method are: 1. Independent
noises are generated from an underlying noise generating variable, and are multiplied by
each original observation to create noise-multiplied data; 2. The data provider releases
the noise-multiplied data together with the partial or full information about the masking
procedure to the public, such as the density function of the noise generating variable;
3. Data users use analysing methods which are developed for analysing noise-multiplied
data exclusively, so that statistical estimates of the population could be recovered from
the noise-multiplied data.
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2.1

Noise-multiplication masking scheme overview

In the following we describe the mathematical setup of the noise multiplication masking method and review methodologies for obtaining statistical inferences from noisemultiplied data. These inferential methods are important for defining utility loss measures we adopt in this thesis. We base our discussion on one-dimensional data. For a set
of univariate original data, the noise multiplication masking method works as follows:
Suppose a set of original data y = {yi }ni=1 are independent realizations from Y . To mask
y, the data provider chooses a noise generating variable C with E(C) = 1. Y and C
are independent. A set of noise terms c = {ci }ni=1 are independently drawn from C and
multiplied with y to produce the noise-multiplied data y∗ = {y∗i }ni=1 = {yi ci }ni=1 . {y∗i }ni=1
could be treated as independent realizations from Y ∗ , where Y ∗ = YC. The data provider
releases y∗ together with other information of C (such as variance σC2 or density function
fC ) to the public. We assume both Y and C are positive and continuous throughout the
thesis.
We note that it is possible for multiplicative noises to be only applied to sensitive values
of an attribute, leaving the non-sensitive values unchanged. For instance, Klein et al.
(2014) considered the case where only extreme values are masked using multiplicative
noises. The results we derived in this thesis could also be applied to these cases.
In the following, we review methods for analysing noise-multiplied data assuming that
all original values are perturbed by multiplicative noises. We consider two scenarios:
in the first scenario, the data provider releases y∗ and σC2 to the public. This setting is
considered in Kim and Winkler (2003) and Lin and Wise (2012); in the second scenario,
the data provider releases y∗ and fC to the public. This scenario is considered more
generally because releasing fC allows data users to recover more statistical information
from the noise-multiplied data.

2.1.1

Case 1: σC2 is public

If σC2 is pubic, Nayak et al. (2011) showed that the first two moments of Y could be
unbiasedly recovered from Y ∗ . That is
E(Y ) = E(Y ∗ )
and

E[(Y ∗ )2 ] E[(Y ∗ )2 ]
E(Y ) =
= 2
.
E(C2 )
(σC + 1)
2
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Denote E(Y ) = µY and Var(Y ) = σY2 . The authors also showed that, µY and σY2 could be
unbiasedly estimated by µ̂Y and σ̂Y2 using y∗ , where
∑ni=1 y∗i
n

(2.1)

n
n + σC2 n ∗ 2
1
)
(y
)
−
(
[(
∑ i
∑ y∗i )2].
n(n − 1) 1 + σC2 i=1
i=1

(2.2)

µ̂Y =
and
σ̂Y2 =

In summary, when σC2 is public, data users could unbiasedly recover estimates of the first
two moments and variance of Y . However, it is not true for other information of Y , such
as quantiles and higher order moments as estimating this information requires fC to be
public (Nayak et al. 2011; Sinha et al. 2011; Lin 2014).

2.1.2

Case 2: fC is public

When fC is public, data users could obtain unbiased higher order moments estimates of
Y , and quantile estimates of Y in addition to those introduced before. Moreover, releasing
fC allows estimates of the density function of Y using reconstruction algorithms.
Moments estimation: Nayak et al. (2011) showed that all higher order moments of
Y could be unbiasedly obtained from the noise-multiplied data. Specifically, since the
original moments E[Y j ] = E[Y ∗ j ]/E[C j ], where j is a positive integer. Therefore, for
large-sized noise-multiplied data, data users could estimate any finite j-th moment of Y
j

using

∑ni=1 y∗ i
nE[C j ]

, where E[C j ] is obtained directly from the density function of C and

j

∑ni=1 y∗ i
n

is the sample estimate of E[Y ∗ j ].
Quantile estimation: Sinha et al. (2011) proposed a Bayesian approach to estimate
quantiles of Y from the noise multiplied data y∗ . Specifically, the conditional posterior
distribution of Yi |y∗i has the following form:
Yi |y∗i ∼

y∗
1
fC ( i )π(yi )
yi
yi

(2.3)

where π(yi ) is the prior of Yi . Denote the posterior random vector as {Yi |y∗i }ni=1 , the
data intruder could then draw N replicates of samples from {Yi |y∗i }ni=1 . Denote the jth replicate as (ŷ1 j , ŷ2 j , · · · , ŷn j ), where ŷi j is a realization from Yi |y∗i for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Denote further that the ordered j-th replicate as (ŷ[1] j , ŷ[2] j , · · · , ŷ[n] j ), where ŷ[i] j is the i-th
order statistic in the j-th replicate. The authors suggest using the N replicates to estimate
order statistics for the original sample. For instance, to estimate y[1] , the smallest order
statistic in y, the data intruder could use N the replicates of {ŷ[1] j }Nj=1 , and use their mean
and standard deviation to construct a point estimate as well as a confidence interval.
Density reconstruction algorithm: Using reconstruction algorithms allows data users
to obtain density approximations of Y from perturbed data (noise-added data, noise-
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multiplied data). Under our context of multiplicative noise perturbation, Lin (2014) proposed a sample-moment-density reconstruction algorithm. The author showed that, the
original density fY could be expressed as fY (y) = ∑∞
k=1 λk Pk (y), where λk is a function of
all moments up to the k-th moment of Y , and Pk (y) is a Legendre polynomial of degree k
in y. Consequently, the density function fY could be estimated by fY,K (y) = ∑K
k=0 λk Pk (y),
where K is the order of the moments of Y that are used to approximate fY .
As data users only observe y∗ and fC , the information of the moments of Y have to be
approximated by y∗ and fC . This could be done using the moments estimation method
we introduced before. As a result, the original density fY (y) could be estimated by
(y∗i )k
fY,K|y∗ ,C (y) = ∑K
k=0 ak (y) nE(Ck ) , where ak (y) is a continuous function of y and order k.
Lin (2014) showed that the density approximation fY,K|y∗ ,C (y) uniformly converges almost surely to the true underlying density function of the original variable fY (y). Lin and
Fielding (2015) developed an R-package MaskDensity14 for data users to implement the
density reconstruction algorithm on noise-multiplied data in R. We will use MaskDensity14 to estimate the density of Y for all our simulations in the thesis. Quantile estimates
of Y could also be obtained if fY could be estimated by fY,K . In that case, data users
could estimate quantiles of Y based on fY,K . The advantage of estimating quantiles in
this way over Sinha et al’s method is that it requires no prior knowledge about the original data. Numerical examples in Lin (2014) and Lin and Fielding (2015) showed that
accurate quantile estimates could be obtained in this way. Also see Lin (2018) for more
information.
MaskDensity14: We use Lin’s density reconstruction R-program for two purposes in
the thesis: 1. From the data provider’s perspective, we use the density reconstruction algorithm to evaluate the overall data utility loss for noise-multiplication masking scheme.
The overall data utility loss will be introduced in Chapter 5; 2. From data intruder’s perspective, we investigate how density reconstruction could be used to estimate the bounds
of y.
The inputs for MaskDensity14 in R are: 1. the noise multiplied data y∗ . 2. a large
noise file which contains random noise drawn from C. For large enough noise files it is
almost equivalent to releasing fC to the public. 3. parameters a and b, where a is the
lower bound of the density function Y , b is the upper bound of the density function of
Y . Lin and Fielding (2015) suggested that the noise.bin file should be consisted of the
noise terms which were used to mask the original data. In order for the noise file to be
large enough (say 100,000), each noise term might be replicated a random number of
times. All the noise terms along with their identical copies are stored in the file The noise
terms and parameters a and b are concealed in a ‘noise.bin’ file which is only readable by
MaskDensity14. Even though the underlying density function of Y might be unbounded,
Lin (2014) showed that if the sample size is large, a very good approximation of fY could
be achieved if a is chosen to be the minimum of the original data, and b is chosen to be the
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Figure 2.1: The Figure shows the density estimate KY (black line), density estimate fˆY ∗
(blue crosses), and density estimate fˆY (red circles). Comparing KY and fˆY ∗ , we see that
the distribution of Y ∗ is very different from the distribution of Y . However, the density
estimate fˆY reconstructed by using Maskdensity14 is close to KY .

maximum of the original data. Lin and Fielding (2015) showed through empirical study
that the program performs better if a is slightly lower than the minimum of the original
data, and b is slightly larger than the maximum of the original data. The noise.bin file is
supplied by the data provider. The R-package has been improved recently, see Lin and
Krivitsky (2018) and Lin et al. (2018).
To illustrate the program, suppose we have a set of original data {yi }1000
i=1 independently
drawn from Y ∼ U[100, 500]. We use a set of noise terms {ci }1000
i=1 independently drawn
from C ∼ U[0.5, 1.5] to mask the original data. The noise-multiplied data is denoted as
{y∗i }1000
i=1 . fY is bounded between 100 and 500, so we let a = 100 and b = 500. The
noise file contains 100,000 noise terms made from {ci }1000
i=1 . As a result, the noise.bin file
contains 100,000 noise terms as well as a and b. We obtain three density estimates. The
first density estimate KY is the density estimate of Y using kernel density approximation
using the original data; the second density estimate fˆY ∗ is the kernel density estimate of
the noise-multiplied variable Y ∗ using the noise multiplied data; the third density estimate
fˆY is the density estimate of Y using the Maskdensity14. The three density plots are given
in Figure 2.1.

2.2

Utility loss and disclosure risk measures overview

For perturbed microdata, it suffers from both identification disclosure risk and attribute
risk. The study of identification disclosure for perturbed microdata mainly focus on how
the matching rate would be if record-linkage algorithm is used to link the records in the
original microdata with the records in the perturbed microdata. It is normally assumed
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that a data intruder has the true knowledge of some records of the original data from other
public sources (Kim and Winkler 2003; Duncan et al. 2004). Identification occurs if the
data intruder correctly matches an original record with a perturbed record using certain
unmasked linking fields. Studies on how data perturbation reduces identification rate
could be found in Kim and Winkler (1995, 2003); Oganian and Karr (2011); Muralidhar
and Domingo-Ferrer (2016). Should identification of a record occur, the only protection
to the original value is the infused noise. Predictive disclosure, or value disclosure risk,
is the risk that a masked value of a sampling unit might be reasonably inferred by a data
intruder using released data. A low value disclosure risk means that, even if a record
is being identified by a data intruder, the private information associated with the record
could not be confidently learned by the data intruder. Discussions on value disclosure risk
can be found in Nayak et al. (2011), Lin and Wise (2012), Klein et al. (2014) and Ma et
al. (2018).
In this thesis we mainly focus on value disclosure risk. For a masking mechanism, we
aim to find ways to reduce value disclosure risk for each record. In various discussions
in the literature, value disclosure occurs if a data intruder’s estimate of a target value is
close to the true value (see Duncan et al. (2004), Sarathy and Muralidhar (2011), Liu et al.
(2008) and references therein). For continuous data, which is the focus of our research, it
is tough to guess the exact value of the original datum, and it is not necessary to achieve
it. Using an Acceptance Rule to decide if an estimate ỹi can be accepted as a correct
guessing of the original value yi is sufficient. A formal definition of value disclosure is
introduced in Lin and Wise (2012), which states the following:
Suppose a data intruder uses ỹi as an estimate of the original value yi . The expression
of ỹi is determined by his own attacking strategy . To classify the ỹi as a valid estimate
of yi , it is sufficient for ỹi to be reasonably close to yi . Disclosure of yi occurs if ỹi
i
satisfies | ỹi −y
yi | ≤ δ , where δ is the acceptance rule and is a small positive number. For
instance, for a positive observation yi , if we set δ = 0.05, we say that ỹi discloses yi if
0.95yi ≤ ỹi ≤ 1.05yi . The value of δ is determined by the data provider according to the
requirement of disclosure risk control.
Using acceptance rule to define value disclosure is adopted by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics for tabulated business data (Chipperfield et al. 2018). Based on this definition,
Lin and Wise (2012), Klein et al. (2014) and Chipperfield et al. (2018) considered a
probabilistic value disclosure risk measure for evaluating the disclosure risk of yi against
an attacking estimator Ỹi . That is:
R(Ỹi , δ |Yi = yi ) = P(

|Ỹi −Yi |
< δ |Yi = yi ),
Yi

where Ỹi is an attacking estimator which could be used by a data intruder to attack the
value of yi . This disclosure risk measure is to be used by a statistical agency for assessing
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the value disclosure risk associated with each original value yi . Other ways for quantifying value disclosure risks include using confidence intervals (Agrawal and Srikant 2000;
Nayak et al. 2011) and using the mean squared errors (Duncan et al. 2004) for the same
purpose. In the thesis, we adopt the probabilistic value disclosure risk for quality control
of a masking mechanism.
In the following we review data utility loss measures. Data users could only obtain
perturbed estimates from masked data. The perturbed estimates are normally less accurate than the ones data users would obtain by analysing the original data (or unperturbed
estimate). Data utility loss measures such loss of accuracy for a population parameter due
to data masking. An overall data utility loss is an aggregate measure of the utility losses
across several parameters of the population.
There is no unique way to measure overall data utility loss. In the literature, the way of
measuring overall data utility loss varies according to different data masking scenarios as
well as which parameters estimates could be recovered from masked data. For instance,
Yancey et al. (2002) proposed to use the average of relative distances between perturbed
estimates and unperturbed estimates across several parameters as an overall data utility
loss measure under the context of additive-noise perturbation. Those parameters include
population means, covariances and correlations, as those parameter estimates could be
accurately recovered from noise-added microdata. Other overall utility loss measures
are available, see Shlomo (2010), Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001) and Agrawal and
Aggarwal (2001). We note that in different masking scenarios, the definitions of overall
data utility loss could be different because different masking scenarios preserve different
pieces of information of the population. In the thesis, the discussion on data utility loss is
for illustration purposes only in order to achieve a balanced discussion. Therefore, we will
define different utility loss measures in each chapter in order to facilitate our discussion.

Chapter 3
Correlation-Attacks on Continuous
Microdata
For univariate noise-multiplied data, Nayak et al. (2011) and Lin and Wise (2012) showed
that the data provider may simply use the noise-multiplied value as an estimate of an
original value because the noise-multiplied variable is in fact an unbiased estimator of the
original value. This fact is also recognised in Kim (2007) and Kim and Jeong (2008) and
the authors proposed several noise distributions so that the corresponding value disclosure risk could be controlled. This chapter introduces an intrusion behaviour for attacking noise-multiplied data. The intrusion behaviour only uses information of the noisemultiplied data and σC . Because of its simplicity, the attacking strategy could always be
used as an attempt to unveil a noise-multiplied value. The attacking strategy exploits the
correlation between the original data and the noise-multiplied data, therefore we name it
as “correlation-attack”. The intuition behind the correlation-attack is that if the correlation between the original data and the noise-multiplied data is high, then a simple linear
regression model might be adequate to explain the relationship between the two sets of
data. The correlation between the original data and the noise-multiplied data could be reasonably estimated by a data intruder, as we show later. On the basis of the mean squared
errors (MSEs), both the unbiased estimator and the correlation-attack estimator tend to
be more accurate as the correlation gets larger. Therefore, a high correlation value might
motivate a data intruder to use either the unbiased estimate or the correlation-attack estimate to disclose a target value. Correspondingly, we propose a disclosure risk measure
to be used by data providers, so that for each original value, the disclosure risks from
both estimators could be simultaneously evaluated. The disclosure risk measure could
help data providers with noise generating variable selection during data masking stage.
We note that other regression models might also be considered to explain the relationship
between the original data and the noise-multiplied data, but we do not consider them in
this chapter.
The idea of using regression models to attack private values has also been consid20
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ered for k-anonymized data. Li and Sarkar (2011) considered the possibility of using a
regression tree to attack a protected value of a target record. By treating the target perturbed attribute as a response variable and other perturbed attributes as explanatory variables, the authors showed that it is possible to reveal the private information of a target
record. The authors referred to this attack as “regression-attack”. The regression-attack
is similar to the idea of using the predicted value based on a generalised linear regression
model to attack a noise-multiplied value proposed in Klein et al. (2014). We feel that
the major difference between the regression-attack and our correlation-attack is that the
correlation-attack only uses information of a noise-multiplied attribute itself to attack a
noise-multiplied value in the attribute. We note that when several attributes in a microdata
are protected by multiplicative noises, the idea of the regression-attack might be used to
attack a particular noise-multiplied value. In that case, the regressors of an attacking regression model are some or all attributes (either noise-multiplied or not) in the microdata.
This idea could be explored in the future.
We assume all original data and noise candidates are positive and continuous, and all
noise candidates have expectation 1. The sample size of the original data is large enough
so that estimates of population parameters, such as population variance, could be accurately recovered from the noise-multiplied data. We assume the following simple scenario: the data provider releases the noise-multiplied data together with the variance of
the noise generating variable used to perturb a set of original data to the public (same
as the assumption in Section 2.1.1), so that data users could unbiasedly recover the first
two moments estimates of the population (i.e. population mean and variance) from the
noise-multiplied data. We note that assuming preservation of the first two moments estimates only is consistent with many other masking schemes in the literature (Brand 2002;
Yancey et al. 2002; Kim and Winkler 2003; Oganian and Karr 2011). For instance, the
data perturbation method proposed in Oganian and Karr (2011) only allows data users to
obtain unbiased estimates of population means and covariance matrix from perturbed microdata. The assumption simplifies discussion of this chapter especially when we define
overall data utility loss. The correlation-attack proposed in this chapter could also be used
under Case 2 scenario specified in Section 2.1.2.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 introduces the correlation-attack strategy. Section 3.2 discusses the correlation-attack estimator and the unbiased estimator.
Section 3.3 proposes a disclosure risk measure which could be used by data providers for
noise generating variable selection and introduces the definition of overall data utility loss
we adopt in this paper. Section 3.4 presents two simulation studies. Section 3.5 concludes
the chapter.
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The correlation-attack strategy

In this section we introduce the correlation-attack strategy which could be used by a data
intruder to obtain an estimate of an unobservable original value yi . The correlation-attack
follows from the idea that, if the sample correlation between y∗ and y is high, then a
simple linear regression model may adequately explain the relationship between y and y∗ .
Consequently, the data intruder could use the predicted value based on the simple linear
regression model to estimate a target original value yi from y∗i .
From the data intruder’s perspective, the original data y is unobservable. Therefore, the
sample correlation between y and y∗ , denoted as ryy∗ , cannot be known. However, when
the sample size n is large, ryy∗ is close to ρYY ∗ , where ρYY ∗ is the population correlation
coefficient between Y and Y ∗ . It can be shown that ρYY ∗ takes the following form:
Cov(Y ∗ ,Y )

s

E(CY 2 ) − E(CY )E(Y )
=
ρYY ∗ = p
Var(CY )
Var(Y ∗ )Var(Y )
s
E(Y 2 ) − E(Y )2
=
E(C2Y 2 ) − E(C)2 E(Y )2
s
σY2
=
E(C2 )E(Y 2 ) − E(Y )2
s
σY2
=
(σC2 + 1)(σY2 + µY2 ) − µY2
s
σY2
=
σY2 (σC2 + 1) + µY2 σC2

(3.1)

In the above expression, µY and σY2 are unknown. However, the data intruder could
unbiasedly estimate these two terms from y∗ by µ̂Y and σ̂Y2 using Equation (2.1) and (2.2).
Therefore, ρYY ∗ could be approximated by r̃yy∗ , where
s
r̃

yy∗

=

σ̂Y2
.
σ̂Y2 (σC2 + 1) + µ̂Y2 σC2

(3.2)

As a result, if the sample size n is large, then r̃yy∗ could be used to approximate the
sample correlation ryy∗ . If r̃yy∗ is large, then it might motivate the data intruder to fit a
simple linear regression model between y and y∗ , and to use the predicted value based on
the linear model to attack the unobservable yi . The predicted value of yi based on y∗i has
the following expression:
ŷi = α̂ + β̂ y∗i ,
where α̂ and β̂ are least squares estimates of the intercept and slope terms. The estimates
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sy
sy∗

and
α̂ = ȳ − β̂ y∗ ,
where s2y and s2y∗ are sample variances of y and y∗ , respectively; ȳ and y∗ are sample means
of y and y∗ , respectively.
For the data intruder, ȳ, sy and ryy∗ cannot be known directly as y is not available.
Therefore α̂ and β̂ cannot be obtained directly. However, when the sample size n is large,
ȳ is close to µY , sy is close to σY , and ryy∗ is close to ρYY ∗ . The values (µY , σY , ρYY ∗ )
could be approximated from y∗ by (µ̂Y , σ̂Y , r̃yy∗ ) using Equation (2.1), (2.2) and (3.2).
Therefore, the unknown quantities ȳ, sy and ryy∗ could be approximated by µ̂Y , σ̂Y and
r̃yy∗ respectively. As a result, the least squares estimates α̂ and β̂ could be approximated
by α̃ and β̃ , where
σ̂Y
β̃ = r̃yy∗
sy∗
and
α̃ = (1 − r̃yy∗

σ̂Y ∗
)y .
sy∗

Therefore, the correlation-attack estimate ỹi which could be obtained by the data intruder
to attack yi takes the following form:
ỹi = α̃ + β̃ y∗i = (1 − r̃yy∗

3.2

σ̂Y ∗
σ̂Y
)y + r̃yy∗ y∗i .
sy∗
sy∗

Discussion on Ỹi and Yi∗

In this section we discuss the correlation-attack estimator Ỹi and the unbiased estimator
Yi∗ for estimating a target value yi . We discuss the two estimators together because both
ỹi and y∗i could easily be obtained by a data intruder to attack yi given basic knowledge
of y∗ and σC2 . Because of the generality, we propose that the disclosure risks from both
estimators should always be evaluated and controlled for most noise-multiplied data. We
base our discussion on the mean squared errors (MSEs) of these estimators.
From the last section, we introduced the correlation-attack estimate ỹi . We denote the
correlation-attack estimator as Ỹi . The exact expression for Ỹi cannot be easily found
without making a large sample assumption. By noting that when sample size is large,
2 , and y∗ is close to µ . Then, Ỹ is approximated to be
r̃yy∗ sσ̂Y∗ is close to ρYY ∗ σσY∗ = ρYY
∗
Y
i
y
Y
the following
2
2
∗
Ỹi ≈ (1 − ρYY
(3.3)
∗ )µY + ρYY ∗ Yi .
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We use this expression of Ỹi for discussion throughout this section. On the other hand,
the unbiased estimator Yi∗ is simply the noise-multiplied variable and Yi∗ = YiCi . It is an
unbiased estimator of yi given Yi = yi because E(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) = yi . It can be seen directly
that Ỹi is partially determined by Yi∗ . The MSE of the correlation-attack estimator Ỹi
conditional on Yi = yi is given as:
2
2
2
MSE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ) = E{[(1 − ρYY
∗ )µY + ρYY ∗ CYi −Yi ] |Yi = yi }
2
2
2
4
2 2
= (1 − ρYY
∗ ) (µY − yi ) + ρYY ∗ yi σC .

The MSE of the unbiased estimator Yi∗ conditional on Yi = yi is given as:
MSE(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) = E[(CYi −Yi )2 |Yi = yi ] = y2i E(C − 1)2 = y2i σC2 .
Accuracies of Ỹi and Yi∗ : We first consider a special case where ρYY ∗ is approximately
equal to 1. We see that based on Equation (3.3), if ρYY ∗ is approximately equal to 1,
then the two estimators Ỹi and Yi∗ are approximately equal. We note that from Equa1−ρ 2

2
YY ∗
tion (3.1), σC2 = ρ 2 (1+µ
2
2 . Therefore, a ρYY ∗ close to 1 indicates that σC is close
Y /σY )
YY ∗
to 0, which means that all noise terms stay very close around 1. Therefore, in this case
the multiplicative noises do not provide enough protection to the original data, as both
the correlation-attack estimate and the unbiased estimate are approximately equal to the
unmasked yi .
2
1−ρYY
∗
We now consider a general case where ρYY ∗ ∈ [0, 1]. As σC2 = ρ 2 (1+µ
2 /σ 2 ) , therefore
YY ∗

σC2

Y

Y

and ρYY ∗ have an inverse relationship. The MSEs of both estimators tend to decrease
as σC2 decreases, meaning that they tend to be more accurate for estimating yi as ρYY ∗
gets larger. It is straightforward to see it for Yi∗ based on its MSE. However, it is not
straightforward to see it for Ỹi . To show this, we substitute σC2 by

2
1−ρYY
∗
2
ρYY ∗ (1+µY2 /σY2 )

in the

expression of MSE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ), so we have
4
2
MSE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ) = (k1 − k2 )ρYY
∗ + (k2 − 2k1 )ρYY ∗ + k1 ,
y2

2 .
i
where k1 = (µY − yi )2 , k2 = 1+h
, h = µY2 /σY2 . So the MSE is a parabola in terms of ρYY
∗
k2
The symmetric axis is S = 1 + 2(k −k ) . The parabola is monotonically decreasing in
1
2
2 ∈ [0, 1] in almost all cases, meaning that the correlation-attack estimator Ỹ is more
ρYY
∗
i
accurate as ρYY ∗ increases. The only exception is when k2 > 2k1 . Under this condition,
the symmetric axis S is within
[0,1] so the function
√
√ is not monotone in [0,1]. That means
2µ (1+h)−µ

2(1+h)

2µ (1+h)+µ

2(1+h)

Y
Y
when yi ∈ ( Y
, Y
), MSE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ) will increase
1+2h
1+2h
2
2
first as ρYY ∗ goes from 0 to S, but it eventually decreases to 0 as ρYY
∗ increases from S
to 1. Therefore, both estimators tend to be more accurate as ρYY ∗ gets larger. A large
ρYY ∗ value might motivate a data intruder to use either the unbiased estimator or the
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correlation-attack estimator to attack yi .
Comparison between Ỹi and Yi∗ : We first note that, the absolute relative distance between
the two estimators are given by the following:
ARD = |

2 )µ
Ỹi −Yi∗
(1 − ρYY
∗
Y
2
|
=
|
+ ρYY
∗ − 1|
∗
∗
Yi
Yi

Based on ARD, if we wish the relative distance between the correlation-attack estimate
and the unbiased estimate to be less than γ (a small number such as 0.05), the following
condition needs to be satisfied:
Condition 1:
−γ + 1 −

µY
µY 2
µY
< (1 − ∗ )ρYY
∗ < γ +1−
∗
yi
yi
y∗i

Given a small γ, if the above condition is satisfied, then it does not matter much which
attacking estimate is to be used to attack yi , as the two estimates are very close to each
other.
An estimator predicts the unknown value better if it yields a smaller MSE. To compare
which estimator predicts yi better, we set MSE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ) − MSE(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) < 0. Those
conditions which satisfy this inequality mean that under the conditions, the correlationattack estimator Ỹi predicts yi with better accuracy. After solving the inequality, we let

a =

b =

σY2 − σY

q
σY2 + µY2

µY2
q
2
σY + σY σY2 + µY2
µY2

,

,
q

c =

2 (σ 2 + µ 2 ) − µ σ ρ ∗ (1 + ρ 2 )(σ 2 + µ 2 )
µY ρYY
∗
Y Y YY
Y
Y
Y
Y
YY ∗
2
2
2
ρYY ∗ µY − σY

d =

2 (σ 2 + µ 2 ) + µ σ ρ ∗ (1 + ρ 2 )(σ 2 + µ 2 )
µY ρYY
∗
Y Y YY
Y
Y
Y
Y
YY ∗
,
2 µ2 − σ 2
ρYY
∗ Y
Y

q

e = min(c, d) and f = max(c, d). Then we have the following result:
Result 1:Based on MSEs, for large-sized sample, when ρYY ∗ < a or ρYY ∗ > b, an
observation yi is more vulnerable to Ỹi if yi ∈ (e, f ); when ρYY ∗ ∈ (a, b), yi is more
vulnerable to Ỹi if yi < e or yi > f ; when ρYY ∗ equals a or b, yi is more vulnerable to Ỹi if
yi > µY /2.
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Depending on the distribution of the original data and the noise variance, the difference
of the MSEs of the two estimators varies and could be substantial. For instance, if the
original variable Y ∼ U(100, 600), and noise variance σC2 is 0.433 such that ρYY ∗ = 0.5,
the ratio of MSE(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) over MSE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ) could go over 15 if an original observation yi takes value around 350. It means that the correlation-attack estimate is far more
accurate than the unbiased estimate according to the magnitudes of the MSEs. On the
contrary, when yi takes value around 100, the ratio is only around 0.125, meaning that the
unbiased estimate is far more accurate according to the MSEs. The ratio of the two MSEs
is around 1 if yi takes value around 200, meaning that the two estimates perform similarly
according to the magnitudes of the MSEs.
Based on the above results, we have the following discussions from both the data
intruder and the data provider’s perspectives:
Discussion 1: If ρYY ∗ is high, then the data intruder may use either the correlation-attack
estimator or the unbiased estimator to attack a target value yi . The values of (a, b, e, f )
depend on three parameters (µY , σY , ρYY ∗ ). From the data intruder’s perspective, these parameters could easily be estimated from y∗ using Equations (2.1), (2.2) and (3.2). Therefore, the data intruder could obtain estimates (â, b̂, ê, fˆ), and use Result 1 to make a decision on which particular estimator should be used for attacking yi . In order to do this,
the data intruder needs to make an initial guess about the location of yi in terms of (ê, fˆ).
For instance, if the data intruder’s estimate r̃yy∗ is within (â, b̂), and the data intruder has
a strong belief that yi is greater than fˆ, then logically speaking the data intruder would
use the correlation-attack estimate to attack the value of yi . In the simulation study in
Section 3.4.2, it can be shown that the original values over 26317.6 are more vulnerable
to the correlation-attack estimator according to Result 1. If a noise-multiplied value is
significantly greater than 26317.6, say 200000, it is unlikely that the corresponding original value is less than 26317.6. Therefore, it is very likely that the data intruder uses the
correlation-attack estimator to attack this value.
2
As the data intruder could obtain estimates of µY and ρYY
∗ from the noise-multiplied
data, the intruder could easily check whether Condition 1 is satisfied for a target yi . If
it is satisfied, then it does not matter much which estimator is to be used to attack this
particular yi .
The ratio of MSE(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) over MSE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ) cannot be obtained by the data
intruder as doing so requires the knowledge of yi . However, given (µY , σY , ρYY ∗ ) which
could all be estimated by the data intruder, the ratio of MSE(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) over MSE(Ỹi |Yi =
yi ) is a function of yi . By treating yi as a variable, the ratio of the MSEs could be known
for each possible value of yi . Taking the previous example where the original variable
Y follows U(100, 600) for instance, the ratio of MSE(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) over MSE(Ỹi |Yi = yi )
is above 5 if yi is between 280 and 500, meaning that the correlation-attack estimator
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should be far more accurate than the unbiased estimator according to the magnitudes of
the MSEs. If the data intruder believes that yi is within (280, 500), then logically speaking
he would use the correlation-attack estimate to attack the unobservable yi .
Alternatively, if noise density fC is public and a data intruder has no prior knowledge
about the location of the unobservable yi , one possible choice is that the data intruder
may attempt to compute the expected value of yi by using E(Yi |Yi∗ = y∗i ). Assuming Y is
positive, the conditional expectation takes the following form:
E(Yi |Yi∗ = y∗i ) =

Z ∞
0

Z ∞

yi fYi |Yi∗ (yi )dyi =

0

fC (

y∗i
) fY (y)dy
y

In the above expression, the density function fY is unknown. To estimate fY , the data
intruder might either come up with a prior based on past experience, or the data intruder
might attempt to estimate fY using the sample-moment-based density reconstruction
algorithm as mentioned in Section 2.1.2. The data intruder might then substitute fY (y)
by its estimate to estimate E(Yi |Yi∗ = y∗i ). As a result, the data intruder could have a
rough idea about the expected value of yi based on y∗i , and make a decision about which
estimator to use accordingly.
Discussion 2: From the data provider’s perspective, the above result means that the
correlation-attack estimator Ỹi could yield a higher disclosure risk than the unbiased
estimator Yi∗ for some yi and vice versa. To protect all observations, the safest way is to
make sure that for each original value yi , the disclosure risks from both estimators are
simultaneously below an acceptable level. In that way, all original observations could be
protected regardless of which estimator a data intruder uses.
In the next section, we propose a disclosure risk measure which could be used by data
providers to measure disclosure risks against these two estimators simultaneously. The
proposed disclosure risk measure could help data providers with noise generating variable
selection during the data masking stage.

3.3

Disclosure risk and data utility loss measures

For noise multiplication masking method, the noise generating variable C plays the role
of balancing data utility loss and disclosure risk, or “tuning mechanism” in Klein et al.
(2014). That is, for a set of original data, the data provider needs to decide on an appropriate noise generating variable which achieves the required utility-risk tradeoff. In this
section we propose a value disclosure risk measure to be used by data providers for noise
generating variable selection in practice. We also introduce the definition of overall data
utility loss we use in this chapter.
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We first note that, Lin and Wise (2012) showed that the value disclosure risk of yi being
disclosed by Yi∗ is given by
RLW (Yi∗ , δ |Yi = yi ) = P(|C − 1| < δ ).
We propose to use the probabilistic disclosure risk measure because it is bounded between 0 to 1 and could easily be modified to measure disclosure risks from other estimators. For instance, Klein et al. (2014) proposed a similar probabilistic disclosure risk
measure by replacing Yi∗ by a linear predictor based on an attacking regression model.
Following this idea, we propose a disclosure risk measure Rρ (Ỹi , δ |y) to evaluate the disclosure risk of yi being disclosed by the correlation-attack estimator Ỹi . That is:
Rρ (Ỹi , δ |y) = P(|

Ỹi − yi
| < δ ).
yi

Hereafter, we use RLW (yi , δ ) to denote RLW (Yi∗ , δ |Yi = yi ). We use Rρ (yi , δ ) to denote
Rρ (Ỹi , δ |y). As the exact form of Ỹi is not straight-forward to show, Rρ (yi , δ ) cannot be
computed exactly. For large-sized sample, we propose two approaches for a data provider
to estimate Rρ (yi , δ ) in practice.
Approach 1: The data provider may just assume that
∗
2
2
Ỹi ≈ (1 − ρYY
∗ )µY + ρYY ∗ Yi

as in Section 3.2. Then, we have
Rρ (yi , δ ) ≈ P(

2 )µ
2 )µ
(−δ + 1)yi − (1 − ρYY
(δ + 1)yi − (1 − ρYY
∗
∗
Y
Y
<
C
<
).
2
2
ρYY ∗ yi
ρYY ∗ yi

(3.4)

In this expression, the parameters µY and ρYY ∗ are not known to the data provider but
they could be estimated using sample estimates obtained from the original data. That
is, µY could be estimated by the sample mean of the original data, and ρYY ∗ could be
estimated by plugging in sample estimates of µY and σY2 calculated from the original data
into Equation (3.1). The data provider could then use the approximated disclosure risk
measure to estimate Rρ (yi , δ ).
Approach 2: The data provider could use Monte-Carlo simulations to approximate
Rρ (yi , δ ). That is, the data provider could firstly produce N samples of noise-multiplied
data using the noise candidate C, and then perform the correlation-attack by assuming
the role of a data intruder. The correlation-attack is applied on each sample of the
noise-multiplied data following the steps described in Section 3.1. To estimate Rρ (yi , δ ),
suppose among the N samples, in q of them yi is disclosed by the corresponding
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correlation-attack estimate. Then Rρ (yi , δ ) is estimated to be q/N.
Hereafter, we use Rcor (yi , δ ) to denote an approximate of Rρ (yi , δ ) regardless of which
approach the data provider uses to estimate Rρ (yi , δ ). From Section 3.2, we have shown
that some original observations are more vulnerable to the correlation-attack estimator
while the others are more vulnerable to the unbiased estimator. We note that even though
Result 1 provides a guidance about which estimator is more effective for predicting each
yi , it is calculated based on MSEs. Under the probabilistic disclosure risk measure we
proposed, our simulation results with different sets of synthetic data show that an estimator with a lower MSE does not necessarily result in a larger disclosure risk. Therefore,
to protect yi , the safest way is to make sure that the disclosure risks from both estimators
are simultaneously below an acceptable level. In that way, we say that yi is protected
against the two estimators. We propose the following disclosure risk measure to evaluate
the disclosure risk against the two estimators:
R(yi , δ ) = max{RLW (yi , δ ), Rcor (yi , δ )}

(3.5)

A sufficiently low R(yi , δ ) value means that yi is protected against both the correlationattack estimator and the unbiased estimator. For a set of original data y and a noise
candidate C, the data provider collects a set of disclosure risks {R(yi , δ )}ni=1 . The data
provider could use the set of disclosure risks as a reference for noise generating variable
selection. In some cases, it might be sufficient to say that a noise candidate offers an
acceptable level of protection to the original data if the average value {R(yi , δ )}ni=1 is
below a threshold value. In some other cases where all observations are highly sensitive,
the data provider may require max({R(yi , δ )}ni=1 ) to be sufficiently low in order for a
noise candidate to be considered. The data provider might need to determine a criteria
according to the nature of the original data. We will provide an example in Simulation 2.
We note that the disclosure risk measure is designed for the data provider to understand
the disclosure risk of using a noise candidate C to mask the original data. For the data
intruder, he/she may rely on Discussion 1 to determine which attacking estimator to use,
but the intruder cannot use the disclosure risk measure to evaluate the probability of successfully disclosing yi using either Yi∗ or Ỹi . This is because the disclosure risk measure
requires the knowledge of the original data. The knowledge is not possessed by the data
intruder. We also note that a low R(yi , δ ) value guarantees that yi is protected against
both the unbiased estimator Yi∗ and the correlation-attack estimator Ỹi . However, we may
not say that yi has a low value disclosure risk because of other possible attacking strategies. When yi is subject to other value disclosure risks, the data provider might need to
consider using R(yi , δ ) together with other disclosure risk measures to jointly determine
a suitable noise generating variable. Because the unbiased estimator and the correlation-
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attack estimator are two basic attacking estimators, we feel that a noise candidate should
at least guarantee that the noise-multiplied data is protected against these two attacking
estimators first in order for the noise candidate to be considered further for masking a set
of original data.
In the remainder of this section, we introduce the overall data utility loss measure we
use in this chapter. We note that, when noise-multiplied data y∗ and noise variance σC2
are released to the public, data users might only be able to estimate the first two moments
and variance estimates of the population from y∗ using estimators developed in Nayak et
al. (2011). A data user might be able to estimate other population parameters through
other means, but we do not pursue the discussion. In this chapter, we assume a simple
case that the overall utility loss measure is computed according to the utility losses of
E(Y ) and E(Y 2 ) only. Similar ways for measuring overall utility loss have also been
considered in the literature (Kim and Winkler 1995, 2003; Brand 2002). For instance,
Kim and Winkler (1995) only considered utility losses for population mean and variance
as indications of overall utility loss for noise-added microdata. Based on this assumption,
we adopt the utility loss measure proposed in Duncan et al. (2001; 2004), which is a data
user’s mean squared error in estimating a population parameter from perturbed data. From
∗ )2 ]
. Therefore, E(Y ) could be unbiasedly
Section 2.1.1, E(Y ) = E(Y ∗ ) and E(Y 2 ) = E[(Y
(σ 2 +1)
estimated by data users using UY =
n

(Y ∗ )2

∑ni=1 Yi∗
n ,

C

and E(Y 2 ) could be unbiasedly estimated

i=1 i
using UY 2 = ∑n(σ
. Based on Duncan et al (2001; 2004)’s utility loss measure, we
2
C +1)
have the following:
σC2 ∑ni=1 y2i
UL1 = Var(UY |y) =
n2
and

UL2 = Var(UY 2 |y) =

[E(C4 ) − (σC2 + 1)2 ] ∑ni=1 y4i
n2 (σC2 + 1)2

The expression of UL1 means that, a set of noise candidates with equal variance will
result in the same level of utility loss for E(Y ). As a result, in this chapter we use the
following overall utility loss measure for noise generating variable selection: When
selecting among a set of noise candidates, we let the variances of these noise candidates
to be equal. Then, we say a noise candidate will result in the lowest level of overall utility
loss if it has the lowest UL2 value. We note that the overall utility loss measure we use
in this chapter is simple and is for illustration purpose only. The primary purpose of this
chapter is the introduction of the proposed disclosure risk measure in Equation (3.5). In
practice a data provider may use its own overall utility loss measure in conjunction with
the disclosure risk measure we proposed for noise generating variable selection.
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Simulations

In this section we present two simulation studies. In the first simulation, we show that
the correlation-attack strategy could be used to disclose perturbed values generated by
Oganian-Karr (2011)’s noise multiplication masking method if parameter of noise k is
released. In the second simulation, we show that our proposed disclosure risk measure
could help a data provider to select an appropriate noise generating variable during the
data masking stage. We will use an R-U map (Duncan et al. 2001; 2004) to aid us with
decision-making in the second simulation. We assume that the unbiased estimator and
the correlation-attack estimator are the only sources of value disclosure risk. We also
comment on the protection levels offered by a few noise candidates which guarantee that
RLW is very small or is 0 for all original observations.

3.4.1

Simulation 1

In this section we present a study on Oganian and Karr (2011)’s multiplicative noise
masking scheme. We would like to show two things: 1. Oganian and Karr’s multiplicative
masking scheme is vulnerable to the correlation-attack if parameter of noise k is released.
2. Rρ could help data providers with the decision on the parameter k to be used during the
masking process.
Oganian and Karr (2011) presented a masking scheme which preserves the mean and
covariance of an original dataset. Specifically, denote the n × d dimensional original data
as xo . xo ∼ Xo . E(X0 ) = µ0 and Var(X0 ) = Σo . There is no restriction on the distribution
of Xo .
The masking scheme works as following:
1. Data providers decide the noise variable R ∼ N(µR , ΣR ) to be used, where
ΣR (i, j) = log(1 +

kΣo (i, j)
),
Σo (i, j) + µo (i)µo ( j)

µR (i) = −ΣR (i, i)/2,

i, j = 1, · · · d,

i = 1, · · · d,

(3.6)

(3.7)

where k is a parameter set by data providers, which is usually a small number such as
0.15 in order to maintain data utility. The noise variable R depends on the mean and
covariance matrix of X0 . The value of k need not to be released to data users.
2. The masked data xm are obtained through the following transformation:
√
( 1 + k − 1)µ0 + [xo ◦ exp(R)]
√
xm =
1+k

(3.8)
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where “◦” denotes elementwise matrix multiplication (Schur or Hadamard product). Suppose xm ∼ Xm , then E(Xm ) = µ0 and cov(Xm ) = Σo .
Now suppose xo is masked by Oganian and Karr’s masking scheme. After masking, the
masked data xm is released to data users. As data providers could decide whether the parameter k is to be released to data users as well, we consider the following three scenarios:
Case 1: The masked data xm and parameter k are released to data users.
Case 2: The masked data xm and the mean of noise variable E(R) are released to data
users. The parameter k is not released.
Case 3: Only masked data xm is released.
Oganian and Karr (2011) discussed whether the parameter k should be public. The
authors showed that data users could only obtain biased third and fourth moments of an
attribute by analysing the masked data. Releasing k could allow data users to adjust for
these biases. However, the consequence of releasing this information on data disclosure
was not studied. In the following we discuss the consequence on value disclosure risk.
Recall that the correlation-attack is for attacking noise-multiplied data. Therefore it cannot be applied to xm directly. However, through transformation of (3.8), data intruders
could obtain the noise-multiplied data from xm . Denote r as the noise matrix drawn from
R, y∗ = xo ◦ exp(r). By rearranging (3.8), we have
√
√
y∗ = ( 1 + k)xm − ( 1 + k − 1)uo
The dimension of y∗ is n × d. For convenience, we denote the jth characteristics of xo as
j
j
xo , the jth characteristics of y∗ as y∗ j and the jth characteristics of xm as xm , jth column
of noise matrix r as r j with r j ∼ R j . Then it can be seen that y∗ j can be regarded as
j
j
j j
the noise-multiplied version of xo , with {y∗ i = xo i ri }ni=1 . However, the expression of
y∗ requires knowledge of k. In case 3 scenario, k is not released. Therefore releasing
xm under Case 3 is safe from the correlation-attack. We discuss the feasibility of the
correlation-attack under Case 1 and Case 2 respectively.
Under Case 1: Since xm and k are released, the data intruder could obtain y∗ . Now
suppose the data intruder targets on observations of jth characteristics of xo . Denote the
j
j
j j
j
original data as {xoi }ni=1 , the noise multiplied data as {y∗i = xoi ri }ni=1 , ri ∼ R j , where
E(R j ) = ΣR ( j, j)/2, Var(R j ) = ΣR ( j, j), the masked data which is passed to data users is
j
{xmi }ni=1 .
The correlation-attack needs three pieces of information: noise multiplied masked data
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j

{y∗i }ni=1 , the mean of the noise generating variable E(R j ) and the variance of the noise
generating variable Var(R j ). Information of E(R j ) and Var(R j ) are not given, but these
b j)
values can be directly estimated by substituting k into (3.6) and (3.7), which yield E(R
and Vb ar(R j ) . That is
ks2 j

j

Vb ar(R ) = log(1 +

xm
),
2
s j + µ̂ 2j
xm
xm

b j ) = Vb ar(R j )/2,
E(R
j

where µ̂x j =
m

∑ni=1 xmi 2
,s j
n
xm

=

j
1
n
2
n−1 ∑i=1 (xmi − µ̂xmj ) .

The noise generating variable used to generate noise terms is exp(R j ), where
E{exp(R j )} = exp{E(R j ) +Var(R j )/2} = 1
and
Var{exp(R j )} = {exp[Var(R j )] − 1}exp[2E(R j ) +Var(R j )].

(3.9)

As a result, the data intruder could carry out the correlation-attack by using the two
j
\ j )}, where Var{exp(R
\ j )} is obtained by
pieces of information {y∗i }ni=1 and Var{exp(R
b j ) into Equation (3.9).
substituting Vb ar(R j ) and E(R
Under Case 2: Even though k is not released, the data intruder has information of
E(R j ). From (3.7), if E(R j ) is available, k can be estimated through:
j

k̂ =

j

{exp[2E(R j )] − 1}[Var(Xo ) + E(Xo )2 ]
j

Var(Xo )

j

.
j

j

The value of E(Xo ) and Var(Xo ) can be estimated through µ̂x j =
m

j
1
n
2
n−1 ∑i=1 (xmi − µ̂xmj )

∑ni=1 xmi
,
n

s2 j =
xm

j

, where µ̂x j and s2 j are sample mean and sample variance of xm .
m

xm

j

Using k̂, the data intruder could estimate {y∗i }ni=1 through
j
yb∗i =


p
p
j
1 + k̂)xmi − ( 1 + k̂ − 1 µ̂x j , i = 1 · · · n
m

and the variance of R j can be easily estimated through

Vb ar(R j ) = log 1 +

k̂s2 j



xm
.
2
s j + µ̂ 2j
xm
xm

Then, the data intruder could follow the steps we described under Case 1 to conduct
the correlation-attack.
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We use the following simulation to show the relationship between value disclosure
risk and the choice of k: Suppose the two-dimensional original variable Xo = (Xo1 , Xo2 ).
Xo ∼ N(µo , Σo ), µo = (10, 20) and
"

#
5 4.5
Σo =
.
4.5 7
We drew a sample of size 1000 from Xo as our original data which requires masking, and
1 , x2 }1000 .
denote the sample as {xoi
oi i=1
1 , x2 }1000 using OgaNow suppose a data provider would like to mask original data {xoi
oi i=1
2
1
nian and Karr’s masking scheme to produce masked data {xmi , xmi }1000
i=1 . Denote the
1
2
masked variable as Xm = (Xm , Xm ). The noise generating variable to be considered is
R ∼ N(µR , ΣR ), where
µR = {0.5log(1 + k/21), 0.5log(1 + 7k/407)}
and

"

#
log(1 + k/21) log(1 + 9k/409)
ΣR =
.
log(1 + 9k/409) log(1 + 7k/407)

Suppose the data provider releases masked data and the value of k to data users, but
the data provider needs to decide which value of k to be used during the data masking process. As releasing k leads to the correlation-attack, the data provider needs
to assess the disclosure risks of different k using the disclosure risk measure Rρ for
1 }1000 and {x2 }1000 respectively. Suppose the data provider uses R (x̃1 , 0.1|{x1 }1000 )
{xoi
ρ oi
oi i=1
oi i=1
i=1
2
2
1000
and Rρ (x̃oi , 0.1|{xoi }i=1 ) to measure disclosure risks against the correlation-attack.
We carried out a simulation with 5000 iterations, recording the summary statistics of
1 , 0.1|{x1 }1000 ) and R (x̃2 , 0.1|{x2 }1000 ), i = 1 · · · 1000. Moreover, we recorded
Rρ (x̃oi
ρ oi
oi i=1
oi i=1
the value of r̃Xm1 Xo1 on each iteration, where r̃Xm1 Xo1 is the estimated population correlation
between the original variable Xo1 and the masked variable Xm1 . We reported the average of
r̃Xm1 Xo1 as r̃[
Xm1 Xo1 . Similarly we recorded r̃Xm2 Xo2 on each iteration and reported the average as
r̃[
Xm2 Xo2 .
1 , 0.1)}1000 ) and
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the summary statistics of {Rρ (x̃oi
i=1
2
1000
{Rρ (x̃oi , 0.1)}i=1 ), respectively. Taking Table 3.1 with k = 0.15 for example, the mean
1 , 0.1)}1000 ) is 0.772, which means roughly speaking, 77% observations could
of {Rρ (x̃oi
i=1
be disclosed by the correlation-attack if the acceptance rule δ is 0.1. The value of r̃[
Xm1 Xo1
1
when k = 0.15 is 0.933, which indicates a strong linear relationship between Xo and Xm1 .
As the correlation could be inferred by the data intruder, such a high correlation may
motivate the data intruder to use the correlation-attack to unveil the original observations.
When k gets lower, the corresponding value disclosure risk against the correlation-attack
gets lower as well. It can be shown that the value of r̃Xm1 Xo1 and r̃Xm2 Xo2 are the same for the
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1 , 0.1)}1000 ) for various k values.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of {Rρ (x̃oi
i=1

k
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40

Q1
0.958
0.873
0.777
0.713
0.664
0.624
0.589
0.563

Q2
0.962
0.852
0.803
0.749
0.709
0.680
0.653
0.633

mean
0.954
0.881
0.772
0.714
0.668
0.635
0.606
0.583

Q3
0.965
0.910
0.815
0.768
0.734
0.709
0.689
0.674

r̃[
Xm1 Xo1
0.976
0.953
0.933
0.913
0.894
0.877
0.861
0.845

2 , 0.1)}1000 ) for various k values.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of {Rρ (x̃oi
i=1

k
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40

Q1
0.999
0.986
0.958
0.927
0.896
0.866
0.840
0.814

Q2
0.999
0.989
0.968
0.945
0.924
0.905
0.887
0.871

mean
0.999
0.985
0.959
0.929
0.900
0.874
0.851
0.831

Q3
0.999
0.990
0.972
0.953
0.935
0.920
0.907
0.896

r̃[
Xm2 Xo2
0.976
0.953
0.933
0.913
0.894
0.877
0.861
0.845

p
same k value and are equal to 1/ (1 + k). Therefore we see that the last columns of both
tables are the same.
If we ignore the impact of k on data utility, then the two tables suggest that the data
provider should use a very large k during the data masking process so that the level of
value disclosure risk against the correlation-attack is acceptable. This simulation showed
that Rρ could be used by the Oganian and Karr’s masking scheme to decide the value of
k to be used during the masking process.

3.4.2

Simulation 2

In this section we show how our proposed disclosure risk measure in (3.5) could help
data providers with the process of noise generating variable selection. Following Klein et
al. (2014), we use the public use data from the 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS)
March supplement (available from http://www.census.gov/cps/). The entire data set contains household, family, and individual records. In this section, we consider all positive
household income values under household income attribute as the original data. The
original data contains 50661 positive observations ranging from 1 to 768742, with mean
53007 and variance 2411407246. The data is skewed to the right. In the following we
denote the original data as {yi }50661
i=1 .
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We consider five noise candidates {Ci }5i=1 with equal variance. We aim to use the
proposed disclosure risk and overall utility loss measure to determine an appropriate
noise generating variable for masking {yi }50661
i=1 . We set the acceptance rule δ = 0.1
throughout this section. The distributions of the noises are:
C1 ∼ 0.5U(0.5, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.5), U(a, b) is a uniform random variable with two
parameters a and b;
p
p
C2 ∼ U(1 − 0.5 93/75, 1 + 0.5 93/75);
C3 follows a truncated normal distribution. That is, it follows N(1, 0.146135) which is
truncated at 0.3 and 1.7, meaning that C3 has support (0.3, 1.7);
C4 ∼ 0.5N(0.7, 4/300)
q
q + 0.5N(1.3, 4/300);
9.6
C5 ∼ 0.5T (1.1 − 9.6
4 , 0.9, 0.9) + 0.5T (1.1, 0.9 +
4 , 1.1), where T (a, b, c) is a
triangular random variable, a is the lower limit of the distribution, b is the upper limit of
the distribution, c is the mode of the distribution..

The distributions of these noise candidates have been proposed or used in the literature
for producing noise-multiplied data. Specifically, C1 follows a mixture of uniforms distribution and was considered in the simulation study in Klein et al. (2014); C2 follows a
uniform distribution, which was proposed and discussed in Sinha et al. (2011); C3 follows
a truncated normal distribution, which was considered in Kim and Winkler (2003); C4 follows a mixture of normals distribution, which was proposed in Lin and Wise (2012); C5
follows a truncated triangular distribution, which was proposed in Kim (2007) and Kim
and Jeong (2008). Note that C1 and C5 lead to RLW = 0 and C4 leads to a small RLW
(0.0414) for all original observations. Therefore they seem to be good noise candidates if
the unbiased estimator is the only source of value disclosure risk for yi . For C4 , there is a
very small probability that it produces a negative noise. We note that negative noise terms
were generated in this simulation. However, it has very little impact on our simulation
result. We also tried to only use positive noise terms for this simulation. For both cases,
the results were very similar.
Now we assume the role of the data provider and we aim to find an appropriate noise
generating variable to mask {yi }50661
i=1 . We assume the following criteria for disclosure
risk control: a noise candidate needs to guarantee that max({R(yi , 0.1)}50661
i=1 ) < 0.3, i.e.
the disclosure risk of any original value is less than 0.3. When multiple noise candidates
satisfy this criteria, we say a noise candidate is better than the others in terms of disclosure risk control if it offers the lowest average disclosure risk {R(yi , 0.1)}50661
i=1 . We use
Approach 1 described in Section 3.3 to estimate Rρ using Rcor . We also use the overall
utility loss measure introduced in Section 3.3 to compare the overall utility loss levels of
the noise candidates. That is, since all the noise candidates have the same variance, a
noise candidate with a lower UL2 has a lower level of overall utility loss under our overall
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utility loss measure.
The disclosure risk against income value plots for all five noise candidates are given in
Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. To comment on the plots, we see that different noise
candidates protect the original values differently. For instance, we see that C2 (Figure
3.1(b)) offers uniform protections to most observations while the others do not. The noise
candidates C1 , C4 and C5 , which were previously thought to be good noise candidates
because they guarantee that RLW = 0, are actually not that ideal for this data set
when our proposed disclosure risk measure R(yi , δ ) is used. For these noise candidates,
R(yi , δ ) = Rcor (yi , δ ), i.e. the value disclosure risk comes entirely from the correlationattack. We see that in this simulation, observations around the sample mean or that are
extremely large are not protected well by these noise candidates. It may suggest that the
merit of those noise candidates with RLW = 0 may need to be reconsidered due to the
correlation-attack. We note that in practice, statistical agencies are more concerned about
extreme values in a set of data compared with values around the sample mean. Values
around the sample mean might be difficult to re-identify because there are many such
observations.
We note that, for this simulation, noise candidates C1 , C4 and C5 do not provide a good
level of protection to observations around the sample mean or that are extremely large.
It might not be true if the original data follows a different distribution. For instance, if
the original data follows U(10, 2000), then observations around the population mean are
well protected by these noise candidates while observations around 600 are not. As we
see in Equation 3.4, the level of protection a noise candidate C offers to an observation yi
depends on δ , σY , µY , the distribution of C and the value of yi itself.
For each noise candidate, we also considered the average disclosure risk {R(yi , δ )}50661
i=1
and the overall level of data utility loss it produces. We use an R-U map to visualize
the utility-risk tradeoffs, which is presented in Figure 3.4. We see that, C3 results in
the lowest overall utility loss but the highest average disclosure risk. C2 and C5 result
in lower average disclosure risks but higher overall utility losses. C1 and C4 yield very
similar and the lowest average disclosure risks but C1 yields a lower overall utility loss
than C4 . However, the overall utility losses produced by these noise candidates are very
similar as the highest utility loss (produced by C2 ) is only 1.2% larger than the lowest
utility loss (produced by C3 ).
Based on all these results, we could make a decision about which noise candidate is
appropriate to use in this context. Based on Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, we see
that C1 , C4 and C5 do not satisfy our criteria for disclosure risk control because they cannot
guarantee that every original observation has a disclosure risk less than 0.3. Therefore,
we could only choose between C2 and C3 . From Figure 3.4, we see that C2 results in a
much lower average disclosure risk level than C3 at the expense of only a slightly higher
level of overall data utility loss. As a result, C2 seems to be the best choice in this context.
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(a) disclosure risk plot for C1 .

(b) disclosure risk plot for C2 .
n
Figure 3.1: Disclosure risks {R(yi , 0.1)}50661
i=1 against income values {yi }i=1 plots for
noise candidates C1 and C2 .
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(a) disclosure risk plot for C3 .

(b) disclosure risk plot for C4 .
n
Figure 3.2: Disclosure risks {R(yi , 0.1)}50661
i=1 against income values {yi }i=1 plots for
noise candidates C3 and C4 .
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(a) disclosure risk plot for C5 .
n
Figure 3.3: Disclosure risks {R(yi , 0.1)}50661
i=1 against income values {yi }i=1 plots for
each noise candidate C5 .

3.5

Conclusion and future work

In this chapter we introduced the correlation-attack which could be used by data intruders
to attack noise-multiplied data. The correlation-attack only uses information contained
in the noise-multiplied data and the variance of noise terms, hence it could be applied to
attack noise-multiplied data in most situations. The correlation-attack estimator is discussed along with the unbiased estimator and we propose that disclosure risks from both
estimators need to be controlled. Correspondingly, we proposed a disclosure risk measure
for data providers to evaluate the disclosure risks against both attacking estimators simultaneously for each noise candidate. The proposed disclosure risk measure could help data
providers with decision-making on noise generating variable selection.
A noise candidate which produces a low level of average value disclosure risk against
the unbiased estimator may produce a high level of average value disclosure risk against
the correlation-attack estimator and vice versa. For instance, if the original data follows
LN(5, 0.122 ), we can show that C4 results in a low level of average disclosure risk against
the unbiased estimator (0.0414) but a high level of average disclosure risk against the
correlation-attack estimator (roughly 0.619). Similarly, we can show that if the original
data follows LN(3, 22 ), the noise candidate C3 will result in a low level of average disclosure risk against the correlation-attack estimator (0.112) but a high level of average
disclosure risk against the unbiased estimator (0.221). An ideal noise candidate should
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Figure 3.4: Utility-Risk tradeoffs of the noise candidates.
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protect against both estimators effectively. It might be interesting to find out these ideal
noise candidates given different distributions of original data in the future.
Identification of other attacking strategies are necessary for disclosure risk control of
noise-multiplied microdata. For instance, it may be the case that in microdata, multiple
attributes are protected by multiplicative noises. In that case, the idea of the regressionattack proposed in Li and Sarkar (2011) might be used to attack a noise-multiplied value.
That is, to attack yi j , which is the original value of the i-th record on the j-th attribute,
a data intruder may regress yi j on the noise-multiplied values of other attributes of the
record, i.e. regress yi j on (y∗i1 , y∗i2 , · · · , y∗ip ), where p is the number of regressors used to
attack yi j . This idea could be explored in the future.

Chapter 4
Simulations studies on noise candidates
selection
When using multiplicative noise to protect sensitive original observations, the data
provider faces the problem of choosing an appropriate noise generating variable from
a set of noise candidates. As a top priority, the noise generating variable should produce
a low disclosure risk to the original data. In the literature, the effect of different noise
distributions on the disclosure risk against the unbiased estimator has been studied. As a
result, several noise distributions have been proposed such that the disclosure risk against
the unbiased estimator is low. Those distributions include mixtures of normal distributions (Lin and Wise 2012), truncated triangular distributions (Kim 2007), and mixtures
of uniform distributions (Klein et al. 2014). In this chapter, we investigate the effect of
noise distributions on the disclosure risk against the correlation-attack estimator on lognormal data through simulations. We note that log-normal distribution can be used for
modelling many real-life data, such as income data (Klein et al. 2014) and business data
in an organisation (Muralidhar et al. 1995) and references therein. Log-normal distribution has two parameters µ and σ . It is non-negative and its shape could go from roughly
normal to heavily skewed. We aim to propose a guide about the noise distributions to use
for protecting log-normal data against the correlation-attack estimator. Unlike the protection against the unbiased estimator where a noise variable offers uniform protection to all
original observations, not all original observations receive the same magnitude of protection. Because in practice, some records are more sensitive than others, sometimes the data
provider needs to choose a noise variable such that highly sensitive observations are well
protected. For business data or personal income data, extremely large observations are
more vulnerable to identity disclosure risk. Therefore, those observations require better
protection against value disclosure risk. We use simulation to investigate this issue. We
apply our findings using the same set of original data as we used in Section 3.4.2. We
note that the distribution of the original data is approximately log-normal. Therefore our
findings in this chapter should be applicable in this case.
43
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To start with, for a noise candidate C and an acceptance rule δ , the disclosure risk of
an original observation yi against the unbiased estimator is given as:
RLW (Yi∗ , δ |Yi = yi ) = P(|

Yi∗ −Yi
| < δ |Yi = yi ) = P(|C − 1| < δ ).
Yi

The disclosure risk of an original observation yi against the correlation-attack estimator
is:
Rρ (Ỹi , δ |{y j }nj=1 ) = P(|

Ỹi − yi
| < δ ).
yi

We use Rρ (yi , δ ) to denote
We use RLW (yi , δ ) to denote RLW (Yi∗ , δ |Yi = yi ).
n
Rρ (Ỹi , δ |{y j } j=1 ). We use Approach 2 mentioned in Section 3.3 to estimate Rρ (yi , δ ).
That is, for a set of original data, we firstly produce N multiple samples of noisemultiplied data using the noise candidate C. Then we perform the correlation-attack by
assuming the role of the data intruder. The correlation-attack is applied on each sample
of the noise-multiplied data. To estimate Rρ (yi , δ ), suppose among the N samples, in q
of them yi is disclosed by the corresponding correlation-attack estimate. Then Rρ (yi , δ )
is estimated to be q/N.

4.1

Simulation 1

In this simulation, we aim to show the following: for a noise candidate, even though it
produces a low RLW (yi , δ ), the value of Rρ (yi , δ ) could still be very high, and vice versa.
This observation is important because it means that the data provider needs to consider
both attacking estimators and their disclosure risks when selecting noise generating variables. We also computed Rρ (yi , δ ) using the Approach 1 we discussed in Section 3.3.
Theoretically speaking, for large-sized data, both approaches lead to similar results. We
aim to show this point in this simulation.
Denote the original data as y = (y1 , y2 , · · · y1000 ). The observations are independently
drawn from Y ∼ U(100, 200). We consider the following four mixtures of uniforms noise
generating variables to mask the data:
C1,1 : 0.5U(0.8, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.2),

C1,2 : 0.5U(0.7, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.3),

C1,3 : 0.5U(0.6, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.4),

C1,4 : 0.5U(0.5, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.5),

The noise candidates C1,1 and C1,4 were used in Klein et al. (2014) for generating
noise-multiplied data.
We assume the acceptance rule δ = 0.1. It can be easily shown that, all four noise gener-
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics of {Rρ (yi , 0.1)}1000
i=1 if y is masked by C1,1 , C1,2 , C1,3 and
C1,4 , respectively.

noise
C1,1
C1,2
C1,3
C1,4

r̃c
yy∗
0.768
0.661
0.570
0.496

Min
0.0864
0
0
0

Q1
0.496
0.492
0.383
0.252

Q2
0.504
0.503
0.498
0.494

mean
0.531
0.477
0.447
0.422

Q3
0.583
0.574
0.584
0.591

Max
0.709
0.663
0.713
0.785

ating variables yield RLW (yi , δ ) = 0 for all {yi }1000
i=1 . To estimate Rρ (yi , δ ), we simulated
the correlation-attack process 5000 times for each noise candidate. On each iteration,
we recorded r̃yy∗ , the estimated population correlation coefficient between Y and Y ∗ . We
recorded the correlation-attack estimates of the original values, which are used to estimate
Rρ for each yi . We computed the average of the 5000 samples of r̃yy∗ , which is denoted
1000
as r̃d
YY ∗ . We report the summary statistics of {Rρ (yi , 0.1)}i=1 for each noise candidate as
well as r̃d
YY ∗ in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 gives the summary statistics of {Rρ (yi , 0.1)}1000
i=1 . To interpret the table, for
1000
instance, the first quartile Q1 of {Rρ (yi , 0.1)}i=1 for C1,1 is 0.496, meaning that 75%
of the original values have probabilities of more than 49.6% of being disclosed by the
corresponding correlation-attack estimates. Similarly, Q2 of {Rρ (yi , 0.1)}1000
i=1 is 0.503
for C1,2 , indicating that 50% observations have more than 50.3% probabilities of being
disclosed.
We also computed Rρ (yi , δ ) using the Approach 1 mentioned in Section 3.3. That is,
computed Rρ (yi , δ ) using
Rρ (yi , δ ) ≈ P(

2 )µ
2 )µ
(−δ + 1)yi − (1 − ρYY
(δ + 1)yi − (1 − ρYY
∗
∗
Y
Y
<
C
<
).
2
2
ρYY ∗ yi
ρYY ∗ yi

The summary statistics of the disclosure risks are given in Table 4.2. We see that the
results in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 are very close. It is expected because in this simulation,
the sample size is quite large. The result might suggest that data providers could use either
Approach 1 or Approach 2 to calculate the disclosure risk.
To sum up, Table 4.1 shows that, a smaller value of r̃yy∗ leads to a lower average disclosure risk from the correlation-attack estimator, as given by the mean of {Rρ (yi , 0.1)}1000
i=1 .
This observation agrees with our discussion in Section 3.2 regarding the accuracy of the
correlation-attack estimator. It might suggest that, the data provider could use a noise
generating variable with a large variance to reduce the risk from the correlation-attack
estimator. The disclosure risks from the correlation-attack estimator are quite large for all
noise candidates, even though RLW (yi , 0.1) are uniformly 0 for all {yi }1000
i=1 .
Now we consider original data sets which follow log-normal distributions. Suppose
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of {Rcor (yi , 0.1)}1000
i=1 if y is masked by C1,1 , C1,2 , C1,3 and
C1,4 , respectively.

noise
C1,1
C1,2
C1,3
C1,4

ρYY ∗
0.778
0.672
0.581
0.507

Min
0.241
0
0
0

Q1
0.500
0.500
0.381
0.250

Q2
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500

mean
0.529
0.476
0.443
0.415

Q3
0.571
0.567
0.572
0.579

Max
0.652
0.608
0.655
0.723

Table 4.3: Summary statistics of {Rcor (yi , 0.1)}1000
i=1 if y is masked by C1,5 , C1,6 , C1,3 ,
respectively.

noise
C1,5
C1,6

ρYY ∗
0.979
0.865

Min
0.096
0.080

Q1
0.109
0.089

Q2
0.112
0.091

mean
0.112
0.091

Q3
0.115
0.094

Max
0.125
0.108

we have a set of original data {yi }1000
i=1 independently drawn from LN(3, 2). We consider
the following noise candidates:
C1,5 : N(1, 0.146) truncated at 0.3 and 1.7.
C1,6 : N(1, 0.2) truncated at 0.1 and 1.9.
Assuming δ = 0.1. We can show that, for C1,5 , RLW = 0.221. For C1,6 , RLW = 0.185.
However, the corresponding disclosure risks against the correlation-attack are lower. The
corresponding disclosure risks against the correlation-attack are given in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 shows that, the disclosure risks against the correlation-attack are very low if
C1,5 and C1,6 are used to mask the original data. The average disclosure risks against the
correlation-attack are 0.112 and 0.091, respectively. However, the disclosure risks against
the unbiased estimator are higher (0.221 and 0.185, respectively).
Overall, Simulation 1 shows that, the disclosure risk from the correlation-attack and the
unbiased estimator need to be examined at the same time. A noise candidate which yields
a low disclosure risk against the unbiased estimator might yield a high disclosure risk
against the correlation-attack estimator, and vice versa. Therefore, the data provider will
generally need to evaluate the disclosure risk against the correlation-attack. Because of
this, the data provider needs guidance about the noise candidates to be used for different
distributions of the original data. In the next two sections, we present a simulation study
for original data sets which follow log-normal distributions. We aim to provide a rough
guide about the types of noise candidates to be used for log-normally distributed original
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data sets.

4.1.1

Simulation 2

Recall that
Rρ (yi , δ ) ≈ P(

2 )µ
2 )µ
(−δ + 1)yi − (1 − ρYY
(δ + 1)yi − (1 − ρYY
∗
∗
Y
Y
<
C
<
).
2
2
ρYY ∗ yi
ρYY ∗ yi

Based on this expression, we see that the disclosure risk of yi against the correlationattack estimator is determined by ρYY ∗ , µY , and the value of yi . Therefore, the distributions
of the original data and the noise generating variable jointly determine the disclosure risk
of yi . We note that the log-normal distribution could go from roughly symmetric to heavily skewed. In this simulation we want to investigate the following questions: 1. Which
kinds of log-normal distribution (e.g. symmetric or heavily skewed) are vulnerable to the
correlation-attack. 2. Which noise generating variables provide more protection against
the correlation-attack for original data sets which follow different log-normal distributions. 3. Which subset of the observations are more vulnerable to the correlation-attack.
For example, do a few large observations have a higher risk of being attacked by the
correlation-attack?
We conducted the following simulation: We chose four different original data sets
y1 ,y2 and y3 , each with sample size 1000. Each data set is created by randomly drawing
1000 observations from a log-normal distribution LN(0, σ 2 ), and then multiply each
√
√
observation by 10. The parameters of σ used for y1 , y2 and y3 are 0.5, 2/2 and 3/2,
respectively. The distribution of y1 is roughly symmetric, the distribution of y2 is mildly
skewed, the distribution of y3 is heavily skewed. We chose five different noise generating
variables to mask each set of data. The five noise generating variables we use are:
1. C2,1 ∼ 0.5U(0.6, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.4).
√
√
2. C2,2 ∼ U(1 − 0.84/2, 1 + 0.84/2).
3. C2,3 ∼ N(1, 0.07).
4. C2,4 ∼ T (0.4755, 1.7245, 0.8).
5. C2,5 ∼ T (0.2755, 1.5245, 1.2).
Note that C2,4 follows a left skewed triangular distribution and C2,5 follows a right
skewed triangular distribution. For all 5 noise candidates, the means are 1 and the vari-
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Table 4.4: Average disclosure risk of y1 for each noise candidate.

noise setting
C2,1
C2,2
C2,3
C2,4
C2,5

average disclosure risk
0.385
0.394
0.410
0.399
0.406

Table 4.5: Average disclosure risk of y2 for each noise candidate.

noise setting
C2,1
C2,2
C2,3
C2,4
C2,5

average disclosure risk
0.216
0.267
0.311
0.298
0.286

ances are 0.07, and therefore the correlations between each set of original data and the
noise candidates are the same. The five noise candidates have the following features:
1. We use a mixture of uniforms random variable C2,1 to represent the group of noise
generating variables with RLW = 0; 2. C2,2 and C2,3 represent balanced noise generating
variables. 3. C2,4 and C2,5 represent skewed noise generating random variables.
For each set of original data and noise candidate combination, we calculated the disclosure risk of each original value against the correlation-attack through 5000 iterations.
For the three sets of original data, the correlations between the original data and the five
noise candidates are 0.678, 0.876, 0.926, respectively. We calculated the average of the
disclosure risks for all observations. The results are given in Table 4.4, Table 4.5, and
Table 4.6.
In the following we use the average disclosure risk to quantify the protection level of
each noise candidate. To interpret the tables, we see that for each choice of noise canTable 4.6: Average disclosure risk of y3 for each noise candidate.

noise setting
C2,1
C2,2
C2,3
C2,4
C2,5

average disclosure risk
0.164
0.232
0.278
0.265
0.246
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didate, y1 has the highest average disclosure risk. It might suggest that log-normally
distributed data sets which are roughly symmetric are more vulnerable to the correlationattack than log-normally distributed data sets which are skewed. Moreover, even though
the correlation between y4 and its noise-multiplied counterpart is the highest, the disclosure risk for y4 is the lowest among the three sets of data. It might suggest that a higher
correlation between the original data and the noise-multiplied data does not necessarily
mean a higher disclosure risk. Results from Simulation 1 and other unreported simulations show that for two sets of original data, a higher correlation between the original data
and its noise-multiplied version is associated with a higher disclosure risk if the two sets
of data are distributed similarly.
In terms of which noise candidates protect the original data better, we see that in all
cases, C2,1 gives the best protection to the original data. It might suggest that those noise
candidates with RLW = 0 also offer good protections to log-normally distributed original
data in many cases. This observation is also showed in our simulation study in Section
3.4.2. In Section 3.4.2, Figure 3.4, we see that C1 and C4 offer the best protection to
the original data. In that simulation, both C1 and C4 has RLW very close to 0. In summary, it seems that the for a log-normally distributed data set, it is more vulnerable to the
correlation-attack if its distribution is roughly symmetric, and it seems that those noise
candidates with a low RLW protect log-normally distributed data sets better in most cases.
Another question we intend to answer is, whether a particular subset of original observations are vulnerable to the correlation-attack. To investigate this question, for y1 ,y2 and
y3 , we divided the original observations into 10 groups according to their magnitude. That
is, the smallest first 100 observations are in the first group, the 101st smallest observations
to the 200th smallest observations are in the second group, etc. We recorded the average
disclosure risk of observations in each group. The results are given in Figure 4.1, Figure
4.2 and Figure 4.3.
Based on Figure 4.1, we see that for y1 and noise candidates C2,3 , C2,4 and C2,5 , the
highest risk regions are around the median. However, the disclosure risk for C2,4 peaks to
the left of the median, and the disclosure risk for C2,5 peaks to the right of the median. In
other words, C2,4 provides more protection to large valued observations and C2,5 provides
more protection to lower valued observations. Notice that C2,4 is right skewed and C2,5 is
left skewed. Interestingly the peak of the disclosure risk shifts according to the skewness
of the noise candidate.
Based on Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, we see that small original observations are more
vulnerable to the correlation-attack than large observations if C2,4 is used. The reverse is
true if C2,5 is used. This observation agrees with our results given in Figure 4.1. Therefore,
these results may suggest that, for log-normally distributed original data sets, in order to
provide more protections to small original observations, the data agency should choose a
right-skewed noise generating variable; similarly, the data provider should choose a left-
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Figure 4.1: average disclosure risk of y1 in each region.

Figure 4.2: average disclosure risk of y2 in each region..
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Figure 4.3: average disclosure risk of y3 in each region.

skewed noise generating variable if the data agency wants to provide more protections to
large-valued original observation. We will use this idea in the application study.
To summarize, simulations in this section might suggest the following: 1. The
correlation-attack is more efficient for attacking data sets which are log-normally distributed and roughly symmetric, and less efficient for attacking data sets which are lognormally distributed and heavily skewed. 2. It looks like noise candidates with the value
of RLW very close to 0 provide better protection against the correlation-attack than other
noise candidates. 3. Given that the original data is log-normally distributed, it looks
like a right-skewed noise generating variable is more efficient for protecting large-valued
original observations, and a left-skewed noise generating variable is more efficient for
protecting small-valued original observations.

4.1.2

Simulation 3

In Simulation 2 we have seen that the mixtures of uniforms noise generating variable
(C2,1 ) provides a better protection than all the other noise candidates. We speculated
in Simulation 2 that noise candidates with RLW = 0 provide better protections against the
correlation-attack as well. In this simulation we nominate a few noise candidates with RLW
being 0. We aim to compare the levels of protection offered by these noise candidates,
and interpret our simulated result. We consider the following noise generating variables:
C3,1 : 0.5T (0.6815127, 0.6815127, 0.9) + 0.5T (1.1, 1.3184873, 1.3184873).
C3,2 : 0.5T (0.501669, 0.9, 0.9) + 0.5T (1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.498331).
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C3,3 : 0.5T (1, 0.61197, 0.9, 0.755985) + 0.5T (1, 1.1, 1.38803, 1.244015).
C3,4 : 0.5U(0.624, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.376).
C3,1 , C3,2 and C3,3 follow mixtures of triangular distributions. This type of noise distribution was proposed in Kim (2007) and Kim and Jeong (2008) for generating noise
terms. The means of these noise candidates are 1 and and the variances are 0.063. The
original data we aim to protect is y4 . y4 is generated by drawing 1000 observations from
LN(0, 0.4), and then multiply each observation by 10.
Following the same steps as we did before, we recorded the average disclosure risk of
y4 for each noise candidate. The results are given in Table 4.7. The table shows that, even
though all these noise candidates have RLW = 0, their protection against the correlationattack can still differ dramatically. In this simulation, C3,1 provides the best protection to
y4 . We suggest that in practice, the data provider could come up with many differently
distributed noise candidates with RLW = 0, and assess their protection to the original data
individually. Kim and Jeong (2008) proposed many candidate distributions with RLW = 0.
These noise distributions could all perform differently in different practical situations.
The more choices the data provider has, the better the chance that the data provider will
find an ideal noise candidate such that the desired utility-risk tradeoff is achieved.
Table 4.7: Average disclosure risk of y4 for each noise candidate

4.1.3

noise setting

average disclosure risk

C3,1

0.238

C3,2

0.280

C3,3

0.244

C3,4

0.262

Simulation 4

In this simulation we compare the performance of different “mixture of uniforms” noise
generating variables. In the above simulations, we only tried mixtures with equal weights
noise generating variables. However, it may be possible to use mixtures with unequal
weights noise generating variables in practice. As we showed in Simulation 1, a skewed
noise generating variable has the advantage of providing greater protection to certain portions of the original observations for log-normally distributed original data. We speculate
that using mixtures with unequal weights noise generating variables could achieve the
same outcome in many situations. For instance, for log-normally distributed original
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Table 4.8: average disclosure risk of y4 for each noise candidate.

noise setting
c4,1
c4,2
c4,3

average proportions
0.254
0.302
0.301

data, if the top 10% of the original observations require strong protection, then we may
consider using a right-skewed mixtures with unequal weights noise generating variables
to mask the whole original data, giving the top 10% original observations more protection
and still certain levels of protection to the rest of the observations. In practice the data
provider only needs to release the variance of the noise variable to the public, therefore the
data intruder may not know that skewed noise variable has been used and more extreme
observations have been given stronger protection. Therefore, in the following we assume
that a correlation-attack is performed on the entire noise-multiplied data as an attempt to
reveal confidential values.
We use the following three mixture of uniforms noise candidates with means equal to
1 and variances equal to 0.103 in this simulation:
C4,1 : 0.5U(0.5, 0.9) + 0.5(1.1, 1.5).
C4,2 : 0.7U(0.1904168, 0.9) + 0.3U(1.1, 1.289821).
C4,3 : 0.7U(0.7101786, 0.9) + 0.3U(1.1, 1.809583).
The original data we use is y4 , the same as we used in Simulation 3. Note that C4,1
is symmetric; C4,2 is skewed to the left; C4,3 is skewed to the right. Following the steps
described in Simulation 1, we first computed and recorded the average disclosure risk for
each noise candidate in Table 4.8. Then, we divided y4 into 10 regions, with region 1
corresponding to the first 100 smallest observations. We calculated the average disclosure
risk of observations in each region. The results are given in Table 4.9.
The results agree with our speculation. Even though C4,1 provide the best protection,
C4,3 provide the best protection the better protections for large observations. Therefore
we suggest that if, in a set of log-normally distributed original data, only extremely large
(or small) observations require strong protection, the data provider could consider using
skewed noise variables with RLW being 0 to protect the original data.
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Table 4.9: Average proportion of y4 being disclosed by the correlational attack according
to regions.

noise setting
c4,1
c4,2
c4,3
noise setting
c4,1
c4,2
c4,3

4.2

region1
0.022
0.084
0.000
region6
0.174
0.190
0.388

region2
0.294
0.144
0.181
region7
0.177
0.428
0.150

region3
0.405
0.138
0.643
region8
0.232
0.658
0.079

region4
0.310
0.105
0.703
region9
0.330
0.699
0.109

region5
0.211
0.075
0.611
region10
0.390
0.503
0.140

Application

In this section we present an application study. The setting we use is the same as the
setting considered in the real-life application study in Klein et al.(2014). We aim to show
two things: 1. The noise candidates considered in their application study are not good for
protecting against the correlation-attack. 2. In order to protect extreme income values,
which is the requirement considered in their application, we apply some of the conclusions
we got through our above simulations, so that extreme income values are protected against
the correlation-attack.
In the following we describe the application setting. The data set is the public use
data from the 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS) March supplement (available
from http://www.census.gov/cps/). The entire data set contains household, family,
and individual records. Klein et al. (2014) only considered household records whose
income are positive as the original data set. We note that the original data roughly
follows a log-normal distribution. Only the largest 10% of income values are sensitive
and require protection. Denote household income data as y = (y1 , y2 , · · · y50661 ) with
y1 > y2 > · · · > y50661 > 0. Extreme income observations (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 ) are sensitive.
Klein et al. (2014) only applied multiplicative noise to these observations. Denote the
noise-multiplied counterparts as (z1 , z2 , · · · z5066 ). In Klein et al. (2014), they proposed
four mixtures of uniforms noise generating variables h1 ,h2 ,h3 and h4 . The distributions
of these variable take the following form:
hi ∼ (1 − p) ·U(ξ1 , ξ2 ) + p ·U(ξ3 , ξ4 ).
The parameters used by each noise generating variables are:
h1 : ξ1 = 0.8, ξ2 = 0.9, ξ3 = 1.1, ξ4 = 1.2, p = 0.5
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Table 4.10: Summary statistics of Rρ (yi , 0.1) and Rρ (yi , 0.2).

noise setting
h1
h2
h3
h4

correlation
0.94
0.74
0.72
0.50

Q1
0.21
0.26
0.23
0.05

δ = 0.1
Q2 Mean
0.33 0.33
0.41 0.38
0.35 0.33
0.19 0.24

Q3
0.44
0.55
0.41
0.42

Q1
0.81
0.57
0.5
0.21

δ = 0.2
Q2 Mean
0.92
0.9
0.71 0.66
0.53 0.55
0.46 0.46

Q3
1
0.8
0.62
0.72

h2 : ξ1 = 0.5, ξ2 = 0.9, ξ3 = 1.1, ξ4 = 1.5, p = 0.8
h3 : ξ1 = 0.5, ξ2 = 0.9, ξ3 = 1.1, ξ4 = 1.5, p = 0.5
h4 : ξ1 = 0.1, ξ2 = 0.8, ξ3 = 1.2, ξ4 = 1.5, p = 0.8
It is assumed that the data provider releases the perturbed data to the public. That
is, (z1 , z2 , · · · z5066 , y5067 , · · · , y50661 ) are released to the public. In the following we consider the Case I in Klein et al. (2014). For Case I, the data provider releases the perturbed data, together with indications of which observations are noise-multiplied observations. When proposing these noise candidates, the authors did not consider disclosure
risk from the correlation-attack. In this simulation we measure the disclosure risks against
the correlation-attack for these noise candidates.
The correlation-attack is performed on (z1 , z2 , · · · z5066 ) to disclose their original values.
We set δ = 0.1 and 0.2 and measure the disclosure risk respectively. We used Approach
2 mentioned in Section 3.3 to measure disclosure risks against the correlation-attack. We
report the average correlation between y and z and the summary statistics of disclosure
risks for δ = 0.1 and δ = 0.2 in Table 4.10.
To interpret Table 4.10, take noise setting h2 for example. The Q2 value when δ = 0.2
is 0.71. It means that if the data provider use h2 to mask (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 ), then 50% of
observations have a disclosure risk of more than 0.71. Based on the table, we see that
when δ = 0.1, it looks like h4 is the only reasonable choice as the average disclosure risk
is 0.24, whereas other noise candidates result in relatively high disclosure risks. When δ
is set to be 0.2, we see that even in the best case the average disclosure risk is 0.46, which
means that none of the noise candidates provide good protection.
To reduce the disclosure risks of (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 ), we propose the following masking scheme: Instead of only perturbing (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 ), we perturb the entire data
(y1 , y2 , · · · , y50661 ) using multiplicative noise. The noise generating variable we propose
is C4,3 , the right-skewed mixture of uniforms noise generating variable in Simulation
4. The reason is that based on our observation in Simulation 1 and Simulation 4, it is
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Table 4.11: Summary statistics of Rρ (yi , 0.1) and Rρ (yi , 0.2).

noise setting
C4, 3

r̃c
YZ
0.904

Q1
0.05

δ = 0.1
Q2 Mean
0.07 0.07

Q3
0.09

Q1
0.12

δ = 0.2
Q2 Mean
0.15 0.16

Q3
0.19

likely that a right-skewed mixture of uniforms noise variable provides better protection
to largest 10% of the original observations. When C4,3 is used, the correlation between
the noise-multiplied data and original data is roughly 0.9. The correlation is very
high, which might motivate a data intruder to use the correlation-attack. Suppose the
correlation-attack is performed by using the entire data. We calculated the disclosure risk
for (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 ), and we report the summaries statistics of the disclosure risks in
Table 4.11.
We see from Table 4.11 that, (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 ) are now well protected against the
correlation-attack. The average disclosure risks are reduced to 0.07 and 0.15 for δ = 0.1
and 0.2, respectively. In summary, this application showed again the advantage of using
skewed noise generating variables to achieve the desired level of protection for certain
portions of original observations.

4.3

Conclusion and Future work

In this chapter we proposed several questions with regard to protecting against the
correlation-attack for log-normally distributed original data sets. We presented several
simulation results of using different types of noise generating variables to protect different log-normally distributed data sets. We have the following observations: First of all,
extensive simulations show that noise candidates with RLW = 0 offer better protection to
the original data against the correlation-attack; Secondly, the simulations show that using
right-skewed noise candidates could help the data provider to better protect larger observations. Similarly, using left-skewed noise candidates could help the data provider to
better protect smaller observations. We presented an application of using skewed noise
candidates to achieve a desired level of protection in a hypothetical scenario. The observations in this chapter could guide the process of noise generating variable selection for
data providers in practice.

Chapter 5
Quantifying protection level of a noise
candidate
From this chapter onward we assume the case where the density function of the noise
generating variable fC is public knowledge. In Chapter 3, we proposed a disclosure risk
measure which could be used by data providers for noise generating variable selection.
However, besides the unbiased estimator and the correlation-attack estimator, there exist
other estimators for attacking noise-multiplied data. Therefore, the disclosure risk measure we introduced in Chapter 3 might be too limited in its applicability. In this chapter we
propose a measure for evaluating the protection level of a noise candidate. The proposed
measure could be of practical use for noise generating variable selection.
Because the data provider has no control over which attacking strategy a data intruder
might use, an ideal noise generating variable should provide enough protection to each
original observation against all attacking strategies. The data provider might say that a
noise candidate provides enough protection to the original data if for any original observation, the maximum value disclosure risk against any attacking strategy is below a
threshold value. However, it is difficult to find such a noise candidate. Alternatively, the
data provider might look at the average value disclosure risk for quantifying the protection
level that noise candidate offers to the original data against an attacking strategy, which
is the mean of the value disclosure risks of all original observations against the attacking
strategy. For large-sized data, the average value disclosure risk provides a rough idea
about the proportion of original observations which could be disclosed by the attacking
strategy in a set of noise-multiplied data. The data provider might want the proportion to
be below an acceptable level, especially if all observations might be identified or targeted.
Under this setting, the data provider might say that a noise candidate offers enough protection to the original data if the average value disclosure risks against several attacking
strategies are all below a given threshold level.
We consider the following setting in this chapter: to attack an original observation
yi , the data intruder uses an attacking estimator g(Yi∗ ), where Yi∗ = yiC, C is the noise
57
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generating variable, and g(Yi∗ ) is a function of Yi∗ . We will show in Section 5.5, that
there are many attacking estimators which satisfy this setting. We also assume the data
protector uses the average value disclosure risk to quantify the protection level that a noise
candidate offers to the original data against an attacking strategy. In practice, to evaluate
the protection level of a noise candidate, the data provider might need to evaluate value
disclosure risks against several attacking estimators. This is a complicated job for the data
provider. In this chapter, we derive an attacking estimator, namely the optimal estimator,
which maximizes the average value disclosure risk. Therefore, for a noise candidate,
instead of measuring its value disclosure risks against several attacking estimators which
are functions of Yi∗ , the data provider could simply measure the average value disclosure
risk against the optimal estimator to understand the protection level the noise candidate
provides to the original data. The data provider could use this single measure for noise
generating variable selection in practice. We note that other attacking estimators which
are not functions of Yi∗ exist, such as the attacking estimator introduced in Klein et al.
(2014). These cases are not considered in this chapter.
As noted in Chapter 3, some distributions have been proposed as good noise distributions in the literature because they offer strong protections against the unbiased estimator
for any set of original data. We will show in the simulation study that these distributions
might not provide good protections to the original data according to our protection level
quantification measure.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 introduces the utility loss measure we
use in this chapter. Section 5.2 introduces the optimal estimator. Section 5.3 derives the
optimal estimator. Section 5.4 introduces methods for evaluating value disclosure risks
against the optimal estimator. Section 5.5 discusses the optimal estimator from the data
intruder’s point of view. Section 5.6 presents a simulation study. Section 5.7 concludes
the chapter.

5.1

Definition of overall data utility loss

As we noted in Chapter 2, moments and quantile estimates of Y could be accurately
estimated from the noise-multiplied data. For quantile estimates, we note that Sinha et
al. (2011)’s approach requires a data user to have prior knowledge about the distribution
of Y . On the contrary, using the reconstruction algorithm to estimate this information
does not require prior knowledge and is very accurate. We note the following: 1. for
large-sized sample, moments estimates of Y are normally estimated accurately regardless
of the distribution of C; 2. under the reconstruction algorithm approach, the accuracy of
the quantile estimates of Y depends on the accuracy of the reconstructed density estimate
fˆY . Unlike moments estimates, the accuracy of fˆY is largely affected by the distribution of
C. (See results in Agrawal and Aggarwal (2001)). Therefore, in this chapter we adopt the
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overall data utility loss measure proposed in Agrawal and Aggarwal (2001). The authors
defined the overall data utility loss measure according to how much the reconstructed
density estimates and the original density function overlap. Mathematically, the overall
data utility loss is defined as:
1
ULy,C = E[
2

Z ∞
−∞

| fY (x) − fˆY,C (x)|dx],

where fˆY,C (x) is the reconstructed density function of fY given the data masked by C.
ULy,C is bounded between 0 and 1. This utility loss measure is similar to the pMSE
which could be seen as a loss measure for synthetic data (Snoke et al. 2018). A low ULy,C
value means that many parameter estimates of Y could be accurately estimated from the
noise-multiplied data if C is the noise generating variable. We note that functionals of the
distribution might be estimated directly better than by going through a density estimator
(Bickel and Ritov 2003). We do not pursue this discussion in this chapter.
In practice, ULy,C could be computed in the following way: 1. the data provider estimates fY from y using either moment based density approximation or kernel density
estimation. Denote the estimate as fˆY ; 2. the data provider independently generates q
sets of noise-multiplied data from Y ∗ ; 3. the data provider applies the sample-momentbased density approximation method (Lin 2014) on these sets of noise-multiplied data to
k , where
obtain q realizations of fˆY,C ; 4. For the k-th reconstructed density function fˆY,C
R∞
k (y)|dy. The data provider esk = 1, 2, · · · , q, the data provider computes −∞ | fˆY (y) − fˆY,C
R
∞
1 q
k (y)|dy. We will use these steps to compute
timates ULy,C using 2q
∑k=1 −∞ | fˆY (y) − fˆY,C
the overall utility loss in the simulation.
Once the disclosure risks and expected losses of several noise candidates have been
estimated, the data provider can choose a suitable noise generating variable to mask the
original data. The data provider could then apply the chosen C once and release the noisemultiplied data to the public.

5.2

The optimal estimator

In this section we introduce the optimal estimator which maximizes the average value disclosure risk. We assume the original data is only subject to attacking estimators which are
functions of Yi∗ . According to Chapter 2, the probabilistic value disclosure risk measure
for evaluating the disclosure risk of yi against an attacking estimator Ỹi takes the following
form:
|Ỹi −Yi |
R(Ỹi , δ |Yi = yi ) = P(
< δ |Yi = yi ),
Yi
where Ỹi = g(Yi∗ ), Yi∗ = CYi .
We assume the data provider uses the average value disclosure risk to quantify the pro-
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tection level a noise candidate C offers to the original data against the attacking estimator
Ỹi . The average disclosure risk is defined as:
∑ni=1 R(Ỹi , δ |Yi = yi )
.
n
The data provider has no control over which attacking strategy a data intruder might use
to attack the original data, therefore, to assess the protection level of a noise candidate,
the data provider might need to evaluate the average value disclosure risk against many
potential attacking estimators. A noise candidate is qualified for masking the original data
if the average value disclosure risk is below a certain level. To facilitate the process, we
propose an optimal estimator which maximizes the average probabilistic value disclosure
risk. The optimal estimator takes the following form:
{R(Ỹi , δ |Yi = yi )}ni=1 =

Ziopt = argmaxg(Yi∗ )

Z

g(Yi∗ )
(1−δ )
g(Yi∗ )
(1+δ )

fYi |Yi∗ (x)dx,

(5.1)
Y∗

where fY is the density function of Y , Yi∗ = YiC and fYi |Yi∗ (x) = 1x fC ( xi ) fYi (x). The derivation of Ziopt is given in the next section. Correspondingly, the value disclosure risk of yi
against the optimal estimator Ziopt is defined as
Ziopt −Yi
Ropt (yi ,C, δ ) = P(|
| < δ |Yi = yi )
Yi
The average value disclosure risk of using C to mask the original data against the optimal estimator is Roverall (y, δ ,C). That is:
∑ni=1 Ropt (yi ,C, δ )
Roverall (y, δ ,C) =
n
We propose that the data provider measures Roverall (y, δ ,C) to quantify the level of
protection a noise candidate C offers to the original data. If Roverall (y, δ ,C) is below an
acceptable level, then C offers enough protection to the original data against any other
estimators which are functions of Yi∗ . We note that when yi is subject to other forms
of attacks which are not solely functions of Yi∗ , such as the one proposed in Klein et
al. (2014), the data provider might need to use Roverall (y, δ ,C) in conjunction with other
corresponding average value disclosure risk measures to quantify the protection level of
C. In this paper we assume the original data is only subject to attacking estimators which
are functions of Yi∗ .
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5.3

Derivation of Ziopt

Suppose for a set of original data {yi }ni=1 , the following probabilistic disclosure risk measure is used by the data provider:
P(

|Ỹ −Y |
|Ỹi −Yi |
< δ ) = P(
< δ ), i = 1, · · · , n
Yi
Y

We assume Y > 0, C > 0, Ỹ = g(Y ∗ ), where Y ∗ = CY . We observe that the disclosure
risk of an observation t is given as:
P(

|g(Y ∗ ) −Y |
< δ |Y = t) =
Y

Z ∞

I(
0

g(t ∗ )
g(t ∗ )
<t <
) f ∗ (t ∗ |Y = t)dt ∗ ,
1+δ
1 − δ Y |Y
∗

where t ∗ is the noise-multiplied version of t. The conditional probability P( |g(Y Y)−Y | <
δ |Y ) is a function of random variable Y .
The average disclosure risk for the original data is
Roverall =
Suppose EY (P(

|g(Y ∗ )−Y |
Y

∑ni=1 P(

|g(Y ∗ )−Y |
Y

< δ |Y = yi )

n

< δ |Y )) exists, therefore we have
P

Roverall → EY (P(

|g(Y ∗ ) −Y |
< δ |Y ))
Y

as n → ∞.
The objective is to find an expression of g(Y ∗ ) which maximizes Roverall as n → ∞.
∗
Because {Y ∗ |Y = t} = tC, therefore fY ∗ |Y (t ∗ |Y = t) = 1t fC ( tt ). We observe the following:
g(x∗ )
g(x∗ )
<x<
)f ∗
(x∗ )dx∗ fY (x)dx
1+δ
1 − δ Y |Y =y
0
0
Z ∞Z ∞
g(x∗ ) 1
x∗
g(x∗ )
=
<x<
) fC ( ) fY (x)dxdx∗
I(
1+δ
1−δ x
x
0
0
Z ∞
Z ∞
∗)
∗)
g(x
g(x
=
fY ∗ (x∗ )
I(
<x<
) fY |Y ∗ =x∗ (x)dxdx∗
1
+
δ
1
−
δ
0
0

|g(Y ∗ ) −Y |
< δ |Y )) =
EY (P(
Y

Z ∞Z ∞

I(

Z ∞

=
0

Therefore,
The form of

∗
EY (P( |g(Y Y)−Y |

g(x∗ )

fY ∗ (x∗ )

Z

g(x∗ )
(1−δ )
g(x∗ )
(1+δ )

fY |Y ∗ =x∗ (x)dxdx∗

< δ |Y )) is maximized if

which maximizes

R

g(x∗ )
(1−δ )
g(x∗ )
(1+δ )

R

g(x∗ )
(1−δ )
g(x∗ )
(1+δ )

fY |Y ∗ =x∗ (x)dx is

fY |Y ∗ =x∗ (x)dx is maximized.
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g(x∗ )
(1−δ )

Z

zopt = argmaxg(x∗ )

g(x∗ )
(1+δ )

fY |Y ∗ =x∗ (x)dx.

Therefore, the optimal estimator Zopt takes the following form
Z

Zopt = argmaxg(Y ∗ )

g(Y ∗ )
(1−δ )
g(Y ∗ )
(1+δ )

fY |Y ∗ (x)dx

Finding Ropt (yi,C, δ )

5.4

In this section we discuss how the data provider could find Ropt (yi ,C, δ ) in practice.
Case 1: fY is known. If fY is known to the data provider then the mathematical
expression of Ziopt might be derived analytically. Suppose Q(y) is the antiderivative of
∗

Yi
1
y fC ( y

) fYi (y), H(x) =

R

x
1−δ
x
δ +1

H(Ziopt ) =

Z

∗

Yi
1
y fC ( y

opt
Zi
1−δ
opt
Zi
δ +1

) fYi (y)dy, then

Z opt
Z opt
Y∗
1
fC ( i ) fYi (y)dy = Q( i ) − Q( i )
y
y
1−δ
δ +1

To find the argument Ziopt where H(Ziopt ) is maximized, we take derivative of H(Ziopt )
to yield:

Ziopt
Ziopt
dH(Ziopt )
Yi∗ (1 − δ )
Yi∗ (δ + 1)
1
1
=
f
(
)
f
(
)
−
f
(
)
f
(
)
Y
Y
C
C
1−δ
1+δ
dZiopt
Ziopt
Ziopt
Ziopt
Ziopt
dH(Z

opt

)

i
We set
= 0 to find Ziopt . As an example, if Y ∼ LN(µ1 , σ12 ), C ∼ LN(µ2 , σ22 ),
opt
dZi
we can show that

Ziopt = exp(

(σ12 + σ22 )ln[(1 + δ )(1 − δ )] + 2σ12 ln(yiC) − 2σ12 µ2 + 2σ22 µ1
)
2(σ12 + σ22 )

.
Correspondingly, we could obtain Ropt (yi ,C, δ ) for each yi if the expression of Ziopt is
available.
Case 2: fY is unknown. In practice, the data provider may only have a set of original
data {yi }ni=1 available without knowing the true underlying distribution of Y . To find
Ropt (yi ,C, δ ) in this case, the data provider might need to estimate the density function
fY . For instance, the data provider might obtain a kernel density estimate KY based on
Y∗
{yi }ni=1 , and replace fY |Yi∗ by 1y fC ( yi )KY (y) in Equation (5.1) to approximate Ziopt , and
then approximate Ropt (yi ,C, δ ) for each yi .
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The data provider might have different strategies to approximate Ropt (yi ,C, δ ). In the
simulation study, we assume Y is bounded between [a, b] and C is bounded between [c, d],
where a and b are the minimum and maximum of the original data, and (a, b, c, d) > 0.
Therefore, we note that Y ∗ is bounded between [ac, bd]. We adopt the following strategy
to approximate Ropt (yi ,C, δ ):

1
;
• Step 1: We generate n1 realizations of y∗i , where y∗i ∼ yiC. Denote them as {y∗il }nl=1

∗

∗

• Step 2: We note that the support of fY |Y ∗ is [max(a, Yd ), min(b, Yc )]. Therefore, for
each y∗il , we take n2 points between [max(a,
2
Q. Denote the points as {hv }nv=1
;

• Step 3: For each hv , we attempt to estimate
[a, b], therefore

hv
(1+δ )

Z

R

y∗il
y∗il
),
min(b,
d
c )]

hv
(1−δ )
hv
(1+δ )

cannot be lower than a and
hv
(1−δ )

hv
(1+δ )

fY |Yi∗ (y)dy =

with equal increment

fY |Yi∗ (y)dy. Y is bounded between
hv
(1−δ )

Z min(b, hv )
(1−δ )
hv
max(a, (1+δ
)
)

cannot be greater than b. So

fY |Yi∗ (y)dy.

hv
hv
To estimate this integral, we take n3 points between max(a, (1+δ
) ) and min(b, (1−δ ) )
hv
with equal increment ∆. Let m j = max(a, (1+δ
) ) + ( j − 1)∆. We approximate the
y∗

n2
1
3
il
integral by Ihv = ∑nj=1
m j fC ( m j )KY (m j )∆. As a result, for {hv }v=1 , we obtain a
2
corresponding set {Ihv }nv=1
;

opt
n2
• Step 4: We let zopt
i,y∗il = argmaxhv {Ihv }v=1 . Then zi,y∗il is the optimal estimate of yi
given y∗il ;

• Step 5: We repeat the above process for each y∗il , l = 1, 2, · · · , n1 . As a result, we
n1
obtain {zopt
i,y∗ }l=1 ;
il

opt
• Step 6: We count the number of zopt
i,y∗il such that zi,y∗il ∈ [yi (1 − δ ), yi (1 + δ )]. Denote
the number as n4 ;

• Step 7: We estimate Ropt (yi ,C, δ ) by n4 /n1 .
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We use the above steps for estimating Ropt (yi ,C, δ ) in the simulation study. We note
that the above approach is naı̈ve and might not be the most efficient way for estimating
Ropt (yi ,C, δ ). However, it is sufficient for illustration purposes.

5.5

Discussion

In this section we discuss the optimal estimator and other possible attacking estimators
mainly from data intruders’ point of view. For illustration, we use another three attacking
estimators for estimating an original value yi . The three attacking estimators will also be
used in the simulation detailed in Section 5.6:
Unbiased estimator: Nayak et al. (2011) showed that Yi∗ = CYi is an unbiased estimator
of yi as E(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) = yi . Therefore, Yi∗ is the unbiased estimator for yi .
Correlation-attack estimator: In Chapter 3 we showed that when the population
correlation between Y and Y ∗ is high, then a simple linear model might be adequate to
explain the relationship between the two variables. The correlation-attack estimator Ŷi
2 )µ + ρ 2 Y ∗ , where ρ 2
takes the following form: Ŷi = (1 − ρYY
∗
Y
YY ∗ is the population
YY ∗ i
∗
correlation between Y and Y , and µY is the population mean of Y .
Maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimator: The MAP estimator is simply the mode
Y∗
of fYi |Yi∗ (y), where fYi |Yi∗ (y) = 1y fC ( yi ) fYi (y). Denoting the estimator as Zi , then
Zi = argmaxy fYi |Yi∗ (y).
Discussion 1: Interpretation of zopt
from the data intruder’s point of view
i
opt
Given y∗i , a realization of Zi takes the following form:

zopt
i = argmaxg(y∗i )

Z

g(y∗i )
(1−δ )
g(y∗i )
(1+δ )

Z

fY |Yi∗ =y∗i (y)dy = argmaxg(y∗i )

g(y∗i )
(1−δ )
g(y∗i )
(1+δ )

y∗
1
fC ( i ) fY (y)dy.
y
y

From the data intruder’s point of view, suppose the data intruder has no prior knowledge
of yi and assumes that yi ∼ Yi . Given y∗i , suppose the data intruder uses an estimate g(y∗i )
to attack yi , then the probability that g(y∗i ) discloses yi could be expressed as
P(|

g(y∗i ) −Yi
g(y∗ )
g(y∗i ) ∗
| < δ |Yi∗ = y∗i ) = P( i < Yi <
|Y = y∗i )
Yi
1+δ
1−δ i

.
The expression of zopt
means that zopt
maximizes the above posterior probability of
i
i
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disclosing yi . Therefore, if the data intruder wants to maximize the posterior probability
to attack yi .
of disclosing yi , the data intruder may use zopt
i
y∗
opt
To find zi , the data intruder needs information of fC ( yi ) and fY (y). Because fC and
y∗

y∗i are public knowledge, the data intruder knows fC ( yi ). However, fY (y) is unknown
and needs to be estimated. The data intruder could estimate fY by using Lin’s reconstruction algorithm which we reviewed in Chapter 2. As a result, the data intruder could
opt
ˆ
obtain an approximated value of zopt
i by replacing fY (y) by fY (y) in the expression of zi .
Discussion 2: Estimator selection from the data intruder’s point of view
To attack yi , the data intruder might use any of the four estimators Yi∗ , Ŷi , Ziopt and Zi .
For the data provider, it could use the corresponding value disclosure risk measures to tell
which attacking estimator is more effective for attacking yi . For instance, in the simulation
study, we can show that if yi is around 185000, then it has a value disclosure risk of 1
against the optimal estimator if C1 is used to mask the original data. Therefore, the data
provider knows that if the optimal estimator is used to attack the corresponding noisemultiplied value y∗i , it will lead to value disclosure. However, the data intruder might not
know that the optimal estimator will surely lead to value disclosure of y∗i .
To attack y∗i , the data intruder might come up with his own rule for determining
which attacking estimator to use to disclose yi . For instance, the data intruder might
use the correlation-attack estimator if the estimated sample correlation between the
noise-multiplied data and the original data is very high. Alternatively, as we argued
in Discussion 1, Ziopt maximizes the data intruder’s posterior probability of disclosing
yi . If the probability is used as a decision rule, then the data intruder will use the
optimal estimator to attack yi . Regardless, the decision rule used by a data intruder
does not necessarily lead to the best choice of estimator for attacking yi . Therefore, the
data provider might be less worried about those original values which suffer very high
disclosure risks against an attacking estimator when evaluating the protection level of a
noise candidate C, especially if the corresponding records have low identity disclosure
risks.
Discussion 3: Value disclosure risk measure and the worst-case DP
When releasing noise-multiplied data to the public, the worst-case differential privacy
(DP) could be achieved. In that way, no private information could be revealed even
if an adversary knows all information about the data except the private information.
This requirement could be achieved in some statistical limitation methods, such as εdifferentially private synthetic data (Snoke et al. 2018). Our value disclosure risk measure aims to ensure a sufficient level of uncertainty when a data intruder with no prior
knowledge attacks the noise-multiplied data, but it does not guarantee the worst-case DP.
Releasing data which satisfy the worst-case DP might render a high loss of data utility
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and therefore might not be considered by a statistical agency. How to generate noisemultiplied data which achieves the worst-case DP while maintaining enough data utility
requires future study.

5.6

Simulation study

In this section we present a simulation study using the data we used in Simulation 2
of Chapter 3. However in this case we only consider the top 5% household income
values under household income attribute as the original data. We consider several noise
candidates. The original data contains 2533 positive observations ranging from 140000
to 768742. We denote the original data as {yi }2533
i=1 . We set the acceptance rule δ = 0.1
throughout this section. We consider the following four noise candidates:
C1 ∼ 0.5U(0.5, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.5);
C2 ∼ 0.5U(0.3, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.7);
p
p
C3 ∼ U(1 − 0.5 93/75, 1 + 0.5 93/75);
C4 ∼ U(0.245, 1.755).
Among the four noise candidates, C1 and C3 have the same variance 0.103. C2 and C4
have the same variance 0.190. C1 and C2 represent those types of noise candidate which
have been advocated by researchers as they offer strong protections against the unbiased
estimator.
We first measured the value disclosure risks of each yi against each of the four attacking
estimators. To find Ropt (yi ,C, 0.1), we obtained a kernel density estimate KY based on the
original data by using the function ‘density()’ with default parameters in R. We computed
the average value disclosure risks against each attacking estimator. The results are given in
Table 5.1. To comment on the table, we see that C1 and C2 provide very good protection to
the original data against the unbiased estimator because the corresponding average value
disclosure risks are 0. However, comparing C1 with C3 (with the same variance), we
see that C3 protects the original data better against the other three estimators than C1 . A
similar story can be seen when we compare C2 and C4 . The result shows that a noise
candidate which protects the original data well against one attacking estimator may not
provides sufficient protection against other estimators. The result may also suggest that,
those noise candidates represented by C1 and C2 which have been advocated by some
researchers might not provide better protections than other noise candidates.
Denote Rcor (yi ,C, 0.1) as the value disclosure risk of yi against the correlation-attack
estimator if C is used to mask yi . We provide value disclosure risks {Rcor (yi ,C1 , 0.1)}2533
i=1
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2533
against the original data {yi }2533
i=1 plot in Figure 5.1, and we provide {Ropt (yi ,C1 , 0.1)}i=1
against {yi }2533
i=1 plot in Figure 5.2. We also provide similar plots under the case of C3
in Figure 5.3 and 5.4. We see that, for an attacking strategy, a noise candidate might
not be able to protect all observations. For instance, we see in Figure 5.2 that some
observations have value disclosure risks of 1 against the optimal estimator. We also see
that, a noise candidate which protects an original observation well against one attacking
estimator might not protect it well against another estimator. For instance, we see in
Figure 5.4 that observations around 200000 only have value disclosure risks of around 0.2
against the optimal estimator. However, the corresponding value disclosure risks against
the correlation-attack estimator are above 0.3. The story is reversed for observations
greater than 500000. While it might be desirable for a noise candidate to be able to
protect all observations against all attacking strategies, these two figures showed that it
is difficult to find such a noise candidate. Therefore, using average value disclosure risk
to quantify the level of protection of a noise candidate offers to the original data against
an attacking estimator, and ensuring that the mean disclosure risk is below a certain level
seems to be one reasonable criteria for noise generating variable selection. There are
other alternatives. For instance, the data provider might select a noise candidate which
ensures that the maximum value disclosure risk against several attacking estimators for
each observation is below a certain level.
For each of the noise candidates, we computed the level of overall utility loss. To compute this value, take C1 for instance, we firstly produced q samples of noise-multiplied
data using C1 . For the i-th sample of noise-multiplied data, we used the R-package
MaskDensity14 (Lin and Fielding 2015) to generate the reconstructed density function
i . Thus, we obtained q reconstructed density functions. We estimated UL( f ,C ) by
fˆY,C
Y 1
1

1 q
∑
2q i=1

Z ∞
−∞

i
|KY (y) − fˆY,C
(y)|dy,
1

q
i /q. Figure 5.5
where KY is the kernel density estimate of Y . Denote fˆY,C (y) = ∑i=1 fˆY,C
and 5.6 provide fˆY,C (y) and KY (y) plots for illustrating the accuracy of the reconstructed
density functions. The overall utility losses for the four noise candidates are 0.190, 0.209,
0.230 and 0.204 respectively. Except for C4 , we see that there is a trade-off between
Roverall (C) (last column of Table 5.1) and the overall utility loss. We see that C1 offers
the lowest level of overall utility loss but the worst protection to the original data, while
C3 offers a better protection at the expense of a higher amount of utility loss. The data
provider could choose a noise candidate which achieves the desired utility-risk tradeoff
for masking the original data.
In this simulation, we see from Table 5.1 that Roverall (C4 ) = 0.519, meaning that it offers the highest level of protection to the original data among the four noise candidates.
To find a noise candidate with better protection, we tried various noise distributions with
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variances larger than the variances of the above four noise candidates and we found several noise candidates. For instance, we found that if C ∼ LN(−0.144, 0.5362 ) truncated
between 0 and 5 is considered, then Roverall (C) is only 0.424, which provides a better
protection than C4 . In practice the data provider could decide its own threshold level such
that Roverall (C) needs to be below the threshold level in order for C to be considered.

5.7

Conclusion

In this chapter we proposed a measure for quantifying the protection level of a noise
candidate C for noise multiplication masking scheme. To attack the original data from
its noise-multiplied version, the data intruder might adopt different attacking strategies.
From the data provider’s perspective, we argued that to quantify the protection level of
a noise candidate against a particular attacking strategy, the data provider might look at
the average value disclosure risk. We proposed an optimal attacking estimator which
maximizes the average value disclosure risk, and the corresponding maximized average
value disclosure risk is the measure for quantifying the protection level a noise candidate
C offers to the original data. As a result, the data provider could use this single measure
instead of using multiple value disclosure risk measures for noise generating variable
selection in practice. We note that in this chapter we assumed an attacking estimator is a
function of the noise-multiplied variable. Relaxing this assumption for more generalised
results requires future study.
Table 5.1: The average value disclosure risks against each attacking estimator

noise

unbiased estimator

correlation-attack estimator

MAP estimator

optimal estimator

C1

0

0.357

0.543

0.628

C2

0

0.307

0.508

0.567

C3

0.179

0.327

0.501

0.547

C4

0.124

0.301

0.484

0.519
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Figure 5.1: {Rcor (yi ,C1 , 0.1)}2533
i=1 against income values plot.

Figure 5.2: {Ropt (yi ,C1 , 0.1)}2533
i=1 against income values plot.
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Figure 5.3: {Rcor (yi ,C3 , 0.1)}2533
i=1 against income values plot.

Figure 5.4: {Ropt (yi ,C3 , 0.1)}2533
i=1 against income values plot.
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Figure 5.5: KY and fˆY,C plots for C1 . The solid lines are density plots of the original
data. The dashed lines are reconstructed density plots.

Figure 5.6: KY and fˆY,C plots for C3 . The solid lines are density plots of the original
data. The dashed lines are reconstructed density plots.

Chapter 6
Attacking Noise-multiplied Data given
extrema information
In this chapter we recognise that even though only noise-multiplied data is released to
the public, the values of the extrema of the unpublished original data, i.e. the maximum
and minimum of the original data, could be learned by some data intruders in some contexts. The first context is protecting business microdata. The noise multiplication masking
method has the potential to be applied to business microdata. A typical character of business data is that it contains a few very large observations relative to the rest observations.
Multiplicative noise might be considered as a good way to perturb each individual observation in the business data as it offers uniform protections to all observations (Nayak
et al. 2011) and multiplicative noise is more suitable for economic modeling of income
data (Kim and Winkler 2003). When masking business microdata, a typical problem is
that the top few respondents of an attribute, such as the top two respondents, know the
ranks of their responses in the original data. Another context is that, the extrema could be
reasonably estimated from noise-multiplied data using the quantile estimation methods
we reviewed in Chapter 2.
This chapter has two purposes. The first purpose is to identify an attacking strategy
by assuming that the extrema of the original data are available. The second purpose is
to introduce and investigate a modification of the traditional noise multiplication masking method, namely controlled noise multiplication masking which guarantees that no
noise-multiplied observation could be attacked by the above strategy. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.1 introduces the utility loss measure we adopt in this chapter. Section 6.2 reviews methods for estimating the extrema of the original data from the
noise-multiplied data. Section 6.3 introduces the attacking strategy. Section 6.4 introduces methods for protecting against the attacking strategy. Section 6.5 presents three
simulation studies. Section 6.6 concludes the chapter.
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6.1

Definition of overall data utility loss

We adopt the same utility loss measure as we did in Chapter 4. That is, suppose the
original observations are independently drawn from Y . The data user could get an estimate
of fY based on the perturbed data. The accuracy of the estimate of fY depends on the data
provider’s choice of noise variable C. Denote the data user’s estimate of fY by fˆY,C . The
overall data utility loss is defined as:
1
UL( fY ,C) = E[
2

Z ∞
−∞

| fY (y) − fˆY,C (y)|dy]

UL( fY ,C) is bounded between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating no utility loss.

6.2

Estimating the extrema of the original data from the
noise-multiplied data

We consider univariate data. For most data intruders, the extrema of the original data
are not known. However, due to the two quantile estimation methods we reviewed in
Chapter 2, it is possible for data intruders to estimate the extrema of the original data
from the noise-multiplied data. In this section, we discuss how to estimate this piece of
information using the quantile estimation methods.
Estimating the extrema using R-package MaskDensity14 As we have described in Section 2.1.2, for MaskDensity14 to work, the data provider releases a noise.bin file. The
noise.bin file contains two parameters a and b. The values of a and b might be very close
to the minimum and maximum of the original data. As a result, the data intruder might
simply use the values of a and b to estimate the minimum and maximum of the original
data.
Estimating the extrema through Sinha et al’s quantile estimation
The quantile estimation method has been introduced in Section 2.1.2. To data intruder
might use the method to estimate the minimum and maximum of the original data.
The authors showed in their simulation study how different combinations of prior/noise
affect estimations of order statistics of the original data which is roughly symmetrically
distributed. For instance, the authors noted that in their example, when a normal prior is
used, the quantile estimation method produces very accurate estimates over the minimum,
maximum and median of the original data if the original data was perturbed by normal
noise or log-normal noise. We will present a simulation study in Section 6.5.2.
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6.3

An attacking strategy

Without loss of generality, we assume that the original data and noise terms are positive.
Suppose the data intruder knows the extrema of y, which are denoted as ymin and ymax .
At the moment we assume all noise terms are bounded between (cl , cu ). That is, suppose
{ci }ni=1 are noise terms used to mask y, with cmin = min({ci }ni=1 ) and cmax = max({ci }ni=1 ).
Then cl ≤ cmin and cu ≥ cmax . In the following we assume the data intruder knows cl and
cu . In practice, the data intruder might use the lower bound and upper bound of C as
estimates for cl and cu .
The values in y are bounded by ymin and ymax and the noise terms are bounded by cl and
cu . Thus for sufficiently low and sufficiently high published values there are restricted
bounds for the noise terms.
Let εl be a constant value. If a published noise-multiplied value y∗i is below ymin (cl +
εl ), i.e. yi ci ≤ ymin (cl + εl ). Then we have ci ≤ ymin
yi (cl + εl ).
As ymin ≤ yi , therefore ci ≤ cl + εl . In other words, ci is bounded between cl and cl + εl .
The data intruder might use the mid-point between cl and cl + εl as an estimate of ci .
Denoting the estimate as c̃i , c̃i = cl + 0.5εl . Consequently, the data intruder’s estimate of
y∗i
.
yi is ỹi = cl +0.5ε
l
The relative error between yi and ỹi is | cc̃ii − 1|. It is maximized if ci is equal to either cl
l +εl
− 1 = α, the value of
or cl + εl . To limit the relative error to a given value α, i.e. clc+0.5ε
l
2cl α
εl is equal to 1−α
.
Similarly, let εu be a constant value. If a published noise-multiplied value y∗j is above
ymax (cu + εu ), that means cu − εu ≤ c j ≤ cu . The data intruder could then estimate c j using
y∗

j
. To limit the
ĉ j , where ĉ j = cu − 0.5εu . The data intruder’s estimate of y j is ŷ j = cu −0.5ε
u
2cu α
relative error of the estimate to a given value α, εu is equal to 1+α .
Therefore, suppose the data intruder would like to unmask certain noise-multiplied
values with relative errors less than α. The data intruder could adopt the following
attacking strategy:

If a noise multiplied value y∗i is below ymin (cl + εl ), then the data intruder could estiy∗i
mate yi using ỹi , where ỹi = cl +0.5ε
. If a noise multiplied value y∗j is above ymax (cu + εu ),
l
then the data intruder could estimate y j using ŷ j , where ŷ j =

y∗j
cu −0.5εu .

Since the density function of C is available, we could work out the expected relative
error of the estimates. That is,
Z cu

E(D̂ j ) =

cu −εu

|

c
fC (c)
− 1|[ R cu
]dc
cu − 0.5εu
cu −εu f cdc

When C is uniformly distributed over (cu − εu , cu ), which is the case for Simulation 1
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in Section 6.5, we have that
Z cu

1
c
− 1| dc
εu
cu −εu cu − 0.5εu
Z cu
Z cu −0.5εu
c
1
1
c
=
(
− 1) dc +
) dc
(1 −
εu
cu − 0.5εu εu
cu −0.5εu cu − 0.5εu
cu −εu
0.25εu
0.25εu
+
=
2(cu − 0.5εu ) 2(cu − 0.5εu )

E(D̂ j ) =

|

= εu /(4cu − 2εu ) = α/2
In situations where the interval (cu − εu , cu ) is very small, we may roughly assume
multiplicative noises are uniformly distributed over the interval and expect the relative
error to be roughly α/2. Similarly we define the relative error of ỹi as d˜i = |ỹi − yi |/yi ,
we could easily show that d˜i ≤ εl /(2cl + εl ) = α. If we assume multiplicative noises are
uniformly distributed over the interval (cl , cl + εl ), following the steps above we could
show that E(D̃i ) = εl /(4cl + 2εl ) = α/2.
As a simple example, suppose a uniform noise variable is used, and a data intruder
10
∗
sets α to be 0.05. Then the intruder could get εl = 10
95 cl and εu = 105 cu . Those yi such
that y∗i ≤ ymin (cl + εl ) or y∗i ≥ ymax (cu − εu ) could be disclosed by the intruder using the
attacking strategy with relative errors no greater than 0.05 with an expected relative error
of 0.025. We have the following discussions about implementing the attacking strategy
in practice:
Discussion 1: When the noise generating variable C is unbounded, the data intruder
cannot know cl and cu . However, we argue that the data intruder could still use the proposed attacking strategy to attack a considerable amount of noise-multiplied observations
with a high success rate. In the following we assume that the data intruder only wishes to
attack extremely small noise-multiplied observations. The data intruder could apply the
attacking strategy to the noise-multiplied data y∗ through the following steps:
Step 1. The data intruder estimates a value q such that P(C < q) ≤ k. k should be a
small number, for instance 0.5%.
Step 2. Replace cl by q in Step 2 of the attacking strategy, and use the attacking
strategy to unmask observations.
Following the above steps, we claim that the expected proportion of successful unmaskings will be worse than (1 − k)% but it should be greater than (1 − nk /m)%, where
nk = nk, m is the number of observations which are attacking (those noise-multiplied
2qα
). To justify it, note that in order
observations falling below ymin (q + εq ), where εq = 1−α
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for our attacking strategy to be successful for unmasking y∗i , two conditions need to be
hold:
Condition 1: y∗i ≤ ymin (q + εq );
Condition 2: q is the true lower bound for ci such that ci is bounded by [q, q + εq ].
Since there are m noise-multiplied observations falling below ymin (q + εq ), therefore
we could attack those observations using the attacking strategy. Due to regression to the
mean, the expected number of attacked observations with noise terms that are less than
q will be greater than mk. As a result, the expected proportion of successful unmaskings
will be worse than (1 − k)%. However note that the expected number of noise terms
that are less than q is nk . In an extreme case where all these nk noise terms were used
to mask those m observations which were being attacked, the success rate of unmasking
will be (1 − nk /m)%. Therefore in general we should expect to see the success rate of
unmaskings to be between (1 − nk /m)% and (1 − k)%. An example will be given in
Simulation 1 in Section 6.5.1.
Discussion 2: If multiplicative noises were applied to business data, the attacking strategy could also be effectively used by the largest and second largest data respondents. It is
because for business data, it is likely that the top few largest data respondents know the
ranks of their responses in the data (Hundepool et al. 2012).
For example, for the annual profit data in a typical business microdata, suppose the second largest data respondent knows that its annual profit is the second largest in the unobservable original data. Denote the unobservable original data as (y[max] , y[2] , y[3] , · · · , y[n] ),
where y[k] is the k-th largest observation. For the second largest respondent, it knows that
its contribution is y[2] , and it knows that y[2] is the true upper bound for (y[3] , y[4] , · · · , y[n] ).
In this case, it could substitute ymax by y[2] in the attacking strategy as an attempt to disclose some observations of (y[3] , y[4] , · · · , y[n] ).
Specifically, if a noise-multiplied business value y∗i = yi ci > y[2] (cu − εu ), therefore we
y
have that y[2]i (cu − εu ) ≤ ci ≤ cu . Except for yi = ymax , in all other scenarios we have
y[2]
yi > 1. Therefore for these scenarios we have (cu − εu ) ≤ ci ≤ cu for sure. As a result,
y∗

i
for these scenarios, we could use ŷi = cu −0.5ε
to estimate yi with a desired error bound.
u
Therefore, suppose the second largest data respondent could find h noise-multiplied
observations falling above y2 (cu − εu ). Among the h noise-multiplied observations, in
the worst scenario the noise-multiplied counterpart of ymax is included. In this case
the attacking strategy is still valid for unmasking the remaining h − 1 noise-multiplied
observations. It is also possible that the noise-multiplied counterpart of ymax is not
included in the h noise-multiplied observations. In this case the attacking strategy is

CHAPTER 6. ATTACKING NOISE-MULTIPLIED DATA GIVEN EXTREMA INFORMATION77
valid for unmasking all h observations. Therefore, the success rate of unmasking these h
noise-multiplied observation is either 100(1 − 1/h)% or 100%.
Discussion 3: When the data intruder does not have the knowledge of the extrema
values ymin and ymax , the data intruder needs to estimate them mathematically, for
instance using the methods in Section 6.2. The data intruder may obtain estimates of
ŷmin and ŷmax , and use the estimates to replace the true values when implementing the
attacking strategy. We note that in order for the attacking strategy to return estimates with
desired error bounds, we need:
(a)ŷmin ≤ ymin and (b)ŷmax ≥ ymax .
For instance, if we use Step 2 to unmask a noise-multiplied value y∗i = yi ci , in order for
our attacking strategy to work we need to have that ymin
yi < 1, so that ci is bounded between
[cl , cl + εl ]. However, if we replace ymin by ŷmin in Step 2 of the attacking strategy, our
∗
attacking strategy only works if ŷmin
yi < 1 as well, so that we could unmask yi with the
desired error bound.
If we have that ŷmin < ymin , our attacking strategy works well. However, since the
number of noise-multiplied observations falling below ŷmin (cl + εl ) is less than or equal to
those falling below ymin (cl +εl ), the data intruder could only attack fewer noise-multiplied
observations and vice versa for the other side.
If (a) and (b) are not satisfied, i.e. ŷmin > ymin or ŷmax < ymax , the relative errors of the
estimates could be larger than α, but the estimates are still good if ŷmin is close to ymin and
similarly for ŷmax . We show this point by calculating the upper bound and the expected
relative errors of the estimates. Suppose ŷmax ∈ [(1 − η)ymax , ymax ]. The data intruder
replaces ymax by ŷmax in the attacking strategy and unmasked several noise-multiplied
observations whose values are greater than ŷmax (cu − εu ). Denote a particular attacked
noise-multiplied observation as y∗j = y j c j , and denote the estimate of its original value
cj
− 1|. Since ŷymax
≥ (1 − η), we have that
y j as ẑ j . The relative error of ẑ j is | cu −0.5ε
u
max
c j ∈ [(1 − η)(cu − εu ), cu ]. The upper bound of the relative error of ẑ j occurs when c j =
u )+0.5εu
(1 − η)(cu − εu ), and it can be shown that the upper bound is η(cuc−ε
.
u −0.5εu
If multiplicative noises are assumed to be uniformly distributed in [(1−η)(cu −εu ), cu ],
then the expected relative error of ẑ j is
(Kη + 0.5εu )2 − K 2 − 0.75εu2 − 2Kεu + c2u
ERE =
,
2(K + 0.5εu )(ηK + εu )
where K = cu − εu . Both results get smaller as η goes smaller, meaning that the intruder’s
estimate ẑ j is more accurate if the intruder’s estimate ŷmax is closer to ymax . The relationship between the ERE and η for cu = 2 and α = 0.05 is given in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: This Figure shows the relationship between ERE and η, given that cu = 2
and α = 0.05. It shows that as η goes smaller, the expected relative error ERE goes
smaller as well. Because a smaller η means that ŷmax is closer to ymax , therefore the
attacking strategy is more effective if ŷmax is closer to ymax .

Therefore, even if the true values of ymax and ymin are not available, the attacking strategy still imposes disclosure risk if the extrema can be accurately estimated.

6.4

Data provider’s approaches against the proposed attacking strategy

As different data intruders possess different knowledge about the original data, it is
reasonable to assume that some data intruders possess the knowledge of the extrema
of the original data. Moreover, as we will show in the simulation study, the extrema
could be reasonably estimated by data intruders from the noise-multiplied data using the
methods we introduced in Section 6.2. In both cases the data provider needs to avoid
disclosure risk from the attacking strategy. In the following we discuss how to generate
noise-multiplied data which are free from the attacking strategy.
Approach 1: The data provider might only supply moments of C instead of fC to the
public. In this way, the lower and upper bounds of C are not available to the data intruder.
For instance, the data provider could release the noise-multiplied data y∗ together with
{E(C), E(C2 ), E(C3 ), E(C4 )} to the public. In this way, data users could still obtain many
useful statistics, such as the first four moments estimates by using the moment estimation
method proposed in Nayak et al. (2011). However, some statistical inferences which
requires fC cannot be drawn. For instance, Sinha et al. (2011)’s quantile estimation
approach calculates the conditional posterior distribution of Yi |y∗i (see Equation 2.3). If
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fC is not available, then this estimation approach cannot be used.
Approach 2: For a set of noise-multiplied data, the data provider might apply the
attacking strategy to the noise-multiplied data first by setting α = δ . Note that for the
data provider, ymin and ymax are known. Suppose only a few noise-multiplied observations
could be attacked by the attacking strategy. In that case, for each of those original values,
the data provider might generate a new noise term to be multiplied with the original
value so that the noise-multiplied value cannot be attacked by the strategy. Formally
speaking, the data provider might generate the noise-multiplied data in the following way:
1. Generate a set of noise-multiplied data y∗ and apply the attacking strategy to y∗ .
2. If there is only a small proportion of original observations whose noise-multiplied
versions either fall below ymin (cl + εl ) or above ymax (cu − εu ), then reproduce the
noise terms from C for those original observations to generate new noise-multiplied
observations. Leave the remaining noise-multiplied observations (those falling between
ymin (cl + εl ) and ymax (cu − εu )) unchanged.
3. Repeat process 2 until there are no observations falling below ymin (cl + εl ) or above
ymax (cu − εu ).
We name the above process controlled noise multiplication masking method. Denote the noise-multiplied data generated in this way as z∗ . The data provider releases
z∗ together with fC to the public. To differentiate, we name the standard noise multiplication masking method as ordinary noise multiplication masking method. We note
that a similar perturbation method which combines noise addition with minimum data
swapping method was investigated in Kim and Winkler (1995). The authors recognised
that applying noise addition masking alone does not provide enough protection to the
CPS-IRS linked file, and an additional data swapping step is needed to further reduce the
re-identification rate. The authors showed that the utility loss due to the data swapping
step is acceptable. The advantage of the Approach 2 over the Approach 1 is that it might
allow data users to obtain more statistical information from the noise-multiplied data.
When consider using the controlled noise multiplication masking method, the data
provider might say that the noise-multiplied data produced by the Approach 2 carries
enough information if the utility losses between the controlled noise-multiplied variable
Z ∗ and the ordinary noise-multiplied variable Y ∗ are similar. We will show an application
in Simulation 3 and we adopt the measure introduced in Section 4.1 for measuring utility
loss.
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6.5

Simulation

In this section we present three simulation studies: In Simulation 1 we demonstrate the
attacking strategy by applying it to the simulation study in Klein et al. (2014). In Simulation 2 we estimate the extrema of the original data by using Sinha et al. (2011)’s quantile
estimation approach. In Simulation 3 we illustrate the controlled noise multiplication
method.

6.5.1

Simulation 1

We firstly illustrate an application of the attacking strategy under a case study in Klein
et al. (2014). to attack a few extremely small noise-multiplied observations. Klein et
al. (2014) considered the following masking scenario (Corresponding to Case I noisemultiplied data in their paper): consider an income attribute which contains n observations, and denote the i-th person’s income value as yi . An income observation is considered sensitive if it is extremely large (exceeding a threshold value t). All sensitive income
values are masked by multiplicative noise. Therefore, denote the income value for the i-th
record in the noise-multiplied attribute as zi , then

y c
i i
zi =
y
i

yi > t,

(6.1)

yi ≤ t.

The data provider releases the following information to the public: 1. the noisemultiplied income data {zi }ni=1 ; 2. the threshold value t; 3. indication of whether an
observation is noise-multiplied. With this information, Klein et al. (2014) developed an
Expectation-Maximization method to obtain log-normal regression coefficients by treating the income attribute as the response variable.
If the data provider uses a noise generating variable with a lower bound Cl to mask the
original data, which is public information, then the data intruder could use Cl as the lower
bound of the noise terms. If this is the case, then with the knowledge of the threshold value
t, the data intruder could carry out the attacking strategy to unmask a small amount of
noise-multiplied income observations which fall below a threshold level, because t could
be treated as the minimum of the original data which are masked by multiplicative noise.
To illustrate this, we consider the simulate study in Section 5 of Klein et al. (2014). The
simulation study uses public use data from the 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS)
March Supplement. The original data contains positive incomes of 50661 households.
Denote the original data as (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 , · · · , y50661 ), where y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ y50661 .
In this example, threshold is defined as the 90th percentile of the income data, therefore
t=106305. Therefore, observations y = (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 ) are masked by multiplicative
noise, where y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ y5066 ≥ t. The data provider releases noise-multiplied data
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Table 6.1: Results of applying the attacking strategy to Klein et al.’s simulation.

noise candidate
h1
h2
h3
h4

mean no.attacked
749.63
58.79
147.10
6.77

sd of mean no.attacked
20.31
7.46
11.40
2.59

mean rel.errs.
0.051
0.049
0.049
0.049

{zi }50661
i=1 to the public, where zi is as defined in Equation (6.1). The authors proposed
four mixture of uniforms noise generating variables h1 ,h2 ,h3 and h4 to perturb y. The
distributions of these variables are:
h1 : 0.5U(0.8, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.2);
h2 : 0.8U(0.5, 0.9) + 0.2U(1.1, 1.5);
h3 : 0.5U(0.5, 0.9) + 0.5U(1.1, 1.5);
h4 : 0.8U(0.1, 0.8) + 0.2U(1.2, 1.5);
To illustrate that the setting is vulnerable to the attacking strategy, for each noise candidate, we generated 5000 samples of noise-multiplied data and applied the attacking
strategy on each sample by assuming the role of the data intruder. We assume α = 0.1,
i.e. the data intruder would like to use the attacking strategy to disclose some noisemultiplied values with relative error bounds less than 0.1. For noise candidate h1 , since
the lower bound of the noise terms is cl = 0.8, εl = 8/45, where εl is defined in Section 6.3. According to the attacking strategy, noise-multiplied values which are below
t(cl + εl ) = 103, 942.67 could be unmasked with error bound less than 0.1. For each
sample of the noise-multiplied data, we recorded the total number of observations being
attacked, and the relative errors of the estimates. We computed the average of the relative
errors. Based on the 5000 results, we calculated the mean and standard deviation of the
total number of observations being attacked in each sample, and the mean of the average
relative errors of all the samples. We did the same process for all the noise generating
variables. The results are given in Table 6.1.
To interpret Table 6.1, taking noise candidate h2 for instance, the average number of
noise-multiplied observations being attacked in each sample (mean no.attacked) is 58.79
with a standard deviation (sd of mean no.attacked) 7.46, meaning that roughly speaking, for each sample of the noise-multiplied data, around 59 noise-multiplied observations could be unmasked by the attacking strategy with relative errors less than 0.1. The
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standard deviation is relatively small, meaning that the number of observations being
attacked in each sample is consistent. The mean of the averages of relative errors of estimates (mean rel.errs.) is around 0.05, which agrees with the expected relative errors we
showed in Section 6.3 as in this case the noises are uniformly distributed over the interval
(cl , cl + εl ).
In practice, the data provider could use an unbounded noise generating variable to
perturb the original data. We argued in Discussion 1 of Section 6.3 that the attacking
strategy could still be used under this case. We illustrate it through the following example:
We consider an unbounded mixture of normals noise generating variable h5 , where h5 ∼
0.5N(0.7, 0.01) + 0.5N(1.3, 0.01). Suppose h5 was used to mask y = (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 ).
Following the steps in Discussion 1, we set k = 0.31%. We drew n sets of noise samples
from h5 , and we found that q = 0.45. In other words, on average only around 15.79 noise
terms were below 0.45 in each set of noise sample. Therefore, q = 0.45 is the lower
bound for approximately 5050 noise terms which were used to perturb y. We repeated
the masking-attacking process 1000 times. During the attacking process, we replace cl
by q = 0.45 when calculating εl and the threshold value. The result shows that when
α = 0.15, on each iteration there were on average 92.27 observations being attacked
(noise-multiplied value below the threshold value t(q + εl )). Following Discussion 1,
it is expected that the proportion of successful unmaskings will be worse than 99.69%
but greater than 82.6%. Our simulation result showed that the average rate of successful
unmaskings across the 1000 iterations was around 89.4%, which agrees with our claim.

6.5.2

Simulation 2

In this section we illustrate Sinha et al.’s quantile estimation approach for estimating extrema of the original data. We do not illustrate using MaskDensity14 to estimate extrema
of the original data because many numerical examples are presented in Lin (2014) and
Lin and Fielding (2015). We consider the quantile estimation method because we want
to show that under certain contexts, it is possible for some intruders to come up with a
reasonable prior which could lead to accurate estimation of the extrema of the original
data. We wish to alert the data provider that the potential disclosure risk due to this fact
needs to be evaluated during the data masking stage, and the choice of noise generating
variable plays a role in determining the accuracy of the estimates.
The distribution of income data could be modelled as a log-normal distribution (Klein
et al. 2014 and references therein). An intruder could use this form of prior in conjunction
with Equation (2.3) for quantile estimation. The log-normal distribution is characterised
by two parameters µ and σ , which could easily be estimated by the data intruder from the
released noise-multiplied data. We still consider the data we used in Simulation 1 as the
original data.
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Recall that the original data consists of 50661 observations. Denote the original income
data as (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 , · · · , y50661 ), where y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ y50661 . Now we suppose
that the data provider uses h3 to produce noise-multiplied data, and releases the noisemultiplied data (z1 , z2 , · · · , z50661 ) to the public, where zi is as defined in Equation (6.1)
with t = 106305. We assume the role of the data intruder and aim to estimate the largest
original value y1 using the quantile estimation method with a log-normal prior. To decide
the two parameters of the prior, we model the distribution of (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 , · · · , y50661 )
as LN(µ, σ 2 ), where µ and σ 2 are estimated using µ̂ and σ̂ 2 . To find µ̂ and σ̂ 2 , since the
population mean and variance of the log-normal random variable are exp(µ + σ 2 /2) and
[exp(σ 2 ) − 1]exp(2µ + σ 2 ), we set exp(µ̂ + σ̂ 2 /2) equal to the mean of the original data,
[exp(σ̂ 2 )−1]exp(2µ̂ + σ̂ 2 ) equal to the variance of the original data. We have µ̂ = 10.568
and σ̂ 2 = 0.619. The mean and variance of the original data could be estimated from the
2
5066 zi
2
noise-multiplied data (z1 , z2 , · · · , z50661 ) by using µ̂ = ∑50661
i=1 zi and σ̂ = ∑i=1 E(h2 ) +
3

2
2
∑50661
j=5067 z j − µ̂ . Consequently, the prior distribution of y = (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 ) is set to be
LN(10.568, 0.619) truncated at [106304, ∞).
We now apply the masking-estimating process 50 times. On each iteration the original data y = (y1 , y2 , · · · , y5066 ) was masked by h3 to generate noise-multiplied data
y∗ = (y∗1 , y∗2 , · · · , y∗5066 ). Then, we estimated the value of y1 by using the quantile estimation approach with the truncated log-normal prior. We drew 50 replicates of sample
from {Yi |y∗i }5066
i=1 and estimated the value of y1 using the sample mean of the last order
statistics of the 50 replicates. We repeated the masking-estimating process 50 times and
obtained 50 estimates of y1 . The real value of y1 is 768742, and the average of the 50
estimates we obtained was 696467.5 with standard deviation 71353.32. Among the 50
estimates, 18 of them were within 10% of the true value of y1 . The distribution of the 50
estimates is given in Figure 6.2(b).
In this simulation, the prior distribution is reasonable, but there is still a difference
between the prior distribution (dotted black lines) and the actual density of y (black line)
as we see in Figure 6.2(a). However, the posterior distribution of y (black points) is closer
to the real distribution of y. The average of the estimates of y1 is not too far from its real
value. The results indicate that the estimates of the extrema could be very accurate if a
good prior distribution is available.
We can show that the choice of noise generating variable plays a role in terms of the
accuracy of the estimates. If h1 was used as the noise generating variable, we can show
that the average of the estimates of y1 is around 744597, while if h2 was used as the
noise generating variable, then the average of the estimates is around 716754. Therefore
h1 leads to a better accuracy of the estimates of y1 , and hence a higher risk against the
attacking strategy. The purpose of this simulation is to illustrate that the extrema of the
original data could be estimated, and therefore the data provider needs to consider the
disclosure risk that might occur due to this fact.
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(a) density plots

(b) histogram of ŷ1

Figure 6.2: Figure 6.2(a) shows the distribution of the original data (solid black line),
distribution of the prior (dotted black line), posterior distribution of the original data
based on a particular set of noise multiplied data (black points); Figure 6.2(b) shows the
distribution of the 50 estimates of y1 . The true value of y1 is 768742.
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6.5.3

Simulation 3

In this section we show an application of using the controlled noise multiplication masking method to generate noise-multiplied data.
The current performance of MaskDensity14 works the best when the original data is
symmetric. For this simulation, the original data we use is still the CPS household income
data (all 50661 observations), but after a logarithm transformation. Moreover, we cut off
those transformed values which are less than 7.5 in order to further reduce the skewness
in the original data. After these steps, the original data is distributed as shown in Figure
6.3 (black triangles). Denote the new original data as y. We have ymin = 7.501 and
ymax = 13.552.
Suppose the data provider feels that the knowledge of ymin and ymax is possessed by
some data intruders, the data provider might consider using the controlled noise multiplication masking method to produce noise-multiplied data. In the following we assume the
role of the data provider and we set acceptance rule δ = 0.075. It means that we do not
want data intruders to be able to attack any noise-multiplied observation with a relative
error less than 7.5% of the true value using the proposed attacking strategy. We use a
uniform variable U(0.7, 1.3) to generate noise terms. Initial assessment shows that if the
ordinary noise multiplication masking method was applied to the original data, then only
around 0.66% noise-multiplied observations could be disclosed by the attacking strategy.
We generated 30 sets of controlled noise-multiplied data, and measure the overall utility
loss to determine if the amount of information carried by the controlled noise-multiplied
variable Z ∗ is sufficient.
To measure the overall data utility loss, we applied MaskDensity14 to reconstruct the
distribution of the original data from each set of the controlled noise-multiplied data. We
recorded the difference of the areas enveloped by the two density curves. Based on all 30
sets of noise-multiplied data, we computed the overall data utility loss UL( fY , Z ∗ ), where
UL( fY , Z ∗ ) =

1 30
∑
60 k=1

Z ∞
−∞

k
| fY (y) − fˆY,C
(y)|dy,

k (y) is the density approximant of f obtained from the k-th sample of the
where fY,C
Y
controlled noise-multiplied data. When we applied MaskDensity14, we set the two parameters a = 0.99ymin and b = 1.01ymax to achieve a better density reconstruction, where
a and b are the lower and upper bounds of the reconstructed density functions. The result
showed that the overall data utility loss due to applying the controlled noise multiplication
is 23.4%.
For parallel comparison, we also generated 30 sets of ordinary noise-multiplied data
using the ordinary noise multiplication masking method. The result showed that the overall data utility loss of applying ordinary noise multiplication is 20.4%. That means that
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the controlled noise multiplication masking method only results in a slightly higher data
utility loss in this case. To visualise the results, we computed the average of the reˆk
ˆk
constructed density functions f¯Yc , where f¯Yc (v) = ∑30
k=1 fY,C (v)/30, fY,C (v) is the density
at point v of the reconstructed density function obtained from the k-th set of controlled
noise-multiplied data. Similarly we computed the average of the reconstructed density
functions based on the 30 sets of ordinary noise multiplied data. The results of density
reconstructions are presented in Figure 6.3. As we can see, the average reconstructed
density function based on the controlled noise-multiplied data is similar to the average
reconstructed density function based on the ordinary noise-multiplied data.
To numerically compare the statistical analysis results (moments estimates and quantile estimates) that could be obtained from the two types of noise-multiplied data, we
analysed the 30 sets of the controlled noise-multiplied data and also the 30 sets of the
ordinary noise-multiplied data. For the original data, the first three moments were (10.53,
111.64 , 1191.66). The first three quartiles were (9.96, 10.6, 11.15). By analysing the
controlled noise-multiplied data, the averages of the first three moments estimates obtained from the 30 sets of controlled noise-multiplied data were (10.51, 111.22, 1183.19)
with standard errors (0.006, 0.139, 2.24) respectively. The averages of the first three quartiles were (9.93, 10.63, 11.23) with standard errors (0.104, 0.085, 0.083). By analysing
the ordinary noise-multiplied data, the averages of the first three moments estimates were
(10.53, 111.66, 1192.04) with standard errors (0.0004, 0.095, 1.56). The averages of the
first three quartiles estimates were (9.90, 10.58, 11.24) with standard errors (0.054, 0.051,
0.062). In summary, the averages of these statistics obtained from the two types of the
noise-multiplied data were quite similar. The results suggested that the controlled noise
multiplication masking method works well in this simulation.

6.6

Conclusion and future work

In this chapter we introduced an attacking strategy against multiplicative noise protection by recognising that the extrema of the original data could be learned by some data
intruders. We showed through simulation that the proposed attacking strategy could effectively unmask certain noise-multiplied observations. We discussed methods to avoid
the disclosure risk from the data provider’s point of view, especially the controlled noise
multiplication masking method. We showed through simulation that it is able to preserve
high data utility in certain contexts, and therefore could be used as an alternative masking
approach when the ordinary noise multiplication masking method cannot deliver satisfactory protection to the original data.
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Figure 6.3: The Figure shows the density plot of the original data (black triangles); the
plot of the average of the reconstructed densities based on 30 sets of controlled noisemultiplied data (solid black line); the plot of the average of the reconstructed densities
based on 30 sets of ordinary noise-multiplied data (dotted black line). The plots show
that the level of utility loss due to the controlled noise multiplication masking method is
similar to that of the ordinary noise multiplication masking method.

Chapter 7
An Algorithm for Protecting Tabulated
Business Data
Releasing business microdata to the public is dangerous because the records could easily
be identified. The reason is that business values (such as annual profit) possessed by
dominant enterprises could be very large compared with other business values, and might
easily lead to identity disclosure (Chipperfield et al. 2019). Methods such as top and
bottom coding can be effective at reducing risk, but often represent a significant loss of
data utility. Alternatively, statistical agencies could rely on a remote server (query system)
for releasing information of business data while protecting sensitive information.
The feature of a remote server is that, data users cannot view the underlying data. The
data users could only communicate with the remote server by sending queries. A simple
model for a remote server (O’Keefe and Chipperfield 2013; Chipperfield and O’Keefe
2014) is: (1) an analyst submits a query to the remote server; (2) the remote server processes the query to generate a secure value; (3) the server returns the secure value to the
user. For the first step, a query could be for some quantity such as a sample mean. For the
second step, even though the user is prevented from seeing the raw data, it is still usual to
perturb statistical outputs to protect against e.g. differencing attacks (see Section 7.2.1).
When a remote server is used, the statistical agency has the option of whether to store
perturbed data or unperturbed data in the remote server. Storing perturbed data is known
as input perturbation (Evans et al. 1998). That is, each underlying data value is perturbed
by a random noise (either through noise addition or through noise multiplication). Each
operation is performed on the perturbed data when responding to a query. For instance,
suppose the original data is (y1 , y2 , · · · , yn ). Instead of storing the original data, a set of
perturbed data (y1 + ε1 , y2 + ε2 , · · · , yn + εn ) is stored, where {εi }ni=1 are random noise
terms. Suppose a query of aggregate total is received, the query system will return the
perturbed total ∑ni=1 (yi + εi ) to the data user.
Alternatively, the statistical agency could store unperturbed data in the remote system.
When responding to a query, a random noise is added to the unperturbed output to pro88
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duce the perturbed output. The perturbed output is then returned to the data user. This
mechanism is called output perturbation. Output perturbation is used in some statistical
agencies, such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
The advantages of using a query system with output perturbation is described in Chipperfield et al. (2019). The following is a direct quote from the paper: ”First, because the
estimates, not the underlying micro-data, are modified, relationships in the micro-data are
essentially retained. Second, the degree to which an estimate is modified depends upon
the output itself. For example, modification of an estimate may be relatively high if a
cell is dominated by a single business and relatively low if a table cell has many small
businesses of roughly equal size. Third, because an analyst is restricted from viewing the
micro-data, less modification is needed than would otherwise be the case. Fourth, it allows users to gain rapid access to estimates they request. Fifth, the modification algorithm
assures a specified level of protection is guaranteed”.
In this chapter, we consider the case where survey estimate of population totals of
business data are released through a remote system using output perturbation. A random
noise is generated through an automatic algorithm, and is added to the true aggregate total
to produce a perturbed total. The perturbed output is released in a table cell. For instance,
the Australian Bureau of Statistics has developed a remote system called “TableBuilder”.
Data users could construct their own tables by sending multiple queries to TableBuilder.
Each table cell contains a perturbed output as specified by a data user. For business data,
using output perturbation is not easy to implement effectively because business data is
normally heavily skewed and dominated by some extremely large observations.
Using output perturbation to protect each individual contributor is studied under the
context of ε-differential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006). ε-differential privacy is a strong
requirement that all contributor values are protected regardless of an adversary’s attacking
strategy. This can be achieved by adding Laplace noise to the statistical outputs, but
it could lead to huge data utility loss (Sarathy and Muralidhar 2011). In this chapter,
we note that in a remote system, the most significant attacking strategy is a differencing
attack. We consider the perturbation algorithm proposed in Thompson et al. (2013) as our
benchmark algorithm. The algorithm is specially designed for protecting business-typed
data. We introduce the algorithm, point out the drawbacks associated with the algorithm.
Then we introduce a new algorithm for perturbing business totals. The new algorithm
allows a better control over cell utility losses, achieves better utility-disclosure tradeoffs
for many cells, and is conjectured to be able to produce a wider range of perturbed cells
with acceptable levels of utility loss and disclosure risk.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.1 describes three attacking scenarios.
Section 7.2 introduces measures of disclosure risk and utility loss. Section 7.3 describes
Thompson et al.’s algorithm. Section 7.4 describes the new algorithm. Section 7.5 discusses advantages of the new algorithm compared with the algorithm in Thompson et al.
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through simulations. Section 7.6 concludes the chapter.

7.1

Attacking scenarios

Chipperfield et al. (2019) described three attacking scenarios that could happen to
business data. Suppose in each scenario, The attacker targets a business value. The
attacker knows that the sampling weight of the target is equal to one, i.e. the target is in
the sample. Moreover, the target is the largest contributor to the cell. In Scenario 1 and
2, the attacker does not have prior knowledge of any contributor values. In Scenario 3,
the attacker is the second largest contributor to the cell. The three scenarios are described
below:
Attack Scenario 1: The table cell value is used as an estimate of the largest contributor
value.
Attack Scenario 2: The attacker uses the difference between two cell estimates as an
estimate of the largest contributor value. The first table cell consists of all business values
and the second table cell contains the same set of contributor values as the first table cell
except that the largest contributor value is excluded.
Attack Scenario 3: This is the same as Attack Scenario 1 except that the attacker is
also the second largest contributor to the cell. The attacker can use the cell total minus its
own contribution to estimate the largest contributor value.
Scenario 2 is an example of a differencing attack. Differencing attack can be particularly effective when used via a remote server since, at least in the case of TableBuilder,
the attacker is relatively free to request tables of their choice. More detailed discussions
on disclosure by differencing can be obtained in Brown (2004) and a list of defences
against differencing attacks via remote servers can be found in O’Keefe and Chipperfield
(2013).
In order for an attack to succeed the attacker needs the following:
1. To know that the target is in the sample. A large business might have a higher
probability to be included in a sample than smaller businesses when stratified sampling
is used. For smaller businesses, sampling may provide some protection since an attacker
will not know if a particular business is selected in the sample. Since the underlying
micro-data are not observed, it would be necessary to submit a series of queries in order
to confirm whether or not a small business is actually in the sample (see Chipperfield and
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O’Keefe 2014).
2. In the case of Attack Scenario 2, to know how to uniquely identify the target in
terms of a set of quasi-identifiers. This allows the attacker to “drop” the target business
from the cell in a table. To conduct Attack Scenario 1 and 3, the business does not have
to be uniquely identified, often referred to as identification, only that the target business
dominates the cell.
3. To circumvent TableBuilder’s confidentiality protections and disclose an attribute of
the business.
TableBuilder gives users a high degree of flexibility in choosing a table’s dimensions
and scope. There is often considerable information about large businesses in the public
domain which may in turn make identification likely (e.g. there may only be one private
hospital in a small area). Accordingly, we conservatively assume that 1. and 2. occur with
certainty. So for large businesses at least, the only protection available in TableBuilder is
perturbation. Consequently, perturbation is the focus of how disclosure risk is measured.
We also measure disclosure risk in terms of a differencing attack only because it is easy
to perform and is very effective.

7.2
7.2.1

Measuring Disclosure Risk and Utility Loss
Differencing Attack

Consider the following scenario: suppose a continuous valued characteristic of the
ith sample unit is yi and there are n sample units. An estimation weight is the reciprocal of the probability that the unit is included in the sample when probability
sampling is used. The estimation weight of yi is wi . Define y = (y1 , y2 , · · · , yn ) and
y1 w1 ≥ y2 w2 ≥ · · · ≥ yn wn > 0 with w1 = 1. The attacker estimates y1 by taking the
difference of two perturbed estimates. That is, suppose we have:
Query 1: Ŝ∗ = ∑ni=1 yi wi + R∗ , where R∗ is a random perturbation variable for perturbing Query 1.
∗ = n y w + R∗ , where R∗ is a random perturbation variable for
Query 2: Ŝ−1
∑i=2 i i
−1
−1
perturbing Query 2.

Under a differencing attack, the attacker’s estimate of y1 is
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∗
Ŷ1 = Ŝ∗ − Ŝ−1
= y1 + R∗ − R∗−1 .

In this chapter, we assume a differencing attack is the only source of disclosure risk.
Throughout the paper, without loss of generality, we assume the attacker’s target is the
largest contributor value y1 w1 , and the attacker also knows the weight of y1 is equal to
one (w1 = 1). The reasons for these assumptions are that, normally speaking, the largest
contributor value y1 w1 has the highest disclosure risk against a differencing attack than
any other contributor value, and for the largest business, its estimation weight is 1 because
it might be unique in the population. Therefore, if we could find ways to effectively
protect the largest contributor, all other contributors would be protected as well.
To define disclosure risk, we conservatively assume that: 1. the target is in the sample;
and 2. the attacker could uniquely identify the target through a set of quasi-identifiers. So
the only protection available in a remote system is perturbation. Consequently, perturbation is the focus of how disclosure risk is measured.

7.2.2

Defining Disclosure

Disclosure Risk: Following the definition of value disclosure risk in Chapter 2, we say
that the disclosure risk against a differencing attack is the probability that a realization of
Ŷ1 is within 100α% of the true value y1 . If we define disclosure risk of attacking target
value y1 as D(y1 , α), then
D(y1 , α) = P(|R∗ − R∗−1 | < αy1 )
We say that α is the the acceptance rule and DL is the acceptable level of disclosure
risk. Different values of (DL, α) could be adopted on the basis of whether the attack is
likely to occur. We say that perturbed cell estimates have an acceptable disclosure risk if
D(y1 , α) is less than DL.

7.2.3

Defining Utility Loss

We define the utility loss of perturbing a cell as the relative distance between the perturbed
cell value and unperturbed cell value. Measuring utility loss by percentage difference
between the perturbed estimate and the unperturbed estimate has been widely used in
many applications. It is formally introduced by Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001) and
widely used by other authors in their studies (see Kim and Winkler 2003; Yancey et al.
2002).
For each table cell, it is perturbed by a random noise variable. The distribution of
the noise variable is determined by a perturbation algorithm. As an algorithm produces
a perturbed cell value randomly, in order to assess and compare the performances of
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different perturbation algorithms, we look at the average utility loss. The average utility
loss is the expected utility loss of perturbing the cell using the algorithm. In other words,
for the Cell 1 described in Section 7.2.1, the average utility loss is E(|R∗ |)/ ∑ni=1 yi wi . It
is preferable that the average utility loss to be as low as possible given that D(y1 ) < DL.

7.3

The algorithm in Thompson et al. (2013)

In this section we introduce an output perturbation algorithm for protecting aggregate
totals of business values. The application of this perturbation algorithm is investigated
extensively in Chipperfield et al. (2019).
As before, consider any particular cell in a table and let there be n sample units
(y1 w1 , · · · yn wn ) contributing to the cell. The survey estimate of the total is ŝ = ∑ni=1 yi wi .
We assume y1 w1 ≥ y2 w2 ≥ · · · ≥ yn wn .
The algorithm basically uses a noise random variable P∗ to perturb each cell. The
∗ ∗
expression of P∗ is P∗ = ∑K
i=1 (mi Di Hi )yi wi , where K is the number of top contributors
in the cell that are used in calculation of P∗ ; m = (m1 , · · · , mK ) is vector of non-negative
real numbers; D∗i is a random variable taking the value -1 and 1 with equal probability;
Hi∗ is a random variable with mean 1 and for the purpose of this chapter we set Hi to have
a symmetric triangular probability density function centered at 1 with width 0.6. The m
vector is used to balance utility loss and disclosure risk for each table cell.
The algorithm in Thompson et al. (2013) generates a perturbed cell value in the
following way:
1. The algorithm identifies the parameters (K, m) to be used.
2. The algorithm generates a perturbation amount p∗ from a random variable P∗ , and
adds p∗ to the total ŝ to generate a perturbed cell value ŝ∗ .
The distinct features of using this perturbation random variable is that:
1. The perturbation amount is relatively high if a cell is dominated by a few large
businesses.
2. It does not add bias to the final table. e.g. E(P∗ ) = 0.
For the first point, we note that the perturbation amount is proportional to the magnitude
of the top few contributor values. It could guarantee that the top few contributor values
are protected against the differencing attack. Mathematically, recall that when w1 = 1,

CHAPTER 7. AN ALGORITHM FOR PROTECTING TABULATED BUSINESS DATA94
attacker’s estimate of y1 is
∗
ŷ1 = y1 + P∗ − P−1
∗ = K+1 (m D∗ H ∗ )y w . Therefore, y is protected by
where P−1
∑i=2 i i i i i
1

∗

P

∗
− P−1

= (m1 D∗1 H1∗ )y1 +

K

K+1
∗ ∗
(mi Di Hi )yi wi −
(mi D∗i Hi∗ )yi wi .
i=2
i=2

∑

∑

∗ is directly determined by the magnitude of y , which means
The magnitude of P∗ − P−1
1
that the perturbation amount goes higher for larger y1 . The optimal set of parameters to be
used for each cell depends on the distribution of contributing values to the cell estimate.
The optimal set of parameters guarantees that the perturbed estimates have the lowest
average utility loss subject to having an acceptable level of disclosure risk DL. Examples
of the optimal choices of magnitude vector when K = 3 for different contributor values
are given in Table 7.1. Chipperfield et al. (2019) showed that these parameters result in
the lowest utility loss subject to having at most 15% disclosure risk, assuming α = 0.11.
For a given cell of a table, the algorithm achieves its best performance if the optimal set
of parameters for perturbing the cell is used. As developing a program of searching the
optimal set of parameters to be used to perturb each cell value is non-trivial, Chipperfield
et al.(2019) investigated the outcomes of using one set of parameters to perturb all cells.
The set of parameters was selected upon satisfying the requirement of disclosure risks for
a few benchmark cells, and the study examined its impact on utility losses of different
cells through empirical studies. However, fixing the set of parameters certainly limits the
efficacy of the algorithm as the choice of parameters is not always the optimal one for
perturbing many cells (see Chipperfield et al. (2019)). In the following, we assume that
the same m vector is used for all cells.
There are issues with this configuration. The issues are:

1. The algorithm could produce a very perturbed table cell because the upper bound of
the support of P∗ could be very large. It might happen that the magnitude of perturbation
produced by the algorithm is extremely large.
∗ could cancel each other out (i.e. taking values
2. The protection to y1 , i.e. P∗ − P−1
close to 0) with high probability if the top K + 1 contributor values are uniformly
distributed.

To illustrate the first issue, suppose the contributor values (y1 w1 , y2 w2 , · · · , y8 w8 ) =
(25, 25, · · · , 25). If the parameter m = (0.5, 0.4, 0.3), then the expected utility loss of
perturbing this cell using the algorithm is E(P∗ )/200 = 7.54%. This value is generally
acceptable for perturbing a table cell. However, the actual utility loss of perturbing this
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cell using the algorithm is bounded between (−24%, 24%). That means, it is possible for
the perturbation algorithm to produce perturbed response with utility loss 24%. Should
it happen, information reflected by the perturbed value could be misleading to some data
users. The distribution of a random perturbed value is given in Figure 7.1.
For the second issue, we note that the disclosure risk of y1 is given below:
∗
D(y1 , α) = P(|P∗ − P−1
| < αy1 )

Z αy1

=
−αy1

∗ (x)dx
fP∗ −P−1

Without loss of generality we consider a special case where the contributor values are
(y1 w1 , y2 w2 , · · · , y8 w8 ) = (25, 25, · · · , 25). We set m = (0.5, 0, 0). Assuming w1 = 1. Using a differencing attack to attack y1 , denote the estimator as Ŷ1 . Then we have
∗
Ŷ1 = y1 + P∗ − P−1
∗ is distributed as 12.5D H . The
For this example, P∗ is distributed as 12.5D1 H1 and P−1
2 2
∗
modes for the two distributions are both at ±12.5. Problem arises if p is close to p∗−1
∗ . As P∗ and P∗ have the same modes, it is likely to
because y1 is protected by P∗ − P−1
−1
∗
∗
happen that the values for both p and p−1 are around one of the modes, providing little
protection to y1 .
d ∗
Generally speaking, when all contributors are identical, we have that P∗ = P−1
. The
∗
∗
distribution of P − P−1 is likely to peak at 0, meaning that there is a high chance that y1 is
not getting sufficient protection. As an example, disclosure risk plot for y1 when contributor values are {25}8i=1 and m = (0.5, 0.4, 0.3) is given in Figure 7.2. The corresponding
disclosure risk of y1 is given in the area shaded red.
We note that in general, cells with identical contributor values are not considered as
sensitive as those cells which contain dominant contributors. However, for a remote system, it might occur that output perturbation is used for all table cells. Therefore, those
cells with identical contributor values need to be discussed in this chapter.
From the data intruder’s point of view, if the data intruder knows the perturbation algorithm and knows that the top K contributor values were equal, then the data intruder
might be aware that using a differencing attack for y1 might be effective based on the
above argument. Knowing that the top K contributor values are equal might motivate the
data intruder to use a differencing attack.
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Table 7.1: Magnitude values that guarantee at most 15% disclosure risk given α = 0.11
and minimise the average utility loss for different distributions of top contributor values.

Distribution
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Relative Size of Top Contributors
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
90
5
5
80
10
5
5
70
20
10
60
20
10
10
60
40
50
20
20
10
40
30
30
30
30
30
10
25
25
25
25

Optimal Magnitude Values
m1
m2
m3
0.15
0.1
0.1
0.15
0.1
0.1
0.15
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.25
0.15
0.1
0.25
0.15
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.5
0.4
0.3

Figure 7.1: Distribution of ∑8i=1 25 + P∗ given m = (0.5, 0.4, 0.3) for the table cell with
contributor values (25, 25, · · · , 25).
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∗ and the corresponding disclosure risk. The distriFigure 7.2: Distribution of P∗ − P−1
∗ to take values around 0. The red
bution peaks at 0, meaning that it is likely for P∗ − P−1
area is the disclosure risk of y1 given α = 0.11.

7.4

A New Algorithm to Generate Perturbed Cell Estimates

We introduce a new algorithm to generate perturbed cell estimates. Compared with
Thompson et al’s algorithm, the advantage of the new algorithm is that:
1. The utility loss for perturbing each table cell is bounded according to the requirement of the data provider.
2. If y1 is not strongly dominating a table cell, then the disclosure risk of y1 is lower.
Suppose an ordinary cell has contributor values (y1 w1 , y2 w2 , · · · , yn wn ), w1 = 1. The
statistical agency specifies a threshold, β , on the average utility loss of a table cell. ŝ is
the unperturbed cell value, i.e. ŝ = ∑ni=1 yi wi . The new algorithm perturbs the cell value
as follows:
1. The statistical agency sets the value of β , e.g. 0.05.
2. Define λ = ŝβ , where ŝ is the cell value. If n is an even number, a noise variable R∗1
is used. R∗1 ∼ 0.5U(−0.5λ , 0.5λ ) + 0.25U(1.5λ , 2λ ) + 0.25U(−2λ , −1.5λ ). If n is an
odd number, a noise variable R∗2 is used. R∗2 ∼ 0.5U(0.5λ , 1.5λ ) + 0.5U(−1.5λ , −0.5λ ).
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The value of β is set according to the requirements of the statistical agency. The maximum data utility loss of the table cell is 2β . This is because the maximum amount of
perturbation (in magnitude) produced by the algorithm is 2λ . The corresponding maximum utility loss is 2λ /ŝ = 2β .
The disclosure risk of y1 could also be mathematically determined. That is, the disclosure risk of y1 is given by:

D(y1 , α) = P(|R∗1 − R∗2 | < αy1 )
Z αy1 Z 1.5λ

=
−αy1 −1.5λ

fR∗1 (x + t) fR∗2 (t)dtdx

The density functions of R∗1 and R∗2 are given in the following:

fR∗1 (r) =




1
2λ

0

fR∗2 (r) =

if |r| ∈ (0, 0.5λ ) or |r| ∈ (1.5λ , 2λ )
otherwise



1
2λ

0

if |r| ∈ (0.5λ , 1.5λ )
otherwise

The disclosure risk of y1 is a function of (y1 , α, β , λ , λ1 ), where λ = β ∑ni=1 yi wi , λ1 =
β ∑ni=2 yi wi . The mathematical expressions of the disclosure risk of y1 is conditional on
the value of y1 , and the relationship between α and β . The mathematical expressions are
given in Tables 7.2 and 7.3.
To interpret the tables, when β ≥ 2α, and n is an odd number, and if the value of y1
satisfy that
λ
λ
λ
< y1 < min(
,
)
4β − 2α
1.5β + α 2α
Then based on Table 7.3, the disclosure risk of y1 is PC21 , where the expression of PC21 is
1
given in Table 7.2. That is, PC21 = αy
2λ .
The idea of splitting up odd and even cases is addressing the differencing attack
by guaranteeing that the counts of contributors for the two queries (for the total and
total minus the target value) will go from odd to even or even to odd. It makes it
much harder for the perturbation under the set of n contributors and the set of n − 1
contributors to cancel out if the largest contributor is not strongly dominating the cell.
In this case the K − 1 noise components that could be equal under Thompson et al.’s
approach will no longer be equal. To see this, suppose we have a set of 8 contributors
(y1 , y2 w2 , · · · , y8 w8 ) = (25, 25, · · · , 25). Assuming β = 0.05, and suppose the data
attacker use a differencing attack to attack y1 by sending two queries. The response the
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Table 7.2: The following terms are to be used for Table 7.3. λ1 = ŝ−1 β .

PC11
PC12
PC13
PC21
PC22
PC23
PC24
PC25
PC26

1
2
2λ λ1 αy1 β
1
2
2
2 2
2λ λ1 (0.125λ + 0.5λ αy1 + 0.5α y1 − 0.25λ λ1 + 0.125λ1 − 0.5αy1 λ1 )
1
2
2 2
2
2λ1 λ (1.125λ1 + 1.5λ1 αy1 + 0.5α y1 − 2.25λ λ1 + 1.125λ − 1.5αy1 λ )
αy1
2λ
1
2 y2 − λ y α + 3λ λ − 2λ 2 − 1.125λ 2 + 1.5λ αy )
(−0.5α
1
1
1
1
1
1
2λ λ1
3αy21 β
2λ λ1
1
2 + 0.5α 2 y2 + 0.5αy λ − 0.25λ λ + 0.125λ 2 − 0.5αy λ )
(0.125λ
1 1
1
1
1
1
2λ λ1
1
2
2λ λ1 (0.75λ λ1 + 0.5αy1 λ1 − 0.875λ1 )
1
2
2
2 2
2λ λ1 (1.125λ + 0.5α y1 + 1.5αy1 λ − 2.25λ λ1 + 1.125λ1 − 1.5λ1 αy1 )

Table 7.3: Disclosure risks of the largest contributor value y1 if table cells are perturbed
by the new algorithm, given different conditions of the largest contributor value y1 and
different relationships between α and β .

n is odd,

λ
4β −2α

λ
4β −2α
λ
λ
odd, 4β +2α
< y1 < min( 1.5βλ+α , 2α
)
λ
n is odd, y1 < 4β +2α
λ
)
n is even, y1 < min( 1.5βλ+α , 2α

n is odd,

n is

λ
< y1 < min( 1.5βλ+α , 2α
)

λ
4β +2α

< y1 <

< β < 2α
PC24 + PC21

α
β ≤ 1.5
not possible

PC22

PC24 + PC22

not possible

PC22

PC24 + PC22

PC24 + PC25

PC23

PC24 + PC23

PC24 + PC26

PC11

PC12

PC12 + PC13

β ≥ 2α
PC21

α
1.5

the two queries are:
First query: ∑8i=1 25 + R∗1 ; Second query: ∑8i=2 25 + R∗2 .
By differencing the two outputs, the attacker’s estimate of y1 is
ŷ1 = y1 + R∗1 − R∗2
The distributions of R∗1 and R∗2 are given in Figure 7.3 and 7.4. The distribution of
R∗1 − R∗2 and the disclosure risk of y1 are given in Figure 7.5. Compared with Figure 7.2,
we see that the disclosure risk of y1 is smaller because the distribution of R∗1 − R∗2 does
not peak at 0.
In the next section, we discuss the advantages of using the new algorithm compared to
the algorithm in Thompson et al. (2013).
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Figure 7.3: Distribution of R∗1 .

Figure 7.4: Distribution of R∗2 .
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Figure 7.5: Distribution of R∗1 − R∗2 and the corresponding disclosure risk of y1 (red
area), assuming α = 0.11. Compared with Figure 7.2, we see that the disclosure risk of
y1 is smaller because the distribution of R∗1 − R∗2 does not peak at 0.

7.5
7.5.1

The new algorithm v.s. Thompson et al. algorithm
Controlled Utility Loss of Perturbing a Cell

For a given cell with cell value ŝ, it can be easily seen that the perturbation amount p∗
generated by the new algorithm is bounded in (−2β ŝ, 2β ŝ). As a result, the utility loss of
perturbing the cell through the new algorithm is bounded in (0, 2β ). As a result, both the
average utility loss and the maximum utility loss of perturbing the cell could be controlled.
To illustrate this advantage, suppose the contributor values to a cell are
(y1 w1 , · · · y8 w8 ) = (25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25). From Table 7.1, the optimal magnitude
values are (m1 , m2 , m3 ) = (0.5, 0.4, 0.3). If the cell is perturbed by the algorithm in
Thompson et al. with the optimal magnitude values, the average utility loss is 7.54%.
However, as we have showed above, the maximum possible utility loss is 24%. A perturbed result with such a high utility loss may mislead some data users. In contrast, perturbing the cell by the new algorithm with β = 0.0754 also gives an average utility loss
of 7.54%. The maximum utility loss is 2β = 15.08%, which is lower than the counterpart
produced by Thompson et al (2013)’s algorithm.

7.5.2

A Conjectured Wider Applicability

It is conjectured that the new algorithm could legitimately perturb a wider range of cells.
A legitimately perturbed cell value should satisfy the requirements of both disclosure risk
and utility loss. Recall that we assume the attacker’s target is the largest contributor value
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y1 , and w1 = 1. In the following, we say that a cell could be legitimately perturbed by
an algorithm if the average utility loss is less than T , and the disclosure risk of y1 against
differencing attack is less than DL given a specified acceptance rule α. We illustrate this
conjectured wider applicability by comparing the performances of the two algorithms on
different cells.
Suppose the statistical agency set (T ,DL,α) to be (10%, 15%, 11%) for a perturbed
cell estimate to be legitimate. Recall that in a recent study in Chipperfield et al. (2019),
we used one set of parameters for the algorithm in Thompson et al. (2013) for perturbing
all cells as it is more practical. We repeat this here and set the parameters to be K = 3,
m = (0.4, 0.3, 0.2). We set β equal to 0.1. Recall that β = 0.1 means that the expected
utility loss to a cell is 10%.
Cell 1:
The contributor values of cell 1 are (y1 w1 , y2 w2 , · · · , y6 w6 ) =
(30, 30, 30, 10, 5, 5). We measure the average utility losses and disclosure risks resulting from the two perturbation algorithms, respectively. We applied Thompson et al.’s
algorithm and the new algorithm to the data 5000 times. On each iteration, and for each
approach, we generated estimates of y1 as the difference in perturbed totals. To estimate
disclosure risk for each algorithm, we record the number of times that an estimate of y1
discloses y1 , i.e. the number of times that the estimate is within ((1 − α)y1 , (1 + α)y1 ).
Let the number be k. Then the estimated disclosure risk is k/5000. For Thompson et al.’s
algorithm, we recorded the utility loss to the cell on each iteration, and we computed the
average utility loss across all 5000 samples of utility losses. The average utility loss is
our estimate of the expected utility loss.
Using the algorithm in Thompson et al., the average utility loss and disclosure risk of
releasing perturbed cell estimates are 12.4% and 9.4%, respectively. It means that, even
though the perturbed cell estimates satisfy a required level of disclosure risk, they do not
carry enough data utility as required by the statistical agency. Using the new algorithm,
the average utility loss and disclosure risk of releasing perturbed cell estimates are 10%
and 6.5%. This means that, both the requirements of utility loss and disclosure risk
are satisfied, and it is legitimate to release a perturbed cell value generated by the new
algorithm.
Cell 2: The contributor values of cell 2 consist of (y1 w1 , y2 w2 , · · · , y7 w7 ) =
(25, 25, 25, 25, 1, 1, 1). Using the algorithm in Thompson et al., the average utility loss
and disclosure risk of releasing perturbed cell estimates are 10.9% and 12.0%, respectively. That means perturbed cell estimates do not carry enough data utility as required
by the statistical agency. Using the new algorithm, the average utility loss and disclosure
risk of releasing perturbed cell estimates are 10% and 11.4%. Both the requirements of
utility loss and disclosure risk are satisfied, and it is legitimate to release a perturbed cell
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value generated by the new algorithm.
The above two cells are used to show that the new algorithm could help to generate
legitimate cell estimates that are not achievable by the algorithm in Thompson et al.
(2013). However, we next show that it is possible that, when a cell contains a dominant
contributor value, the algorithm in Thompson et al. (2013) is better. For illustration, we
set (T ,DL,α) to be (15%, 12%, 11%), and β = 0.15 for the next cell.
Cell 3: The contributor values of cell 3 consist of (y1 w1 , y2 w2 , · · · y9 w9 ) =
(60, 20, 20, 15, 15, 10, 10, 10, 10). The average utility loss and disclosure risk of releasing perturbed cell estimates generated by the algorithm in Thompson et al. are 14.1% and
9.5%, while the counterparts generated by the new algorithm are 15% and 13.1%. In this
case the algorithm in Thompson et al. (2013) is the better algorithm for perturbing the
cell.
The reason the new algorithm is not favourable for Cell 3 is that, when the ratio y1 w1 /ŝ
gets large, the disclosure risk of using the new algorithm goes up dramatically. To see this,
λ
). From
without loss of generality, we assume n is even, β ≥ 2α, y1 w1 < min( 1.5βλ+α , 2α
1
2
2
Table 7.3, the disclosure risk is PC11 = 2λ λ αy1 w1 β . It is evident that the ratio y1 w1 /ŝ has
1
a large impact the value of disclosure risk. Possible future research would be to use either
the algorithm in Thompson et al. or the new algorithm to perturb a cell estimate subject
to a condition involving the value of y1 w1 /ŝ.

7.5.3

Better Utility-Disclosure Trade-offs

We compare the utility-disclosure tradeoffs of the two algorithms on cells with different
contributor values through simulations. In order to obtain utility-disclosure plots, we
gradually changed the values in the magnitude vector m used by the algorithm in
Thompson et al. (2013) and the parameter β used by the new algorithm. We recorded the
average utility losses and disclosure risks given different parameter values. Moreover, we
provide utility-disclosure plots for α = 0.11 and α = 0.18, respectively.
Simulation 1: The contributor values of a cell are (y1 w1 , y2 w2 , · · · , y8 w8 )
= (25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25).
We set the magnitude vector to be m =
(0.3 + 0.01i, 0.2 + 0.01i, 0.1 + 0.01i), where i = 1, 2 · · · 40. We recorded the utility
loss and disclosure risk of releasing perturbed cell estimates generated by the algorithm
in Thompson et al. (2013) for each value of i for generating the utility-disclosure plot.
When i = 20, m = (0.5, 0.4, 0.3), which is the optimal magnitude vector as shown in
Table 7.1. Similarly we set β = 0.04 + i/400, i = 1, 2 · · · 40; and we obtained the utilitydisclosure plot for the new algorithm. We use boxes to represent the utility-disclosure
plot of the algorithm in Thompson et al. (2013) and dots to represent the utility-disclosure
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plot of the new algorithm and these symbols also apply to Figures 7.7 and 7.8 discussed
in Simulations 2 and 3. The utility-disclosure plots for α = 0.11 and 0.18 are provided
in Fig. 7.6.
Simulation 2: The contributor values of a cell are (y1 w1 , y2 w2 , · · · , y9 w9 )
= (40, 20, 20, 15, 15, 10, 10, 10, 10).
We set the magnitude vector to be
m = (0.15 + 0.01i, 0.1 + 0.01i, 0.05 + 0.01i), where i = 1, 2 · · · 40. The parameter
of new algorithm is set to be β = 0.03 + i/300, i = 1, 2 · · · 40. We follow the same
procedure as in Simulation 1 to obtain the utility-disclosure plots of the two algorithm
for α = 0.11 and 0.18. The plots are given in Fig. 7.7.
Simulation 3: The contributor values are (y1 w1 , y2 w2 , · · · , y49 w49 )
= (60, 20, 10, 10, · · · , 10).
We set the magnitude vector to be m = (0.05 +
0.05i, 0.05i, 0.05i), where i = 1, 2 · · · 40. The parameter of the new algorithm is set
to be β = 0.01 + i/150, i = 1, 2 · · · 40. The utility-disclosure plots for α = 0.11 and 0.18
are given in Fig. 7.8.
From Fig. 7.6, we see that the new algorithm leads to a better utility-disclosure tradeoff when the contributor values to a cell estimate are uniformly distributed. From Fig.
7.7, we see that this advantage is reduced when the largest contributor value dominates
the cell estimate. From Fig. 7.8, we see that the new algorithm again offers a better
utility-disclosure trade-off even though the largest contributor value is significantly larger
than all other contributor values, as in this case where the largest contributor value does
not dominate the cell total.

7.6

Conclusion

In this chapter we introduced a new algorithm to generate perturbed survey estimates of
population totals via a remote system. The perturbed totals are released in table cells. The
advantages of the new algorithm are discussed compared with the algorithm in Thompson
et al. (2013). It is conjectured that the new algorithm could be widely used in many remote
systems for creating aggregate totals from business microdata. Possible future research
would be on combining the new algorithm with the algorithm in Thompson et al. to
perturb business totals such that the more efficient utility-risk tradeoff could be achieved.
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(a) Utility-Disclosure plots for Simulation 1 with α = 0.11

(b) Utility-Disclosure plots for Simulation 1 with α = 0.18

Figure 7.6: Utility-disclosure plots for Simulation 1 with different α values. The boxed
plot represents results generated by the Thompson et al. algorithm and the dotted plot
represents results generated by the new algorithm.
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(a) Utility-Disclosure plots for Simulation 2 with α = 0.11

(b) Utility-Disclosure plots for Simulation 2 with α = 0.18

Figure 7.7: Utility-disclosure plots for Simulation 2 with different α values.
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(a) Utility-Disclosure plots for Simulation 3 with α = 0.11

(b) Utility-Disclosure plots for Simulation 3 with α = 0.18

Figure 7.8: Utility-disclosure plots for Simulation 3 with different α values.

Chapter 8
Conditional linkage error model
For statistical agencies, they might have collected multiple datasets which contain information on the same individuals. For instance, for the same individuals, three datasets
might have been created based on survey responses. The first dataset might contain information of age, gender and personal income of the individuals. The second dataset might
contain information of gender, education status, and daily expenditures of the individuals. The third dataset might contain information of age, gender, marital status and ethnic
group of the individuals. When recording these information, the identity of the data respondents are generally removed from the dataset for data privacy concerns. However, it
might be interesting to know the relationship between two attributes which are not in the
same dataset, for instance personal income and ethnic group.
When the personal identities of the data respondents are known, the statistical agency
could easily match the records from different datasets, and create a larger dataset containing all the attributes contained in the smaller datasets. The statistical agency could then investigate the relationships between attributes originally located in different datasets. However, because uniquely identifying information is generally removed from these datasets,
the statistical agency cannot match records from distinct datasets with certainty. Investigating the relationships by collecting new data could be very expensive. Alternatively,
the statistical agency could link the records, and then investigate the relationship between
those attributes. Record linkage is relatively cheap and easy to conduct. Therefore, it is a
daily routine for many statistical agencies to match records from different datasets via the
process of record linkage. In this chapter, we consider the case where only two datasets
are linked together through the process.
Record linkage is the act of identifying records from two files that belong to the same
unit (individual or business). Ideally, record pairs that belonged to the same unit could
be identified with certainty. In this way, data analyst could extract accurate statistical
information between analysing variables in the linked-dataset. This is only possible when
unique identifiers, such as social security number, are available and error-free. However,
such information is normally not available in each dataset to be linked in order to protect
108
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respondents confidentiality. Therefore, for a record pair, i.e. one record from each
dataset, it is not known that whether it is a match (the two records in the record pair come
from the same unit), or a non-match (the two records come from different units).
Fellegi and Sunter (1969) developed a record linkage model for linking records of two
datasets where unique identifiers are not available. The record linkage model utilises a set
of attributes called link fields. Link fields are a subset of attributes which are present in
both datasets. They contain quasi-identifying information for a unit, such as age, gender,
education status etc. For a record pair, Fellegi and Sunter’s (1969) record linkage model
compares the values of a record pair across their link fields. To compare the similarity,
an agreement pattern is created. An agreement pattern is a vector contains agreement
outcomes. If the record pair agrees on the first link field, then the agreement outcome is 1.
Otherwise it is 0. For instance, suppose there are three link fields. The record pair agrees
on the first two link fields, but disagree on the third link field. Then the agreement pattern
is (1,1,0). The match weight for a record pair is the log2 of the probability of observing
the agreement pattern if the record pair is a match minus the log2 of the probability of
observing the agreement pattern if the record pair is a non-match. Suppose there are n
records in each dataset. Then there are n2 record pairs to consider. For each record pair, a
match weight is computed.
In practice, the statistical agency needs to decide on upper and lower thresholds on
the match weight, U and L. The decision rule is : If for a record pair, its match weight
is above U, then we say the record pair is a match. If its match weight is below L, we
say the record pair is a non-match. If the match weight is in between, then we say the
record pair is a potential match. Generally the vast majority of record pairs are classified
as non-matches.
Fellegi and Sunter (1969) showed that the optimal U and L could be determined in the
sense that the set of potential matches is minimized, subject to pre-specified error levels for false links (linked non-matches) and false non-links (non-linked matches). Other
methods for determining these two thresholds can be found in Tuoto (2016). All potential
matches are passed to clerical review, which means statistical agents need to manually
determine whether a potential match is a match by comparing more information of the
record pair based on some extra information. For instance, suppose a record pair disagrees on address. A statistical agent could manually check whether the disagreement on
address is due to spelling errors, and then make a decision on whether the record pair is a
match. However, the clerical review process is costly, time-consuming, and is also subject
to judgement error (Scheuren and Winkler 1993).
For the purposes of this chapter, we only consider one-to-one correspondence, i.e. for
each record in one file there is exactly one match in another file. We assume the following
process for record linkage, which could be seen as an application of matching constraint.
That is, firstly, the files are linked by a probabilistic linkage algorithm, which is described
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in Chipperfield and Chambers (2015). Next, the match weights of linked record pairs
are compared with the threshold values U and L to determine matches or non-matches,
same as in Fellegi-Sunter’s approach. The probabilistic linkage algorithm is a one-to-one
assignment algorithm. One-to-one assignment means that, for each record in one file,
it is assigned a link with a record in the other file. Records on each file could only be
linked once. The probabilistic linkage algorithm links the record pairs iteratively. On
each iteration the record pair with the highest match weight is linked, and the record pairs
which contain one of the linked records will not be linked on subsequent iterations. A
linked record pair with match weight greater than U is considered as a match. A linked
record pair with match weight below L is considered as a non-match. A linked pair with
match weight in between is considered as a potential match and is to go to clerical review.
Once the clerical review process is done, those record pairs which are considered to
be matches are linked together. However, linked data almost inevitably contains errors.
Analysing linked data with linkage errors can result in large levels of estimation bias. For
instance, Scheuren and Winkler (1993) showed that the ordinary least squares estimator
would lead to biased estimation of regression coefficients when linked data contains errors. Consequently, methods for correcting estimation bias have been studied extensively
in the past (Scheuren and Winker 1993; Lahiri and Larsen 2005; Chambers 2009; Hof and
Zwinderman 2012; Chipperfield and Chambers 2015). Generally speaking, these methods allow data users to perform data analysis on probabilistically-linked data (e.g. data
linked by the probabilistic linkage algorithm). Consequently, the need for clerical review
is reduced. It is important because clerical review is costly and is subject to linkage errors.
Broadly speaking, there are two main methods for correcting estimation bias. The first
method uses a Matching Error Model (MEM). The second method uses a Linkage Error
Model (LEM). An alternative approach is developed in Goldstein et al. (2012), where the
authors suggest replacing all potential matches with synthetic records generated by multiple imputation. For a MEM, the probability for a record pair to be a match is computed for
each record pair, and the probabilities are summarized in a matrix. The probability could
be computed based on the observed agreement pattern or the observed match weight of
the record pair. The use of MEM for correcting estimation bias is thoroughly discussed
in Scheuren and Winkler (1993). The authors assumed that an accurate MEM could be
constructed, and showed that using the MEM and a bias-corrected estimator would lead
to unbiased estimates of linear regression coefficients. Lahiri and Larsen (2005) developed an unbiased linear regression coefficient estimator which incorporates a MEM. The
authors also proposed a new MEM which computes the posterior probability for a record
pair to be a match. Hof and Zwinderman (2012) developed several unbiased regression
coefficient estimators for different regression models.
Different MEMs have been proposed in the literature. In addition to the MEM proposed
in Lahiri and Larsen (2005), Scheuren and Winkler (1993) proposed a MEM by using the
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match weight of a record pair. A similar MEM was proposed in Goldstein et al. (2012).
Lahiri-Larsen (LL)’s MEM is studied in Hof and Zwinderman (2012) and Chipperfield
and Chambers (2015). In this chapter we consider LL’s MEM for comparison purposes.
On the other hand, LEM calculates the probability that two sampling units, when properly indexed, are linked by the probabilistic linkage algorithm. The probabilities for
each pair of sampling units are collected in a matrix. Calculating these probabilities
might require simulating the process of probabilistic linkage iteratively, such as the bootstrap method in Chipperfield and Chambers (2015). Chambers (2009) proposed several
bias-adjusted estimators by incorporating LEM, under one-to-one correspondence. The
author showed that, when an LEM is constructed accurately, data users could use the
bias-adjusted estimators to obtain unbiased linear regression coefficient estimates from
probabilistically-linked data. Subsequent works by Chambers and Kim (2010), Chipperfield and Chambers (2015) extended the result for other regression models and other linkage scenarios than one-to-one correspondence. All these works made it possible for a data
analyst to obtain unbiased results directly from probabilistically-linked data. We note that
for LL’s MEM, it does not matter whether the record pairs are probabilistically-linked, as
the calculation of the MEM only depends on the observed agreement patterns.
Chipperfield and Chambers (2015) showed that LL’s MEM perform poorly under oneto-one correspondence. Our simulation showed that LL’s MEM tends to assign a higher
probability of being a match to non-match pairs and lower probability of being a match to
match pairs compared with a LEM. We note that a record pair being linked by the probabilistic linkage algorithm provides strong evidence that the record pair is a non-match. As
a result, the record pair should have a low probability of being a match. However, LL’s
MEM does not consider this fact. Consequently, LL’s MEM might not be accurate in
some situations. Our simulation showed that using LL’ MEM will result in larger relative
standard errors for linear regression coefficient estimates compared with using a LEM.
Constructing an accurate LEM might be difficult. Chambers (2009) constructed an
LEM by assuming that all matches have the same probability λ of being linked, while
all non-matches have the same probability of (1 − λ )/(n − 1) being linked, where n is
the total number of records in each file. For high quality probabilistically-linked data, λ
should be close to 1. This LEM is called “Exchangeable Linkage Error (ELE) Model”.
The ELE model has only one parameter λ . λ is also the proportion of links which are
matches, i.e. the proportion of correct links. To estimate this parameter, Chambers (2009)
proposed to use a good audit sample drawn from the probabilistically-linked data. A
clerical review process is needed for estimating the proportion of correct links in the
sample. Chipperfield and Chambers (2015) proposed a bootstrap method for estimating
this parameter without using an audit sample. The authors showed that using the bootstrap
method leads to very good estimation of this parameter. However, because the ELE made
the assumption on the structure of linkage errors, it will cause estimation bias in many
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scenarios.
This chapter introduces a new LEM, namely Conditional Linkage Error (CLE) model,
under one-to-one correspondence. Following the convention in Chambers (2009) and
Chipperfield and Chambers (2015), we assume a secondary file is being linked to a
“benchmark file”. The benchmark file contains all explanatory variables of a regression
model, the secondary file contains the response variable of the regression model. The
CLE model is constructed by conditioning on the link fields in the benchmark file. The
advantage of the CLE model over the ELE model is that: (a) it produces unbiased regression coefficient estimates in wider scenarios; (b) by conditioning on more information, the
CLE model could lead to estimates with a lower mean squared error than the ELE model
for a regression coefficient. In line with Scheuren and Winkler (1993), Lahiri and Larsen
(2005), and Chipperfield and Chambers (2015), we assume all link fields are categorical
and discrete.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.1 introduces the latent model and probabilistic linkage algorithm. Section 8.2 reviews the work of Chambers (2009). Section 8.3
introduces the ELE model and the CLE model. Section 8.4 discusses the ELE model, the
CLE model and LL’ MEM. Section 8.5 presents a simulation study. Section 8.6 concludes
the chapter.

8.1

Latent model and probabilistic-linkage algorithm

In this section we introduce how two datasets are linked by the probabilistic linkage algorithm. Suppose we wish to link two files, File A and File B, and under one-to-one
correspondence. Each file contains n records. Following Lahiri and Larsen (2005); Chambers (2009); Kim and Chambers (2010), we assume that File A contains all explanatory
variables of a regression model, and File B contains the response variable. File A is the
benchmark file.

8.1.1

Linking fields and agreement pattern

A typical dataset contains details of units across several attributes. Linking fields are
fields that are common to both datasets. Examples of linking fields are first name, date
of birth, postcode. Records are linked based on their linking fields. Suppose both files
contain k linking fields. Define a record pair to be a record on File A and a record on File
B. As the matching status of a record pair is not known, each record pair is a potential
match. For each record pair we observe an agreement pattern on the set of linking
fields. The observed agreement pattern for the ith record on File A and the jth record on
File B, called here the (Ai , B j ) record pair, is denoted as aoij = (aoij1 , aoij2 , · · · , aoijk ), where
aoijl = 1 if both records share the same value on the l-th linking field and 0 otherwise. For
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instance, suppose there are three linking fields which take the values (2,2,1) for record Ai
and take the values (2,3,1) for record B j . In this case, the observed agreement pattern is
aoij = (1, 0, 1). The observed agreement pattern aoij can be treated as a realization of an
underlying random variable ai j , where ai j = (ai j1 , ai j2 , · · · , ai jk ). We say that ai jk is the
agrement outcome of (Ai , B j ) on the k-th link field. The observed agreement patterns of
all record pairs are stored in a observed comparison outcome matrix Ao (the superscript
o is to emphasise that the matrix is observed). The underlying random variable of Ao
is A, where A = (a11 , a12 , · · · , a1n , a21 , a22 , · · · , a2n , · · · , · · · , an1 , an2 , · · · , ann )T , T denotes
vector transpose. That is, we treat Ao as a realisation from the random variable A. It
is often assumed in the literature that the agreement patterns in A are independent. The
distribution of an agreement pattern is described by a latent model which will be shown
next.

8.1.2

Latent model and match weight

A latent model is used to classify the matching status of a record pair. That is, each record
pair belongs to one of two latent (or unobserved) classes: match or non-match. Denote
the match class by M and the non-match class as U. Denote the conditional probability of observing aoij if (Ai , B j ) is a match by P(ai j = aoij |M), and denote the conditional
probability of observing aoij if (Ai , B j ) is a non-match by P(ai j = aoij |U).
It is often assumed (Fellegi and Sunter 1969; Lahiri and Larsen 2005), and is also
adopted in many real-life applications (such as the Death Registrations to Census Linkage Project in the Australian Bureau of Statistics) that, for a record pair, the agreement
outcome on one linking field is independent of the agreement outcome on other linking
fields, given its latent class. Following this assumption, the probability of observing an
agreement pattern aoij for ai j that is a match or non-match, respectively, is given below:
k

ao

o

P(ai j = aoij |M) = ∏ Ml i jl (1 − Ml )(1−ai jl )
l=1
k

P(ai j = aoij |U) =

∏

o
ao
Ul i jl (1 −Ul )(1−ai jl )

(8.1)

l=1

where the parameter Ml is the probability that a match record pair agrees on the l-th
linking field, and the parameter Ul is the probability that a non-match record pair agrees
on the l-th linking field. The parameters Ml and Ul could be estimated through either
supervised learning or unsupervised learning (Jaro. 1989). Supervised learning requires
training data with known matching status of the record pairs. The parameters could then
be estimated directly from the training data. The most common unsupervised approach
uses maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters. Specifically, the likelihood of
observing the comparison outcome matrix Ao is given by:
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m

L(Ao ) = ∏ ∏ {P(ai j = aoij |M)π + P(ai j = aoij |U)(1 − π)},
i=1 j=1

where n is the number of records in File A, m is the number of records in File B. π is the
probability that a random record pair is a match and is equal to n0 /mn, where n0 is the
number of matches between the two files. Under one-to-one correspondence, n = m = n0
and π = 1/n. In general, for any n0 , m and n, the parameters Ml , Ul and π are estimated
via expectation maximization. To simplify our discussion of this chapter, we assume that
Ml and Ul are known.
From Equation (8.1), we could calculate the match weight for each record pair. Mathematically, the match weight of (Ai , B j ), denoted as wi j , has the following form:
wi j = log2 [

P(ai j = aoij |M)
P(ai j = aoij |U)

].

For a record pair, the higher the match weight, the more likely that the record pair is
a match. For all record pairs, the match weights are calculated, and the record pairs are
ready to be linked by the probabilistic linkage algorithm. In practice, a statistical agency
could use any linkage algorithm which ensures one-to-one assignment, as long as the
linkage algorithm is reasonable. That is, the linkage algorithm should only link those
record pairs with high match weights. The CLE model we propose in this paper could be
used for any linkage algorithm. In the following we introduce the probabilistic linkage
algorithm.

8.1.3

Probabilistic Linkage algorithm

Following Chipperfield and Chambers (2015, Section 4.2), a simple probabilistic linkage
algorithm is used in this chapter. The probabilistic linkage algorithm works as follows:
1. Sort all record pairs by their match weights, wi j for i, j = 1, . . . , n, from the highest
to the lowest. Note that there are n2 record pairs;
2. The first record pair in the ordered list is linked;
3. All record pairs containing either of the records linked in Step 2 are removed from
the list of potential links, meaning that those removed record pairs will not be linked in
the future;
4. Return to Step 2 until all records are linked.

8.1.4

Blocking variable

In this paper, we assume the existence of a blocking variable Z. A blocking variable is
measured without error on both files, such that a record pair cannot be linked at all if the
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two records share different values of the blocking variable Z. Records are partitioned into
different blocks according to the value of Z. Records in the same block share the same Z
value. Therefore, only records within the same block have positive probabilities of being
linked, i.e. linkage errors only exist within a block.

8.2

Using linkage error model to correct estimation bias

Once two datasets are linked by the probabilistic linkage algorithm, the linked dataset
could be used for data analysis. To do this, a Linkage Error Model (LEM) needs to be
constructed first. Suppose File A and File B to be linked are of size n. An LEM is a
matrix, denoted as Q, with the following form:

q11 q12

q21 q22
Q=
..
 ..
.
 .
qn1 qn2


· · · q1n

· · · q2n 
. 
..
. .. 

· · · qnn

where qi j is the probability that (Ai , B̃ j ) is linked by the linkage algorithm. B̃i is a
record on File B. B̃i and A j is a match. B̃i is not observable. In the following we review
previous works developed by Chamber (2009) on using LEM to correct estimation bias.
Define B̃ be a re-ordering of the records, such that (A1 , B̃1 ),... (Ai , B̃i ), ...(An , B̃n ) are
matches. We do not observe B̃ because we do not know the matching statuses of record
pairs between File A and File B. We define ãi j as the agreement pattern for (Ai , B̃ j ).

8.2.1

LEM overview

Denote Xi = (Xi1 , Xi2 · · · , Xin ) be the set of explanatory variables for record Ai , Yi be the
response variable such that E(Yi |Xi ) = f (β , Xi ). Yi is possessed by B̃i . After probabilistically linking the data, Xi is linked to Yi∗ , which is observable. Denote Y = (Y1 ,Y2 , · · · ,Yn )T ,
Y ∗ = (Y1∗ ,Y2∗ , · · · ,Yn∗ )T , X = (X1 , X2 , · · · , Xn )T , where T denotes matrix transpose. Chambers (2009) modelled the relationship between the two random vectors as Y ∗ = PY ,
where P is a random permutation matrix which shuffles the order of Y into Y ∗ by applying the linkage algorithm. P is full rank, each row and column contains a value
of one and n-1 values of zero. Assuming P and Y are independent given X, that is,
E(Y ∗ |X) = E(P|X)E(Y |X). Then E(P|X), which is denoted as Q, is the LEM. Q is an n
by n matrix with elements {qi j }i, j=1,··· ,n , where qi j is the probability that Ai and B̃ j are
linked given X. So qii is the conditional probability that record Ai is correctly linked. In
the following we review unbiased estimators for two regression models.
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Linear Regression

Let the true linear model be Yi = β0 + β1 xi1 + β2 xi2 + · · · + β p xip + εi , E(εi ) = 0 and
Var(εi ) = σ 2 and cov(εi , ε j ) = 0 for j 6= i. We observe (xi1 , xi2 , · · · , xip ) for each record
Ai , and we observe y∗i , which is linked to Ai .
Let β = (β0 , β1 , β2 , · · · , β p ). Chambers et al. (2009) use an LEM to estimate β by
β̂ = (XdT QT QXd )−1 XdT QT y∗ ,
where y∗ = (y∗1 , y∗2 , · · · , y∗n ), y∗i is the observed value of the response variable which is
linked to xi . XdT is the transpose of Xd , Xd is the design matrix, i.e.


1 x11 x12 · · · x1p


1 x21 x22 · · · x2p 

Xd = 
 .. .. . . . ..

.
. .

1 xn1 xn2 · · · xnp

8.2.3

Logistic Regression

Suppose the true model is

1, if β + β x + β x + · · · + β x + ε > 0
p ip
i
0
1 i1
2 i2
yi =
0, otherwise
where {εi }ni=1 are independently distributed logistic errors.
Denote β =
(β0 , β1 , β2 , · · · , β p ).
Chambers et al. (2009) uses an LEM to estimate β by iteratively calculating:
β̂ k+1 = β̂ k − (−XdT QT QDXd )−1 XdT QT (y∗ − Q f ),
until convergence, where f = exp(Xd β̂ k )/(1 + exp(Xd β̂ k )), D = diag( f (I − f )), I is identity vector with same order as f , Xd is the design matrix, Xd−1 is the inverse of Xd .

8.3

Conditional Linkage Error Model

In this section we review the Exchangeable Linkage Error (ELE) model, which is the only
LEM proposed in the literature so far. Then, we will introduce a new LEM, which we call
the Conditional Linkage Error (CLE) model.
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ELE model

In practice, the form of Q is difficult to know. Chambers (2009) proposed an Exchangeable Linkage Error (ELE) model by assuming that qii = λ for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n and
qi j = 1−λ
n−1 for all i 6= j, where the parameter λ is the proportion of links that are matches.
Under this specification, the ELE model only requires the knowledge of λ . To estimate λ ,
Chambers (2009) suggested to use a good audit training data with known matching status.
Alternatively, a model-based estimate of λ is described in Chipperfield and Chambers
(2015). The authors noted that, even though the agreement pattern for (Ai , B̃i ) cannot be
observed, the distribution of the agreement pattern for (Ai , B̃i ) is given in Equation (8.1)
for all i, j = 1, · · · , n. Let ãi j be the random variable of the agreement pattern for (Ai , B̃ j ).
The authors proposed to generate agreement patterns ãi j using (8.1):
(a) For matches (Ai , B̃i ) for i = 1, ..., n, generate an agreement pattern ãsii according to
πãii |M in (8.1).
(b) For non-matches (Ai , B̃ j ) for i, j = 1, ..., n and i 6= j, generate an agreement pattern
according to πãi j |U in (8.1).

ãsij

Note that we do not need to simulate the linking fields of B̃. We only need to simulate
agreement patterns for matches and non-matches according to the latent model. The
probabilistic linkage algorithm only needs the agreement patterns of the two files to link
the records. The estimate of λ is calculated in the following way:
1. Generate plausible agreement patterns for ãi j as described in (a) and (b) above for
all i, j = 1, ..., n. The simulated agreement patterns are stored in a simulated comparison
outcome matrix Ãs . Repeat this T times and denote the tth set of simulation-generated
agreement patterns by the matrix (A˜s )t . Note that in (A˜s )t , we know the class from which
an agreement pattern is simulated.
2. For the t-th replicate, use the probabilistic linkage algorithm to link records in File
A and File B̃ according to (A˜s )t (instead of Ao ). Note that for each Ai , we know which
simulated agreement pattern in (A˜s )t is the simulated agreement pattern for (Ai , B̃ j ) for
all j = 1, 2, · · · , n. For the t-th replicate, when we link the data according to (A˜s )t , say if
we know that (Ai , B̃i ) is linked by the probabilistic linkage algorithm, then we know that
it is a correct link. Therefore, for all linked record pairs, we know how many of them are
correct links. We calculate pt , which is the proportion of links that are matches for the
tth replicate. Repeat for t = 1, .., T .
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3. The estimated λ is λ̂ = T −1 Σt pt , the average of the proportions of correct links
across all replicates.
Recall that in Section 8.2.1, Chambers (2009) showed that Q = E(P|X), where P is a
random permutation matrix and X is the set of explanatory variables. The construction of
the ELE model certainly does not take X into account. Therefore, the ELE model only
works if P is independent of X. Recall that P reflects the outcome of a linkage algorithm.
Therefore, when P and X are independent, that means that X is independent of the linkage
outcome. It is true when link fields and covariates are independent, because in all situations the linkage outcome is determined by link fields only, and the linkage outcome is not
affected by covariates if link fields and covariates are independent. However in general
covariates and linkage outcome are not independent. For instance, ‘Gender’ could used
as a link field and could also be one of the covariates in a regression model. Therefore,
the ELE model is unlikely to hold in practice. Therefore we propose a new linkage error
model, namely “Conditional Linkage Error (CLE) model”, for correcting estimation bias.
The CLE model is constructed by conditioning on all link fields of the benchmark file. By
doing so, it delivers two advantages: 1. the CLE model is able to correct estimation bias
under wider scenarios, such as when covariates X and link fields are not independent; 2.
for a regression coefficient, the CLE model leads to a lower mean squared error than the
ELE model.

8.3.2

Conditional Linkage Error model

The CLE model is constructed by conditioning on observed information of link fields in
the benchmark file (File A). Assuming there are k link fields. Denote the link fields in File
A as L = (L1 , L2 , · · · , Lk ). The information of L is summarised through the following steps:
Step 1: We construct the agreement patterns of all record pairs in File A. For
instance, let Ai and A j form a record pair (Ai , A j ). Then we have the agreement pattern
aBij = (aAij1 , · · · , aAijk ), where aAijl = 1 if (Ai , A j ) agrees on the l-th linking field, and 0
otherwise. The superscript in aAijl is used to indicate the agreement outcome is from
(Ai , A j ). Following this idea, we could obtain all agreement patterns for all record pairs
from the benchmark file. The agreement patterns are stored in AA .
Step 2: We define a set of parameters {pl }kl=1 . pl is the probability that (Ai , A j ) agrees
on the l-th linking field, or P(aAijl = 1) = pl for all i 6= j and l = 1, 2, · · · , k. In practice,
given linking fields of File A, we observe (AA )o = {(aAij )o }i=1,··· ,n;i6= j . The value of pl
could be estimated by

∑i=1,··· ,n ∑ j6=i (aAijl )o
.
n(n−1)
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Recall that Equation (8.1) shows the probability of observing an agreement outcome
given each latent class. Because of AA , we could construct the following set of conditional
probabilities for observing an agreement outcome for the non-match class U:
P(ãi jl = 0|aAijl = 0, ã j jl = 0,U) =

1 −Ul − (1 − p)Ml − p(1 − Ml )
(1 − p)(1 − Ml )

P(ãi jl = 0|aAijl = 0, ã j jl = 1,U) = 1
P(ãi jl = 0|aAijl
P(ãi jl = 0|aAijl

(8.2)

= 1, ã j jl = 0,U) = 1
= 1, ã j jl = 1,U) = 0

The last three conditional probabilities above are obtained by logical inference. For
instance, if (Ai , A j ) disagrees on the l-th link field, and (A j , B̃ j ) agrees on the link field.
That means Ai and B̃ j for sure disagree on the l-th link field.
The above two steps show how to make use the information of link fields on the File
A. Because of Equation (8.2), we could now generate a plausible agreement pattern for
(Ai , B̃ j ) for all i, j = 1, · · · , n based on AA in the following way:
(a) For match record pairs (Ai , B̃i ) for i = 1, ..., n, generate an agreement pattern ãsii
according to πãii |M in (8.1);
(b) For non-match record pairs (Ai , B̃ j ) for i, j = 1, ..., n and i 6= j, generate an
agreement pattern ãsij according to (8.2).
We propose a bootstrap method for constructing the CLE model:
1. Generate plausible comparison outcomes for ãi j according to (a) and (b) above for
all i, j = 1, · · · , n. Repeat this T times and denote the tth set of simulated agreement
outcome matrix by (A˜s )t .
2. For the t-th replicate, use the probabilistic linkage algorithm to link File A and
File B̃ according to (A˜s )t . Let the t-th linkage outcome be M s (t) (a permutation matrix),
where M s (t) = (m1 , m2 , · · · , mn )T . mi = (mi1 , mi2 , · · · , min ), mi j = 1 if Ai is linked to B̃ j ,
and 0 otherwise. Repeat for t = 1, .., T .
3. Estimate Q by

T M s (t)
∑t=1
.
T

We note that both the ELE and the CLE could be constructed using the bootstrap approach, i.e. for each record pair we simulate an agreement pattern based on the latent

CHAPTER 8. CONDITIONAL LINKAGE ERROR MODEL

120

Table 8.1: Values of linking fields on File A and File B.
Record
A1
A2
A3
B1
B2
B3

L1
1
1
2
1
2
2

L2
1
1
2
2
1
2

L3
1
2
2
2
1
2

model. The difference is that, for the CLE the agreement pattern is simulated by using
the conditional probabilities in Equation 8.2, whereas for the ELE the agreement pattern is simulated by using the unconditional probabilities in Equation 8.1. The simulated
agreement patterns are more plausible if the information of AA is taken into account. A
numerical example for comparing these two models are given in the next section.

8.4

Comparison between CLE, ELE and MEM

Simulations show that the CLE model is able to correct estimation bias for various regression models when covariates are a function of link fields, i.e. X = f (L). A full
mathematical proof will be sketched in future works. In this chapter, we will compare the
performance of the CLE model with the ELE model via simulations. We use both models to compute linear regression coefficient estimates, and we compare the relative bias
and Relative Mean Squared Errors (RMSEs) of the results. Moreover, we will also add
a Matching Error Model (MEM) proposed by Larhiri and Larsen (2005) for comparison.
The purpose is to show that using MEM is unable to correct estimation bias whereas using
LEM is able to correct estimation bias.

8.4.1

Numerical example

We compare the difference between ELE and CLE using a numerical example. Suppose
File A contains three records and File B contains three records. The true matches are
(A1 , B1 ), (A2 , B2 ) and (A3 , B3 ). Suppose there are three linking fields (L1 , L2 , L3 ) with 2
categories each. The linking fields’ values are shown in Table 8.1.
Suppose true parameters of the latent model are Ml = (0.9, 0.9, 0.8) and Ul =
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5), pl = Ul . Notice that the values of Ml are very high, meaning that it is
very likely that a true match pair agrees on all these linking fields. Using the probabilistic
linkage algorithm to link the data, the linkage outcome is (A1 , B2 ), (A2 , B1 ) and (A3 , B3 ).
That means, A1 and B2 are linked, A2 and B1 are linked, A3 and B3 are linked. Because
only (A3 , B3 ) is a correct link, therefore 1/3 of the records are correctly linked.
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Under the ELE model,qii =1/3 and off-diagonal elements are uniformly qi j = 1/3. This
means that A1 has the same probability of being linked to B2 and B3 . However, by observing Table 8.1, we see that A1 and A2 agree on more linking fields than A1 and A3 , therefore
it is more likely for (A1 , B2 ) to be linked than (A1 , B3 ). Under CLE, we could show that
q12 = 0.192 and q13 = 0.006, which is consistent with our argument. The QCLE matrix is
the Q matrix under the CLE model, which is obtained by following the bootstrap method
at the end of Section 8.3.2.
The two Q matrices under the two models are given below:


1/3

QELE = 1/3
1/3

0.802

QCLE = 0.192
0.006

8.4.2


1/3 1/3

1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3

0.192 0.006

0.780 0.028
0.028 0.966

Matching Error Model

In this subsection we review the Matching Error Model (MEM). The mechanisms of using
MEM and LEM for correcting estimation bias are similar. However, the definitions of the
two approaches are slightly different.
Using a MEM, an n × n matrix is constructed. We denote it as QMEM , which has the
following structure:

q11 q12

q21 q22
QMEM = 
..
 ..
.
 .
qn1 qn2


· · · q1n

· · · q2n 
. 
..
. .. 

· · · qnn

where qi j is the probability that (Ai , B j ) is a match.

8.4.3

Lahiri and Larsen (2005)’s MEM

To compute the probability of a record pair to be a true link, Lahiri and Larsen (2005)
proposed to use the following posterior probability:
qi j = P(M|aoij ) =

πP(aoij |M)
πP(aoij |M) + (1 − π)P(aoij |U)

,

(8.3)
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π is the probability that a random record pair is a match. However, normally for the MEM
matrix computed in this way, the sum of each row does not equal to 1. Under one-to-one
correspondence, for each record in File A there is a match in File B. Therefore, the sum of
each row of the MEM matrix should equal to 1. The authors suggest to standardize each
row (i.e. by dividing the entries by the row sum) to construct the final QMEM matrix.

8.4.4

Unbiased estimators using MEM

Lahiri and Larsen (2005) proposed the following unbiased estimator for a linear regression’s coefficients:
β̂ = (XdT QTMEM QMEM Xd )−1 XdT QTMEM z,
where Xd is the design matrix as in Section 8.2.2, z = (z1 , z2 , · · · , zn ). zi is the observed
value of the response variable from C j .
For logistic regression coefficients, Hof and Zwinderman (2012) proposed the following iterative method for getting unbiased estimates:
β̂ k+1 = β̂ k + (XdT QTMEM ΩQMEM Xd )−1 XdT QTMEM (z − p̂(z|Xd , QMEM , β k ))
p̂(z|Xd , QMEM , β̂ k ) = exp(QMEM Xd β̂ k )/(1 + exp(QMEM Xd β̂ k ))
Ω = diag( p̂(z|Xd , QMEM , β̂ k )(1 − p̂(z|Xd , QMEM , β̂ k ))),
where β̂ k stands for the estimate of β̂ obtained by iterating the above equation k times.
To find β̂ , let β̂ 0 be an initial estimate of β set by the data user. Then the data user could
update the estimate of β̂ by substituting β̂ 0 in the above equation to obtain β̂ 1 , and then
substitute β̂ 1 in the above equation to obtain β̂ 2 , etc. The final estimate of β̂ is obtained
if the difference between two consecutive estimates of β̂ is below a threshold level, e.g.
0.001.

8.4.5

Discussion on using MEM to correct estimation bias

Different MEMs have been proposed in the literature (see Rubin and Belin (1991), Lahiri
and Larsen (2005), Goldstein et al. (2012)). However, the problem with MEMs is that
these models generally do not correct estimation bias under one-to-one correspondence
scenario. It is noted in Goldstein et al.(2012), that it is an on-going research problem to
find a MEM which corrects estimation bias. Hof and Zwinderman (2012) proposed several methods to improve the accuracy of the LL’s MEM, however these methods generally
do not correct estimation bias either.
On the contrary, Chipperfield and Chambers (2015) showed that using the ELE model
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could correct estimation bias when link fields and covariates are independent. We will
show in the simulation that, the CLE model could correct estimation bias in a wider
context where covariates and link fields are not independent. Moreover, as an LEM incorporates the probabilistic linkage algorithm, it results in a lower mean squared error
than LL’s MEM for a regression coefficient in general. To see this, we still consider the
the numerical example in 8.4.1. The link fields of the two files to be link are given in
Table 8.1. There are 9 record pairs, three of them are matches, therefore the probability of a random record pair being a match is π = 1/3. Given that Ml = (0.9, 0.9, 0.8)
and Ul = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5), we could compute the probability of each record pair being a
match given the observed agreement pattern of the record pair using Equation (8.3). For
instance, the observed agreement pattern of (B1 ,C1 ) is (1, 0, 0). Then we have
q11 =

0.3 · 0.91 · 0.90 · 0.80
= 0.435
0.3 · 0.91 · 0.90 · 0.80 + (1 − 0.3) · 0.51 · 0.50 · 0.50

We repeat the above process and calculated the QMEM , which has the following form:


0.338 0.429 0.233


QLL = 0.396 0.312 0.292
0.329 0.259 0.412
We can compare QLL with QCLE . Attention needs to be paid at the diagonal elements of
the two matrices. As the matches are (Ai , Bi ), i = 1, 2, 3, we should see larger diagonal elements than off-diagonal elements, i.e. a match should have a higher probability of being
linked or a higher posterior probability of being a match given the observed agreement
pattern. We say that for QCLE , the diagonal elements are much larger, whereas it is not
true for QLL . The agreement pattern for record pair (B1 ,C3 ) is (0,0,0), which means that
it is very unlikely for this record pair to be a match. This fact is captured by the QCLE
model, with q13 = 0.006. However, we see that for QLL , the probability for this record
pair being a match is 0.233, which is still very high.
Chambers (2009) showed that, for the ELE model, there is an inverse relationship between the proportion of correct links and the relative standard errors of regression coefficient estimates. Our simulations showed that it is also true for the CLE model. That is,
we prefer the diagonal elements to be large so that the relative standard errors of regression coefficient estimates are reduced. For the MEM model, the diagonal elements are
normally not as large, probably because it does not consider the probability linkage algorithm. The probability linkage algorithm could effectively identify record pairs that are
non-matches, and assign 0 (or close to 0) probabilities to those record pairs in an LEM. It
is not true for LL’MEM. We found that LL’s method tends to assign a match record pair
with a lower probability in the MEM compared with the LEMs.
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Simulation

The simulation compares the performance of the CLE, ELE and LL’s MEM in terms of
estimating regression coefficient estimates. We compare them by setting up a hypothetical
one-to-one linkage scenario, which is introduced below.
Two linkage scenarios were simulated in this section. In both scenarios, block size was
10 records and only records within a block could be linked. Both File A and File B contain
5 linking fields. In File A the values for each linking field were assigned independently
with equal probability from the set of possible categories. The linking fields on File B,
say the l-th linking field of record Bi , denoted as FilB , was generated independently for
each i and l according to:
P(FilB = filA ) = r
and
P(FilB = any value other than filA ) =

1−r
;
Cl − 1

where filA is the observed value of the l-th linking field for Ai , Cl is the number of categories in the l-th linking field. r is a random realisation from U(2Ml − 1, 1). Under this
setting, we have Ul = 1/Cl and pl = 1/Cl .
In the first linkage scenario, (C1 ,C2 ,C3 ,C4 ,C5 ) = (5, 5, 4, 4, 4). It means that Ul =
(0.2, 0.2, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25). We set Ml = (0.8, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6). In the second linkage
scenario, (C1 ,C2 ,C3 ,C4 ,C5 ) = (7, 7, 7, 6, 6). It means that Ul = (1/7, 1/7, 1/7, 1/6, 1/6).
We set Ml = (0.8, 0.7, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5). In Scenario 1 and 2, 74% and 91% of the links were
matches. We assumed the true values Ml , Ul and pl are known.
The following process was repeated 500 times for each linkage scenario. On each
iteration 1000 records (100 blocks with 10 records each) were independently simulated
for File A and File B according to above settings. File A contains three explanatory
variables X1 , X2 and X3 . Denote Xi1 , Xi2 and Xi3 as the covariates for the i-th record in
File A. Let FilA be the underlying random variable for filA . The distributions of Xi1 , Xi2 and
Xi3 satisfy the following:
1. Xi1 ∼ U(80, 180) if Fi1A + Fi2A ≤ 6, otherwise Xi1 ∼ U(170, 300);
2. Xi2 ∼ U(10, 20);
3. Xi3 ∼ 0.5Fi2A .
Note that X1 and X3 are dependent of the first two linking fields in File A. File B
contains two response variables Y1 and Y2 , where Y1i = 30 + X1i + 2X2i + εi , εi ∼ N(0, 2);
Y2 = 1 if −4.5 + 2Xi3 + δi > 0 and 0 otherwise, where δi is logistic noise with mean 0 and
scale 1. Therefore the true parameters for linear regression coefficients were (β0 , β1 , β2 ) =
(30, 1, 2) and for logistic regression coefficients were (β3 , β4 ) = (−4, 2.5).
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The performance of LL’s MEM, ELE model and CLE model under the two linkage
scenarios are compared. For LL’s MEM, each row of the P matrix is standardised so that
the elements in each row sum up to 1. For the ELE model, the parameter λ were estimated
by the bootstrap method (Section 8.3.1) using 50000 iterations. We also computed the
naive results which were obtained by performing standard statistical analysis on the linked
data. The naive results were biased because of linkage errors.
After all 500 iterations were simulated, the absolute relative mean squared errors
(RMSE) and absolute relative biases were computed. The results of linkage scenario
1 is given in Table 8.2 and the results of linkage scenario 2 is given in Table 8.3.
Table 8.2: Results of linkage scenario 1

parameters
β0

β1

β2

β3

β4

model

RMSE

|Relative Bias|

naive

75.86

156.6%

LL

43.50

116.7%

ELE

3.047

19%

CLE

3.281

3.5%

naive

0.052

22.7%

LL

0.032

17.9%

ELE

0.002

3.4%

CLE

0.001

0.5%

naive

0.226

26.3%

LL

0.175

14.7%

ELE

0.080

0.3%

CLE

0.130

0.7%

naive

0.303

25.4%

LL

0.024

1%

ELE

0.066

6.2%

CLE

0.045

0%

naive

0.199

30.8%

LL

0.029

7.8%

ELE

0.039

7.3%

CLE

0.027

0.2%
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Table 8.3: Results of linkage scenario 2

parameters
β0

β1

β2

β3

β4

model

RMSE

|Relative Bias|

naive

12.48

61.7%

LL

26.664

92.3%

ELE

0.660

6.8%

CLE

1.220

0.2%

naive

0.006

7.8%

LL

0.014

11.8%

ELE

0.000

1%

CLE

0.000

0%

naive

0.050

9.1%

LL

0.077

12.3%

ELE

0.021

0%

CLE

0.038

0%

naive

0.104

14%

LL

0.028

4.2%

ELE

0.036

4.2%

CLE

0.028

0.3%

naive

0.049

14.5%

LL

0.017

6.2%

ELE

0.016

4.1%

CLE

0.012

0.1%

From the tables, we observe the following: 1. LL’s MEM leads to biased results for all
parameters; 2. The ELE model and CLE model lead to better results in terms of RMSE
and absolute relative bias than LL’s MEM in general. This shows that LEM models are
more efficient because they take the probability linkage algorithm into account; 3. While
the ELE model leads to biased results except for β2 , the CLE model leads to low biases
for all parameters in both linkage scenarios. The exception is β0 in linkage scenario 1,
where the absolute relative bias is around 3.5%. Our unreported simulations show that
our CLE model leads to estimates with increased bias when linkage quality is bad (say
less than 80% correct links). This issue will be investigated in the future. In conclusion,
the results suggest that the CLE model leads to better results than LL’s MEM and the ELE
model if explanatory variables and linking fields are not independent, and the CLE model
is able to correct the estimation bias in this situation.
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Conclusion

In this chapter we introduced a new linkage error model, namely the conditional linkage
error (CLE) model, under one-to-one correspondence. Estimates using the CLE model
have very low bias even when the covariates and linking fields are correlated- this is not
the case for the ELE. Simulation results showed that the CLE model outperformed the
ELE and that both LEM approaches (ELE and CLE) outperformed the MEM approach.

Chapter 9
Conclusion
This thesis presents our research achievements throughout the course of my Ph.D study.
We derived a few results on the aspect of data confidentiality. Specifically, we showed
several disclosure risks associated with using the noise-multiplication masking scheme
to protect data confidentiality. We proposed several measures to aid the process of noise
generating variable selection, so that a balanced utility-risk tradeoff could be achieved for
noise-multiplied data. We also developed a perturbation algorithm which could be used
for output perturbation in a query system. The perturbation algorithm is very effective
against the differencing attack. Other than the research developments on data confidentiality, our research also covers the area of analysing probabilistically-linked data. We developed a linkage error model which helps to correct estimation bias of probabilisticallylinked data. We showed that the linkage error model outperforms other models, and that
the linkage error model can deliver parameter estimates with very low bias while other
models fail to do so. The research outcomes outlined in the thesis might help to promote
future research on the noise-multiplication masking scheme and the development of more
powerful linkage error models.

128

Bibliography
[1] Abrahams, C, and Mahony, K. (2008) New Policy and Procedures Governing the
Release of Microdata Derived from ONS Social Surveys. 13th GSS Methodology
Conference, London, June 23rd.
[2] Agrawal, R. and Aggarwal, C. (2001) On the Design and Quantification of Privacy
Preserving Data Mining Algorithms. In Proceedings of the 20th Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, Santa Barbara, California, USA.
[3] Agrawal, R. and Srikant, R.(2000) Privacy Preserving Data Mining. In Proceedings
of the ACM SIGMOD, pp. 439-450.
[4] Bickel, P. J. and Ritov, Y. (2003) Nonparametric Estimators Which Can Be
“Plugged-in”. The Annals of Statistics, 31, No.4, 1033-1053.
[5] Blakemore, M. (2001) The Potential and Perils of Remote Access, in Confidentiality, Disclosure, and Data Access: Theory and Practical Applications for Statistical
Agencies, P. Doyle, J. Lane, L. Zayatz, and J. Theeuwes(eds.), Amsterdam: Elsevier
Science B. V., 315-340.
[6] Brand, R. (2002) Microdata Protection Through Noise Addition. In Inference Control in Statistical Databases, LNCS, 2316. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 61-74.
[7] Chambers, R. (2009) Regression Analysis of Probability-Linked Data. Statisphere
Official Statistics Research Series 4.
[8] Chambers, R., Chipperfield, J. O., Davis, W. and Kovacevic, M. (2009) Inference
Based on Estimating Equations and Probability-linked Data. Working paper 18-09,
Centre for Statistical and Survey Methodology, University of Wollongong.
[9] Chipperfield, J. O. and Chambers, R. L. (2015) Using the Bootstrap to Account for
Linkage Errors when Analysing Probabilistically Linked Categorical Data, Journal
of Official Statistic, 31(3), 397-414.
[10] Chipperfield, J., Newman, J., Thompson, G., Ma, Y., Lin, Y.X. (2019) Prospects for
Protecting Aggregate Business Microdata via a Remote Server. Journal of Official
Statistics (To appear 2019).
129

BIBLIOGRAPHY

130

[11] Chipperfield J. O. and O’Keefe C. M. (2014) Disclosure-protected Inference Using Generalised Linear Models. International Statistical Review, 82, 3, 371-391.
doi:10.1111/insr.12054.
[12] Christen,
P. and Churches,
T. (2005) A Probabilistic Deduplication,
Record Linkage and Geocoding System. Available at:
http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/
Peter.Christen/publications/arc-health-dm-2005paper.pdf.
[13] Decays D. and Nanopoulos P. (1993) Panels of Enterprises and Confidentiality: the
Small Aggregates Method. Proceedings of 92 Symposium on Design and Analysis
of Longitudinal Surveys, pp.195-204.
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